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ABSTRACT
In these times of economic volatility, much emphasis is 
placed on "good industrial relations" and increased 
productivity. These require a more rigorous understanding 
of work organisation, work processes, and industrial 
relations at the workplace. In this thesis two different 
steelmaking work areas at Port Kembla Steelworks are 
examined over the years 1967-87. The older open hearth 
steelmaking process ceased in 1982. The newer BOS process 
was begun in 1972. The focus of the thesis is the question: 
"To what extent, and in what ways do the specific 
characteristics of the workplace influence industrial 
relations processes?" A modified job regulation theoretical 
approach is used to argue that the structure of work 
organisation can be determined by the nature and historical 
traditions of the technology. These factors reflect and 
affect the nature of industrial relations at the workplace. 
Contextual factors such as the product market, the national 
economy and influences on management styles are also linked 
to the nature of the workplace, but this effect is diffused 
at the workplace. In the postwar years open hearth 
workplace relations were characterised by stability, and a 
reliance on traditional work organisation and work prac­
tices. By contrast for most of its first decade of 
production, workplace relations at the BOS were character­
ised by changing work organisation, and so unsettled 
industrial relations. One conclusion of the thesis is that 
when planning for stable output and industrial relations, 
greater account should be taken of workplace variations. 
Unions must continue to be involved in consultation over 
change, nationally and at the workplace.
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In recent years the investigation of industrial 
relations at the workplace has received increasing 
attention. In Australia, the focus on industrial 
relations processes have traditionally been well beyond 
the workplace. However new economic pressures have led to 
efforts by all the parties to industrial relations 
processes to develop new approaches to work organisation 
and industrial relations. The steel industry in Australia 
has been a prime example of how approaches to workplace 
industrial relations have changed in the 1980s in order to 
meet the demands of increased international competition in 
a changing domestic system. The new patterns of workplace 
industrial relations in the steel industry contrast 
markedly with those of the previous two decades.
The two workplaces at the Port Kembla steelworks chosen 
for study over two decades from 1967 demonstrate the ways 
in which the wider economic, political and social 
variables have affected management and union approaches to 
job regulation. The two case studies also demonstrate 
that differences that occur between workplaces in the same 
plant may also occur as a result of factors within each 
workplace. These include the nature and history of the 
technology that is in place, and the ways in which work 
processes and management activities interact with each
[ 1 ]
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other. In times when policy and analysis require a full 
and clear understanding of the ways in which the workplace 
operates, there is a need to redress the relative paucity 
of studies of workplaces in Australia. From the analysis 
of the links and interaction between the workplace and 
external factors in a steel plant, hypotheses can be drawn 
about the role of the workplace in other environments.
As is discussed further in Chapter 1, the term 
"workplace" is used to denote a unit of production or 
department often within a larger plant or establishment. 
The workplace is organisationally' defined by a hierarchy 
of managers, supervisors, and workers. From the 
technological perspective, the workplace is defined 
through the production processes which take place in a 
discrete area of production. Finally the orientations of 
workers and managers to the particular area define the 
social limits of a workplace. Such a definition need not 
be limited to manufacturing, The workplace can also be a 
department in a bank or a school within an education 
system. What is important is that the work area is 
discrete, has some technological or production unity which 
marks it off from other workplaces, and it is one which 
workers and managers recognise as such. A study of a 
workplace in its narrowest terms, therefore, is a study of 
the actions and behaviours of workers and managers within 
the structures set by the technology, organisation, and 
the social and rulemaking processes within a defined area 
of work. To leave it in its narrowest terms however would
[2]
[3]
be u/orthless, since workplaces are component units within 
a larger framework, including the plant or establishment 
in which they may be situated. The terms plant and 
establishment are used interchangeably throughout the 
thesis to mean a place which is at one site, and which 
produces a definable array of products and which is 
organisationally defined generally through a hierarchy of 
managers, technicians and workers. Beyond the plant or 
establishment may be the firm or enterprise which owns the 
plant.
The major aim of the thesis is to highlight the fact 
that each workplace has particular features which 
differentiate it from others. The most important 
differential factor is the technology in place, and it is 
this which will affect work relations most, albeit in
several ways which are not always obvious. The most
useful method of identifying the effects of the
differences in workplaces, and the ways in which the 
workplace reflects and reacts to changes outside the 
workplace, is the case study approach. Case studies 
should be more than just "small, rich tapestries", 
however. If they are to illuminate the role and function 
of the workplace in industrial relations, there needs to 
be an approach which gives the study coherence through a 
theoretical framework.
To this end the thesis follows the theoretical model 
proposed by Guille, as exemplified by Hagan in his history 
of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, (A.C.T.U.). In
[3]
[4]
this model the researcher takes a 'problematic', as Guille
calls it, which is "a single overriding question of such
magnitude that the others [asked in the study] are
subsidiary to it." Since the need for theoreticians and
policy-makers is for greater understanding of the role of 
the workplace in industrial relations, a major question of 
this kind needs to consider how the particular nature of 
workplaces may influence or be influenced by, higher 
levels of industrial relations. The thesis addresses 
these concerns by asking the question: "To what extent, 
and in what ways do the specific characteristics of 
workplaces influence industrial relations processes?" The 
question, when answered, illuminates the nature and role 
of the workplace in both empirical and theoretical terms. 
It also places workplace industrial relations squarely in 
the context of the environment beyond the workplace 
itself. This is essential, since workplace relations 
reflect not only the sum of “customs, norms and 
understandings" within the workplace but also the 
"expectations and statuses which workers and managers 
bring into the workplace" [P.Edwards, 1986: 59]. They 
also reflect the imperatives and actions from the plant, 
firm, region, industry, national and international which 
influence the workplace in many ways [Hill,1981: 141-51].
Such analysis of workplace industrial relations must 
also focus on specific workplaces. In Chapter 2 the need 
for specific case studies is shown to be central to the 
need for understanding workplace industrial relations.
[4]
[5]
Many writers take the workplace to be all the points of 
production or the entire shopfloor at a plant. [Kriegler, 
1980; Beynon, 1973] While the generalised shopfloor 
approach may elicit the nature of industrial relations on 
the shopfloor in broad terms, it may also offer only an 
indeterminate picture of workplace industrial relations. 
Thus, closer focus on the workplaces themselves is needed 
to identify exactly what it is that influences industrial 
relations processes. As a consequence industrial 
relations at a workplace within the plant or enterprise 
will reflect not only the industrial relations variables 
from the wider context, but also the specific factors 
which shape the workplace. It is the technology and other 
workplace characteristics that the workers and managers 
are faced with each day, and the way in which social 
relations of production are organised, which also 
influence workplace industrial relations. [Hill, 
1974:213ff; Edwards and Scullion, 1982:277-88]
Herding [1968:15] has noted, for example that "the 
devices of job control are closely related to the peculiar 
institutional and physical conditions induced by its 
technology". The steel industry is a germane example of 
this need to consider history and nature of the technology 
at different workplaces and their consequences for 
industrial relations. Not only do ironmaking and 
steelmaking have a long history deeply steeped in job 
traditions, but also equipment and plant for steel 
industry processes are highly expensive relative to other
[5]
[6]
forms of manufacturing. The life cycle of the capital 
equipment is concomitantly longer than in many other 
processes. At any point in time in an integrated 
steelworks old and new equipment for the various processes 
will be in production.
The steel industry in Australia is, with reason, 
considered a very significant industry in economic and 
employment terms, as is discussed more thoroughly in 
Chapter 2. At the beginning of the period under study in 
this thesis, 1967, over six million tons of steel were 
being produced in Australia annually, almost sixty per 
cent of which was produced at the Port Kembla steelworks. 
The value of the total Australian steel output in 1967-8 
was $875 million, which was greater than the value of 
gross wool production for that year. [Stewardson and 
Davidson, 1973; Commonwealth Bureau Of Census and 
Statistics, Value of Primary Production (Excluding 
Mining), Australia, 1970-1. Cat.No. 10.25, 1971] Over 
forty thousand workers were employed in steel production 
in 1967, half of them at Port Kembla. fBHP Annua 1 
Reports; Hoskins-Kembla Works, n.d. (1968?); Johnston and 
Rutnam, 1981; Duncan, 1969.] The Port Kembla steelworks, 
as with other Australian steelworks, was extremely 
important to the region in which it was situated. By 
1980-1 the Port Kembla steelworks accounted, directly and 
indirectly, for 71.6 per cent of employment in the 
Illawarra region, with 27.6 per cent of all workers (a 
total of about 22000 including 2900 employees at the
[6]
[7]
collieries), directly employed by Australian Iron and 
Steel (AI&S). [BHP to IAC, 1982] This company was a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the Broken Hill Proprietary 
Limited, (BHP), the monopoly producer of steel in 
Australia. Given the size and significance of the steel 
industry in Australia, it is perhaps surprising that it 
has only rarely been studied from an industrial relations 
perspective.
Steel plants themselves are too complex as such, to 
examine for workplace industrial relations because of the 
heterogeneity of technology and work organisation within 
any steel plant. Port Kembla steelworks, for example, 
makes sinter from iron ore, puts coal through several 
operations before it is finally turned to coke, burns its 
own lime, produces much of its energy requirements, and 
makes its own oxygen, as well as converting iron to steel, 
which is then rolled, treated and shaped in a number of 
mills within the plant. [Brinson, 1978; The Port Kembla 
Steelworks, n.d. (1980?).] Because of technological 
invisibilities in examining the plant more broadly, it was 
necessary therefore to choose an area where there was a 
degree of specialisation.
In this thesis, two forms of large scale steelmaking
have provided the focus for analysis. The older form,
open hearth steelmaking, had been the dominant method
throughout the world until the 1960s. The two open hearth 
shops at Port Kembla were closed in 1977 and December 1982 
respectively. These shops, are the workplace sites chosen
[7]
[8]
here as representing the old technology. At each open 
hearth shop there were around half a dozen furnaces 
capable of producing steel at any one time. The more 
modern form of steel production, basic oxygen steelmaking, 
(BOS), began at Port Kembla in 1972 and was the only form 
of steelmaking at Port Kembla by the late 1980s. While 
the process of converting iron into steel was basically 
similar in the two methods, there are considerable 
differences in the equipment, employment levels, skill 
mix, pace and accuracy of production. Examination and 
analysis of these offer specific examples of the ways in 
which company, plant, union and workplace imperatives 
interact with each other. This case study approach thus 
overcomes the problem of vagueness and indeterminacy which 
may be the outcome of a more generalised study of 
shopfloor industrial relations.
The workplace is not an island, remote from other 
influences. It has its own "distinct sphere of 
influence" , but it is subject also to a myriad of 
influences which come from higher levels of industrial, 
relations and the wider social economic and political 
context. These factors interact with each other and with 
the workplace. As the thesis demonstrates workplace 
industrial relations in the steelmaking areas at Port 
Kembla in the years 1967-1987 were affected by an array of 
external conditions and events. These external phenomena 
had some differing effects on the two workplaces studied. 
Therefore it is necessary to identify these contextual
[8]
[9]
influences and the ways in vi-hich they contributed to the 
behaviour of workers and managers at the workplace. In 
this introductory chapter it is only necessary to identify 
the factors outside the workplace which influence or 
interact with processes or structures at the point of 
production.
As Chapter 2 describes, the international economic 
environment for steel altered markedly over the two 
decades from 1967. At the beginning of the period world 
steel demand still exceeded capacity, although the gap was 
closing fast. [See Appendix 1. Wilshire et al, 1983; 
OECD, 1985a; Davidson and Stewardson, 1973] Competition 
from other materials such as plastics and aluminium, and 
the successful entry of new producers such as Japan, Korea 
and Brazil had considerable effect on the tightening of 
the market. [OECD, 1985a:16] The Australian steel 
industry was cushioned by the ready availability of 
resources, a strong domestic demand and some protection. 
The availability of resources, such as iron ore and fossil 
energy sources, meant that Australian steel was extremely 
cheap to produce by world standards. During the 1970s, 
excess capacity was often exported. [ See Appendix 3;
Donaldson, 1982; McLennan, 1973; BHP Annua1 Reports;
Stewardson, 1973] As is discussed in Chapter 3, the
availability of markets for Australian steel and the
expectation of a "resources boom” also meant that BHP did 
not feel the need to rationalise production or upgrade 
technology to the degree required in the much older
[9]
[10]
European steel industries in the 1970s. [Kassalow, 1984; 
OECD, 1985b; Goldberg, 1986: 12-32.] In the early 1980s 
the world economy slumped. [See Appendix 1] In Australia, 
this deterioration led to an unexpected and severe 
domestic recession u/hen the anticipated resources boom 
failed. [See Appendix 2]
At that time the situation in the Australian steel 
industry also reached crisis proportions. [Kelly, 1988] 
Chapter 2 describes more fully the rapid reduction in 
productive capacity and the u/orkforce which took place, 
with overwhelming effects on workers' morale and the steel 
region economies of Kwinana, Whyalla, Newcastle and 
Wollongong. The reconstruction process which followed was 
an outcome of the Steel Industry Plan, a tripartite rescue 
operation which centred on major new investment in 
equipment, reduced employment levels, and closer 
communication between the employer and unions. From an 
industrial relations perspective the Steel Industry Plan 
provided formal structures for closer consultation between 
the employer and the trade unions. These stood in marked 
contrast to the confrontationism and mutual suspicion 
which pervaded plant level industrial relations at Port 
Kembla in the 1970s.
Many of the formal structural procedures of the Steel 
Industry Plan had however been introduced prior to the 
beginning of the plan, particularly at Port Kembla. As is 
shown in Chapter 2 industrial relations at the latter 
plant had been especially conflictual in the 1970s, with
[10]
[11]
labour relations fitting Fox's model of low trust 
relations. [Fox, 1974] The parent company had a long 
tradition of anti-union approaches, and described itself 
as "a hard company to deal with". [BHP Review, 1978; See 
also Quinlan, 1986] Company policies may have been 
tempered at Port Kembla, which was not originally owned by 
BHP. Rather Port Kembla's original owners were the Hoskins 
family and a group of English companies. In 1935, BHP 
took controlling interest of the Australian Iron and Steel 
(AI&S) company. [McLennan, 1974; Sheridan, 1981; Hughes, 
1964: 113-6; Trengove, 1973; Blainey, 1971; Fagan, 1984] 
From that time BHP sought to implement standardised 
strategies in its steel plants. Management's industrial 
relations strategies at Port Kembla in the 1960s and 1970s 
primarily reflected the BHP approach of having little 
truck with unions. Workers were penalised for involvement 
in industrial activity, by such means as the withdrawal of 
overtime for workers in areas where industrial action had 
recently taken place.
Centralised administration of recruiting and maintenance 
of records on all employees at Port Kembla also allowed 
the company to identify "troublesome" employees. Until 
well into the 1970s, dismissals, suspensions and recording 
of perceived misdemeanours were all functions which could 
be undertaken by foremen. Many of these were former 
"wages" workers who had risen to the ranks of "staff". 
These two categories of employees are the simplest 
classifications in what is a complex hierarchical
[11]
[12]
structure at the plant.
"Wages" workers are those who are paid under the steel 
award. They include the tradesmen, their assistants and 
plant production workers. Written into their award have 
been clauses which allow them to be laid off, if surplus 
to the company's needs, or disciplined through suspension 
for infractions of company rules. Their shifts and 
rosters could be changed according production needs. 
Their pay is determined in the public forum of the 
tribunal, and they'are required to clock on and off.
By contrast "staff" include most employees in offices, 
technical employees, supervisors, and managers. They have 
usually had much greater security of employment (except in 
the major downturn in the industry in 1981-3), and have 
not been required to clock on and off since the early 
1970s, although until then, this was required of the lower 
level "fortnightly" staff. "Staff" pay is individually 
determined and there are separate eating areas available 
to them. Beyond "fortnightly staff" is the category of 
"monthly staff", the managers and senior technicians and 
engineers who had access to further fringe benefits. It 
was generally expected of most "staff" that they would not 
belong to unions, and that they would willingly operate 
equipment during strikes.
Of the dozen or so unions represented at Port Kembla, 
the most important were the Federated Ironworkers' 
Association (FIA) and the Amalgamated Metal Workers' Union 
(AMWU). Other important or active unions at the plant
[12]
[ 13]
u/ere the Building Workers' Industrial Union (BWIU) and the 
Electrical Trades' Union (ETU). The FIA covered over 
three-quarters of the "wages" workers at the plant, most 
of whom were production workers and tradesmen's assistants 
with no formal or recognised post-school qualifications. 
The AMWU was an amalgamation of the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union (AEU), the Blacksmiths' and 
Boilermakers' Society(BBS), the Federated Moulders' Union 
(FMU) and several other small craft unions which 
amalgamated with the AEU in the early 1970s. Prior to 
this time they had acted in close concert with each other. 
Utilising the traditional bargaining leverage of craft 
unions, they were more active in working to attain job 
controls than the FIA.
Until the 1970s the FIA was controlled at Port Kembla by 
a national leadership committed to a conciliatory approach 
to industrial relations, as has been well documented. 
[Dickenson, 1980; Murray and White, 1982; Quinlan, 1986; 
Cragg, 1983] The election of a locally-based leadership in 
1970, however led to a quite different approach to 
industrial relations. As Chapter 2 describes the 
locally-based "Rank and File" team was committed to 
decentralised union organisation with an emphasis on 
actively confronting workplace problems. After the 
election of the new local leadership, the links between 
all the unions at Port Kembla strengthened. [Quinlan,
1986] Union conciousness increased as workers used their 




Not only were the difficulties for migrant workers 
addressed more effectively through multi-lingual 
publications, but issues such as occupational health and 
safety were placed on the union agenda. The willingness 
of all unions to act in a concerted and militant fashion 
throughout the region in the 1970s, in the face of 
traditional management anti-union attitudes, led to highly 
aggressive industrial relations at the steelworks.
The increasing number of strikes and bans was countered 
by tactics such as the frequent use of stand-downs, and 
other sanctions. Union officials and company officers 
alike, recall a pattern of deep suspicion and mutual 
hostility. Indeed the confrontationism which
characterised plant level relations continued almost 
unabated until the steel crisis of 1981-3.
A marked change in labour relations can be seen from
about this time, as unions and workers sought to deal with
the massive workforce reductions. Company management came
to realise that in the new economic environment for steel,
reliance on the smaller workforce required a better
approach to workers. Burawoy [1985: 148-51] identifies
the kinds of changes which occurred in management
approaches to industrial relations during and after the
steel crisis as "hegemonic despotism" which Edwards
summarises as a consequence of
Increasing competition [which] has forced firms 
. . . into a more despotic form wherein workers 
have to accept effort intensification in order 
to keep their jobs. The new despotism differs
[14]
[15]
from the despotism of competitive capitalism 
because it is no longer based on arbitrary 
managerial authority and the threat of the 
sack. Instead it is a fear of plant closure 
that binds workers collectively to their firms. 
[Edwards, 1986: 222-3]
If the very significant drop in strikes at Port Kembla 
from the beginning of 1983, described in Chapter 2, is any
guide, the collective response of workers and unions, to 
workforce reductions and speculation over plant
closure, was one of apparent commitment to the goals of 
BHP. However the upturn in the world steel industry, and 
the improved trading position of BHP as a consequence of 
the floating of the Australian dollar, as well as the 
early successes of the Steel Industry Plan, removed the 
fear of plant closure by 1985. [SIA, Review 1988] 
Nevertheless, the impact of the 1981-3 retrenchments on 
workers at Port Kembla should not be minimised. On the 
other hand management had begun to change tactics even 
before the major effects of the crisis had been felt. 
[Kelly, 1988] The implementation of the reductions in the 
workforce and production capacity was undertaken by John 
Clarke, whose appointment as General Manager in 1982 led 
to adoption of a human relations management approach in 
most areas of the plant. [Schultz, 1984] By the end of 
the 1980s the steel unions were consulted more frequently 
over a range of issues, many of which management had 
previously insisted were unquestionably managerial
prerogative. These included the introduction of




However, it is important to consider the differences 
between the plant and the workplace. The industrial 
relations of a plant or establishment is the sum of 
industrial relations at all of the workplaces within that 
plant or establishment. This does not necessarily mean 
that each workplace is an average representation of the 
plant. In some, unionists are more militant than in 
others, in some, supervisors have a more "insensitive and 
intransigent attitude" [SIA, Review, 1988: 76] than
others. This is apparent in the strike levels of the two 
workplaces studied in this thesis. The significant 
differences between the two indicate the value of analysis 
which concentrates on specific workplaces. At the older 
open hearth shops strike levels were low during the latter 
1960s, as they were in the rest of the plant. With the
exception of 1971, strike levels remained low and even 
decreased during the 1970s, despite an overall increase 
across the plant. By contrast, dispute levels at the BOS 
were very high from the second year of operation. These 
levels remained much higher than the plant average until 
well into the 1980s. [Company strike data; See Graph 1, 
Chapter 3 and Appendix 4] Since the two sorts of 
workplaces were subject to the same company and plant 
management structures and tactics, as well as producing 
the same goods, steel, the reasons for this disparity must 
be found in the nature of the workplaces. These are 
explored in Chapter 3 (Open Hearth) and Chapter 4 (BOS).
In Chapter 3, the aim is to explain the links between
[16]
[17]
the the historical traditions of the outdated technology 
and the function of management emphasis on workplace 
identification. The role of the internal labour market, 
in enhancing workers' identification with their workplace, 
is given considerable weight. Work processes in this very 
demanding work environment also affected the nature of 
workplace relations. The open hearths were little changed 
from their original nineteenth century design, except for 
incremental changes, such as oxygen injection during the 
conversion process which had been introduced early in the 
1960s. For the workers in the late 1960s and 1970s, the 
intense heat, heavy manual work, and omnipresent graphite 
dust in the open hearth atmosphere, would have been little 
different to that experienced by earlier generations of 
steel production and maintenance workers. There was also 
little difference in either the tasks of workers in 
particular jobs or in many of the customs and practices 
which defined work content and allocation of tasks. In 
the thesis most attention is given to the production 
workers, those skilled and unskilled employees who had no 
trade training or other portable qualifications. This is 
not only because of their numerical dominance. Their 
experience, of changing patterns of work and work 
organisation in the two steel making workplaces, also 
illuminates the importance of analysis of the workplace.
In, interviews, former open hearth workers expressed 
pride in the kinds of cooperative work patterns present in 
the open hearth. Both the cooperative patterns and the
[17]
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pride in their existence in turn fostered the strong 
feelings of identification with open hearth production and 
the shops themselves. These feelings were strengthened 
for many workers by the working of a strong internal 
labour market which offered workers movement from 
unskilled labouring work through a series of steps to the 
highest "wages" classification and beyond to the "staff" 
level of foreman. Workers in the higher margins of the 
"wages" classifications were able to exercise a fair 
degree of individual decision making over their work 
processes. Indeed the "rule of thumb" nature of open 
hearth steelmaking relied on the skills of these most 
experienced workers whose ability to "read" the metal was 
widely admired by co-workers. In these kinds of ways the 
internal labour market enhanced workplace identification.
These open hearth traditional customs and defined job 
areas were generally accepted by the foremen. Many of 
them had moved to this supervisory position from the 
"wages" levels. However, the power which accrued to the 
foremen was not simply from their experience at the 
workplace. Traditionally at steel plants in Australia, 
foremen had significant disciplinary powers, until well 
into the 1970s. Open hearth management above foreman 
level also identified with the stable, familiar 
technology. Since most of them had risen to their 
management positions as engineers, their interest was in 
the technology and the nature of the production process 
itself. They had become managers as a consequence of
[ 18 ]
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their technical qualifications and experience as engineers 
rather than from any professed skill or training in 
management.
It is also evident from some high labour turnover data 
available for some years, that not all u/orkers at the open 
hearth identified with the technology and goals of the 
workplace. [Company data] Rather, this identification was 
largely confined to those workers who chose to gain 
workplace specific skills as they moved up the job 
classification hierarchy, even after the margins for 
highly skilled work in steelmaking relative to lower 
skilled work became compressed during the wages explosion 
of 1973-4. [See Steel Works Employees (Broken Hill 
Proprietary Company Limited) Award and Steel Works 
Employees (AI&S P/L) Award, 1964 - 1982, NSWIC) Those who 
received the highest margins were responsible for the 
melting or tapping of steel or drove the cranes carrying 
molten metal. These were part of the "stable core" of the 
open hearth workforce. Beyond this core was a periphery 
of labourers and perhaps those on lower skill margins, 
poorly organised through the lack of a common language and 
a relatively high turnover. Of themselves, these offer 
good reason to explain the mildness of open hearth 
relations.
By contrast in Chapter 4, an examination of the BOS 
presents a different set of reasons for the high level of 
strikes and notified disputes. Since this workplace 
contained many former open hearth production workers, the
[19]
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reasons for strike levels, which were generally very much 
higher than the proportionate plant strike levels, again 
originated from the specific characteristics of the 
particular workplace. For example in the BOS the greater 
pace and intensity of work, also offered greater 
bargaining leverage for ironworkers. This came about 
through the requirement on workers for close coordination 
in tasks which led to greater management dependence on the 
workforce operating as a team. The pace and intensity of 
work, together with the enforced coordination at the BOS, 
were derived from the capacity of this newer steelmaking 
technology to produce steel more exactly and more quickly. 
Not only did the newer steelmaking technology make greater 
demands on the workers, but also the new technology was 
capable of taking a wide range of incremental 
technological changes. These changes were introduced by 
management with little reference to the workers at the 
plant.
As a consequence, workplace relations were highly 
unsettled almost from the first. The early deterioration 
of workplace industrial relations was also hastened by the 
continuation of the authoritarian style of management and 
supervisors, despite the apparent commitment to teamwork 
rather than coercion. Matters were perhaps also 
exacerbated by the foreshortening of the internal labour 
market, together with the centralisation of control via 
the control room and a pervading public address system. 
Workers could no longer move through to foreman level,
[20]
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because only foremen with post school technical 
qualifications were employed at the BOS. Another 
significant factor in the unsettled or aggressive patterns 
of industrial relations at the BOS was the absence of 
customs or practices which might mitigate the more 
demanding aspects of work. Some of these aspects of work 
organisation included the closer control over work 
processes, the destabilising effect of incremental 
technological changes, reduced opportunities for 
advancement and job security, and the greater pace and 
continuity of work.
By the beginning of the 1980s, the world steel crisis 
began to have effects on the Australian steel industry. 
At Port Kembla it was becoming apparent that despite their 
remarkably good industrial relations and production 
records, the open hearths were becoming economically 
non-viable. The BOS was now- the only large scale steel 
production unit at the plant. In the competitive steel 
market, where customer specifications were increasingly 
exact, the old forms of management were no longer 
appropriate. At the steelworks a variety of new 
strategies of management were implemented by managers and 
foremen, many of whom had received intensive training in 
the new management styles. The impact of the retrenchment 
shocks on workers and union efforts to facilitate labour 
relations enhanced the effectiveness of this new approach. 
A new emphasis on multi-skilling of workers by the last 
years of the 1980s offered an updated version of the
[21]
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internal labour market for the BOS workers. In this new 
environment they were encouraged to develop new skills or 
gain post—school qualifications so that they were
...fit for a variety of labours, ready to face
any change of production...[Marx, 1974: 458]
For all these reasons the BOS in the latter half of the 
1980s had become as notable for its peaceful industrial 
relations as it had been notable for its high dispute 
levels from the 1970s.
An examination of shopfloor relations across the plant 
may have identified some of these kinds of workplace 
influences on industrial relations processes. However 
they would not have been seen in the context of the 
particular technology, historical features of the
workplace or work organisation which were peculiar to the 
two steelmaking workplaces which have been studied. These 
particular characteristics were inextricably linked with 
each other to create particular patterns of industrial 
relations. The changing product market for steel was
reflected in the changing style and priorities of plant 
management, which recognised that in the new economic 
environment, old confrontationist approaches which 
resulted in high levels of disputes were no longer 
feasible. Central to developing new approaches to 
workplace industrial relations therefore lies an 
understanding of the specific characteristics of the 
workplace
This kind of analysis is not simply limited to the steel 
industry. Recognition that workplace technology,
[22]
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management behaviour, work organisation, and workplace 
industrial relations are inextricably interwoven is 
capable of much greater generalisation. Such analysis can 
be widened to include other industries - not only large 
scale metal processing but also for example the public 
transport industries. This sort of industry is similar to 
the steel industry in that there are a wide variety of 
workplaces requiring different skills and skill mixes. An 
examination of the workplaces offers insights into the 
ways in which industrial relations at the higher levels 
can be illuminated. Managements have discovered the 
values to output of closer focus on particular work areas. 
Unions too must revert to focussing also on particular 
workplaces so that they can plan and respond to the 
changing environment to the benefit of their workers and 
the union movement as a whole.
Thus the thesis aims to highlight the value of the ways 
in which a close focus on the particular characteristics 
of the workplace may expand the knowledge of industrial 
relations for policymakers and analysts alike. Before 
this though, the theoretical basis of the inquiry must be 
expanded upon. This is addressed in Chapter 1 which 
reviews the literature on workplace industrial relations 
and the steel industry, and identifies the research 
methodology most useful for clarifying the special aspects 
of the workplaces studied. The chapter also considers the 
approaches that are needed in order to answer the 
problematic which is the framework of the thesis - "To
[23]
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what extent, and in what ways, do the specific
characteristics of the workplace influence industrial
relations processes?". To respond adequately to this kind
of question, it is necessary to go beyond the merely
descriptive account of the nature of the workplace and
elaborate a theoretical framework through which the needs
of the 'problematic' are met. For as Popper argued
...all observation involves interpretation in 
the light of our theoretical knowledge .. . pure 
observational knowledge, unadulterated by 
theory would, if at all possible, be utterly 
barren and futile. [Popper, Conjectures and 
Refutations, 3rd ed., London 1969: 22]
[24]
CHAPTER 1
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF WORKPLACE INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY
Introduction
The study of the workplace has received considerable 
attention from theoreticians and policy makers in the last 
decade or so. Increasingly intense competition for 
fluctuating markets, with concomitant concern for raising 
productivity, has resulted in wide-ranging discussion 
about workplace organisation and labour flexibility as 
crucial variables for meeting the new economic 
uncertainty. [Nichols, 1989; Frenkel, 1989; Clarke, 1989; 
Lash and Urry, 1987] New national strategies may tend 
towards corporatism as in Sweden or Australia [Markey, 
1987; Higgins et al, 1987; Streeck, 1986] or deregulatory
and decentralising as in Britain and the United States. 
[Nichols, 1989; Donn, 1989] Whatever the wider trend, it 
is still the workplace which writers have given prominence 
as a means of re-establishing a more stable economic 
environment. There is a need, therefore to gain a clearer 
understanding of this micro unit of production without 
losing sight of more macro elements. Given the new high 
level of interest in the workplace, this thesis is timely. 
In focussing on specific workplaces, it analyses the ways 
in which the broader economic and political environments, 
the nature and history of workplace technology and work 
organisation, and management and union strategies interact
[25]
u/ith each other.
The thesis aims to explore the ways the analysis of the 
workplace can expand understanding of industrial relations 
at higher levels. In doing so it examines industrial 
relations in the two steelmaking workplaces over two 
decades beginning in the late 1960s. The events and 
changes within the workplaces are firmly placed in the 
context in which these occur. There is a potential danger 
when examining lower level industrial relations to focus 
exclusively on the area under study. To do this is to 
ignore the interaction that occurs between different parts 
of a plant or establishment, or the effects of changes 
well beyond the workplace and the plant. As is shown in 
this thesis, workplace industrial relations will be 
affected by changes in the product markets or national 
economic or social policy.
A narrow case study of a workplace which takes little 
account of events beyond the workplace may result in a 
"small rich, tapestry" [Lerner et al, 1976] but one which 
is simply interesting and narrative rather than expanding 
the sum of understanding of industrial relations. As this 
literature review demonstrates, there is also a readily 
apparent danger, evident in some workplace studies in 
Australia, of skimming over the workplace and giving 
attention instead to the context for workplace industrial 
relations processes or the accommodation structures for 
example. [Frenkel, 1978] This is useful in its own right 
but may ignore the specific environments which workers and
[26]
managers experience daily. To avoid these kinds of 
problems it is necessary to take a theoretical framework 
which provides for a coherent investigation which expands 
our understanding of the workplace as an integral part of 
the larger plant, industry and society.
Theoretical approaches
Guille proposes that
the test of any theoretic account of 
practice is shown to be the extent to 
which it aids in understanding the 
practice.
This thesis attempts to do this by examining and analysing 
the practice of industrial relations at the workplace and 
the ways in which it interacts with industrial relations 
at other levels. In doing so the thesis takes as its 
organising principle a paramount question which asks the 
extent to which the specific characteristics at a 
workplace influences industrial relations processes. The 
use of this kind of paramount question, overcomes the 
potential dangers of either exclusive focus, or lack of 
focus on the workplace described above. It also overcomes 
the kinds of weaknesses of theory in Australian industrial 
relations such as those delineated by Blain and Plowman 
[1988], Dabscheck [1985; 1989] and Guille [1983]. Use of 
a paramount question does this by giving the inquiry 
theoretical coherence and providing “some criteria for 
asking questions and selecting facts which are relevant to
[ 2 7 ]
answering them”. [Hagan, 1983: v] This is essential but 
on its own may still not be sufficient.
The questions which are subsumed within the paramount 
question will still depend to some degree on the stance 
taken by the investigator. The deregulatory, 
individualist, perspective of Blandy, [1988], for example 
will lead to a different set of questions from those asked 
by Plowman the institutionalist [1988; 1983] or a 
theoretician of labour process school such as Littler. 
[1982; 1988] On the other hand the insights from different 
schools of thought can provide indications of useful areas 
of inquiry. One method is to take a specific stance from 
which to follow the line of questioning which flows from 
the broad question, but to draw on the many industrial 
relations theoretical approaches which might be useful in 
particular areas.
In this thesis, the major approach is a modified version 
of the 'job regulation' approach of Kerr et al, 
[1960],Fox, [1966], Flanders, [1975: 83-99ff], Dunlop 
[1965] Dufty, [1975; 1979] and Clegg [1979: 449-56]. 
These writers draw on the belief that industrial relations 
is the study of rulemaking or the study of the 
institutions of job regulation. Here job regulation is 
taken to mean the making of rules over the rights and 
responsibilities of work organisation by the parties in 
industrial relations. In this pluralist framework, the 
above writers contend that industrial relations processes 
are those which take place among the institutions in the
[28]
industrial relations systems. These institutions or
parties, are often taken to mean defined collectivities,
such as trade unions. Clegg [1979: 450] argues that the
job regulation theorists do not exclude the informal
relations or processes and cites Flanders' [1964] study of
the Fawley productivity agreements which he says were "
very largely the study of informal organization in
workplace industrial relations1'. Flanders [1975: 8 6] on
the other hand is quite explicit in excluding rulemaking
outside the formal processes when he asserts that
industrial relations,
...deals with certain regulated or 
institutionalised relationships in 
industry. ...unstructured relationships 
have their importance for management and 
workers but they lie outside the scope of 
a system of industrial relations.. 
[Flanders, 1970: 8 6]
Brown [1972] attempted to remedy this exclusion when he 
clearly demonstrated that workplace rulemaking such as 
custom and practice was a central feature of workplace 
industrial relations. Therefore, he argued, it was a 
valid process of job regulation. However Brown [1972: 
46-8] also demonstrated the requirement in a job 
regulation approach, to utilise only those elements of 
custom and practice which had achieved managerial 
legitimacy. This still ignores an essential element of 
workplace behaviour, even if the difficult concept of 
"managerial legitimacy" is agreed upon (which management? 
which level of management?). It still ignores much of 
what Krieger [1984: 49] cites as "the unseen structure" 
and action of the workplace.
[29]
The role of the formal institutions has received 
considerable emphasis in Australian industrial relations. 
These parties have been major actors in the most readily 
recognised processes of rule-making, conciliation and 
arbitration. Research has tended to follow the formal 
practice. At first glance then, the job regulation 
approach has only limited value in searching out the 
effects of specific characteristics of the workplace on 
processes. There appears no setting for examining 
specific workplaces if the institutions of rulemaking are 
the central elements. To exclude particular 
characteristics or patterns of behaviour because they have 
no institutional basis is to ignore much of the behaviour 
of workers and managers. Yet such behaviour is clearly 
part of the process of attempting to regulate the 
employment relationship. This is particularly true in the 
steel industry, where work relations at the shopfloor have 
been bound up in other less institutionalised strategies. 
A difficulty with the traditional job regulation approach, 
despite Clegg's [1979: 450-2] disavowal, is that its focus 
is on the institutional and formal processes. For these 
kinds of reasons a traditional institutional approach, as 
exemplified by the work of writers such as Flanders and 
Dunlop, needs to be modified for this thesis which takes 
the workplace as a focus.
On the other hand the implication that industrial 
relations is about the regulation of jobs acknowledges 
that ultimately work relations take place at the point of
[30]
production. The job regulation approach is thus a 
potentially useful basis for analysis. What is needed is 
to adapt the approach to suit workplace analysis as 
Krieger [1984] has done. He developed a framework for his 
study of English miners' responses to the U.K. National 
Power Loading Agreement of 1966. He focussed on the 
attempts of these workers to use historical and social 
relations to reduce the effect of measured daywork as a 
means of pay determination. To do this Krieger took a 
modified job regulation approach but with workers and 
their workplaces as the focal point of study.
Labour, from Krieger's perspective, is perceived as "a 
form of complex social interaction * so that rulemaking not 
only generates specific work performances", but will also 
"express and extend definite social relations" [Krieger, 
1984. p.51] Using this approach, Krieger overcomes the 
static nature which is an expressed criticism of the job 
regulation approach. [Dabscheck and Niland, 1981: 27] He 
does this by assuming that the dynamic of workplace 
rulemaking and the ways in which rules (action) are 
generated will affect job performance and relations 
between workers and management (structure). [Krieger, 
1984: 47, 57-60]
It is not possible to fully utilise Krieger's model for 
two main reasons. First his aim was to analyse the 
response of Durham/ Nottingham miners to a state 
initiative on wage structures. In this he gave much 
closer attention to the role and strategies of the state
[31]
bureaucracy, incorporating aspects of Weberian 
interpretation - much more than is needed for this study 
despite the significant role of the state in the 
Australian steel industry. Moreover his focus was on the 
state's attempts to standardise wage structures and 
introduce measured daywork. As a consequence, the 
generative rules which Krieger's miners developed are 
based on output and wages. These are less appropriate to 
this study of steelmaking workplaces, since the system of 
wage determination in the steel industry changed little 
from the perspective of the workplace between 1967 and 
1987, with almost none of the incentive pay elements which 
were central to Krieger's study.
Nevertheless Krieger's modified job regulation approach
offers questions to be asked of the workplace not found in
the traditional job regulation framework. Thus
what is at issue [is] ...what are workers 
actually doing? How' do they coordinate 
their work tasks? What guides their 
response to management initiative? 
[Krieger, 1984: 51]
Krieger asks these questions in light of the different 
historical social traditions of each mine, and the 
geological and technological resources and constraints at 
each. For two steel workplaces the questions can be the 
same but within different technological and historical 
frameworks. Thus Krieger's basic analytical framework can 
be adapted to the Australian steel industry readily, 
particularly when comparing the old tradition-bound open 
hearth and the newer faster BOS.
[32]
Krieger's questions do need some further adaptation,
however. He does not specifically nominate management as
requiring the same kind of investigation. Nevertheless he
looks to the different actions and responses of management
at the different mines in his study in order to illuminate
the patterns of job regulation. This thesis does
likewise. The tactics and style of management is integral
to workplace job regulation. Since management is not
homogeneous, questions must relate to the management at
the specific workplace, not simply company or plant
management. At the workplace
...the line manager ... assesses the 
various demands of him [sic] and acts in 
accordance with both his own abilities and 
limitations and his understanding of what 
senior executives require of him.
[Brewster, Gill and Richbell, 1983: 70]
Workplace managers have the power to implement the
decisions and policies of other levels of management to a
greater or lesser degree, depending on their own
imperatives. In this way their actions will underpin the
nature of the workplace, and interrelate with the actions
of workers in various ways.
In order to identify the specific characteristics of 
workplace industrial relations, the structure and actions 
of both management and workers must be investigated. To 
illuminate the nature of workplace industrial relations in 
this thesis, theoretical coherence is achieved by use of 
the paramount question: "To what extent, and in what ways, 
do the specific characteristics of the workplace influence 
industrial relations processes?" The sub-questions which
[33]
flow from this major question, are, for the most part, 
informed by the modified job regulation approach. This 
becomes evident in an examination of some of the 
literature which is relevant to this study.
The workplace: Definitions
Many studies which purport to be workplace studies are, 
in fact, studies at plant level or even wider as is shown 
below. In this thesis workplaces are taken to be the 
units of production within the larger plant or 
establishment, probably spatially evident and recognised 
as as an organisational sub-entity, with clear social and 
technological characteristics which mark them off from 
other units within the larger plant.
By contrast the terms "shopfloor" and "point of 
production" have generally been used in industrial 
relations to mean the areas in a plant or establishment 
where production workers have operated production 
equipment. These terms may need some redefinition. In 
recent years computer technology has changed the nature of 
production processes. The importance of manufacturing as 
a source of large scale employment has declined, while the 
proportion of workers employed in "white collar" areas has 
increased. The terms shopfloor or point of production may 
need to be broadened to cover any point of production, 
where the "product" may be information or a service as 
much as it may be definable goods in the traditional 
factory sense. While the analysis in this thesis covers
[34]
traditional metal processing, it perceives the shopfloor 
to cover more than the areas u/here workers maintained or 
operated production equipment. In one of the workplaces 
studied in this thesis for example, the BOS, the control 
room was the centre of production.
In this respect, the study of the workplace may be 
different to the study of the shopfloor since the 
workplace is seen as a particular work area. By contrast 
studies of industrial relations at the point of production 
or at the shopfloor refer to many sites within the plant 
or establishment. In a large scale plant or a firm which 
provides a variety of goods or services, such as metal 
processing or provision of public utilities, there will be 
some or many work areas which invoke different structures 
and activities from those employed in the more specific 
areas.
However a major problem immediately presents itself, in
that clear definitions of the workplace are not readily
available. Much of the literature on workplace industrial
relations treats the term "workplace" as meaning those
workers or work areas generally seen as the shopfloor or
point of production of any plant or firm. In the British
workplace survey series for example, workplaces are seen
as establishments, but in order
to provide stylistic variation [the 
authors] ...refer interchangeably to 
establishments as ...workplaces, sites, 
units or establishments and (when
referring to manufacturing establishments)
... refer to plants workshops or
factories. [Daniel and Millward, 1985: 8 ]
Frenkel and Coolican [1984: 52] take a slightly narrower
[35]
frameu/ork when they state that "Workplaces in the metal 
industry are generally divided into various shops, 
departments and sections" [Frenkel and Coolican, 1984: 52] 
but the establishment is still the basic frame of 
reference. This approach can offer useful illumination of 
shopfloor industrial relations in the plant or firm. The 
difficulty with such a broad definitional basis is that it 
ignores the individual worker's experience of the plant 
and enterprise. The work processes and social relations 
of production in a highly computerised mill will differ 
from those of the draftsperson in the drawing office which 
in turn will differ from those experienced by the labourer 
in the coke ovens. And while the worker at the coke ovens 
will share many of the working conditions of the worker in 
the blast furnace or the steelmaking shop there will be 
significant differences too. These will arise because of 
the local and international traditions which have come 
about at different times depending on the age and nature 
of the technology. The ways in which managers have 
organised the work processes around the technology also 
influence differences between workplaces. In times when 
increasing pressures are being placed on workers and 
managers in specific work areas to perform at new levels 
of intensity, under changing conditions, the structures 
and activities within the specific workplaces deserve 
closer attention. This requires recognition that 
workplaces are indeed specific work areas within the plant 
or establishment.
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There are thus several factors which may be necessary in 
the definition of the workplace, depending on the size and 
organisation of a plant. A small plant with only a few 
workers may, of itself, be a workplace. As Frenkel and 
Coolican [1984: 52] record only 1.2 per cent (n=56) of NSW 
metal industry establishments had over 500 employees in 
1981. Over 90 per cent of establishments employed fewer 
than 100 persons. This kind of size distribution of 
establishments is the norm in Australia. [ABS 8103.0]. 
The bases for some British studies of the workplace are 
also relatively small plants which each employ fewer than 
a thousand workers. Armstrong, Goodman and Hyman [1981] 
studied factories where the largest workforce was less 
than a thousand. The studies of Edwards and Scullion 
[1982], Cunnison, [1966] and Nichols and Beynon, [1977] 
draw on still smaller numbers. Nevertheless, even in 
these studies of relatively small plants, the particular 
work environment varied to an extent where generalisations 
about the workplace, were open to qualification. 
Differences in work and management practices, traditions 
and technology led to different production and industrial 
relations outcomes.
In the larger plant, the workplace is first of all a 
defined unit or sub-unit of production. The subsidiary 
element may be defined simply in an organisational sense 
of a department as designated by management for management 
purposes. On its own this is not sufficient. At the Port 
Kembla steelworks in the 1970s the steelmaking department
[37]
encompassed the electric steel shop, the Basic Oxygen 
Steelmaking (BOS) and the open hearth shops.
It is to the specific shop or workplace that the 
employee gives his or her work effort each day; the 
department is in this case simply a framework for 
expediting management. Within the workplace, in the sense 
of a unit of production, there will be a hierarchy of 
managers and supervisors. Like production and trade 
trained workers, they are likely to say that they work in 
the open hearth or electric steel, rather than in the 
steel making department.
For employees in a workplace, the reality of work is in 
the material surrounds and social relations of their 
workplace. That is, the workplace is also defined by 
technology, work processes, and physical conditions. 
These set the limits for the social relations to a 
considerable degree. The technology of the workplace 
governs the choices of the work processes and working 
conditions which workplace managers can implement. The 
workplace is thus the specific work area with its own 
managerial organisation, and further defined by the 
production processes and geographical situation as 
separate from other workplaces. [R.K. Brown, 1973: 
85-113; Hill, 1981]
These elements which define a workplace, which also 
implicitly include a final essential element, the social 
aspects of the workplace. For the workers and their 
managers the technology and work organisation provide the
[38]
structural aspect of the workplace which necessarily 
includes the social and industrial relations processes 
which result. As Edwards [1986] has depicted in his 
comprehensive descriptive analysis, the workplace is as 
much a social construction as a physical entity. This is 
not to confuse the workgroup with the workplace.
Edwards [1986:81] defines workgroups as "teams of 
workers who share common work situations and who act as 
distinct collectivities". Palmer, [1983: 82-93] in noting 
that these are not necessarily limited to non-managerial 
employees, [see also Hill 1974; Batstone, Boraston and 
Frenkel 1977] perceives these groups as,"small groups with 
an interest in improving employment conditions." [Palmer, 
1983:83] Workgroups are, thus, usually groups of either 
managers or employees, formally or informally developed to 
meet particular group imperatives. Within a workplace 
there may be several workgroups. The organisation and 
distinctive actions of these workgroups Edwards [1986: 81] 
says will depend on
managerial behaviour, and on a range of 
contingencies reflecting the nature of 
work tasks and technological and product 
market forces.
Workgroup analysis can aid this investigation because it 
considers workers and managers within their specific work 
environments, but by their very nature workgroups are 
social constructions which involve managers and workers 
separately. In a workplace analysis they are components 
of the same unit.
[39]
Closer to the demands of this thesis is Marsh and Evans' 
[1973: 354] definition of the workshop which perceives the 
workplace as a
...workshop, department, or other portion 
of a factory or establishment; [or] 
sometimes when the establishment is small 
for the whole establishment.
- It is this subsidiary element within a plant which is 
also essential in defining the workplace. In this there 
are two defining elements - the workers/workgroups who 
perceive the workplace in social terms, as being in this 
department or production unit, and the technology which in 
varying degrees defines the workplace by the technological 
processes and also allows management to define the work 
processes within it.
In examining the specific characteristics of the
industrial relations in the Basic Oxygen Steelmaking (BOS)
shop and the open hearths in this thesis, questions are
asked about the links between these factors. To a
considerable extent the technology of the workplace is a
definitive factor in work processes and management
behaviour. As Marx noted .
By means of machinery... [industry] is 
constantly changing not only in the 
technical basis of production but also in 
the functions of the labourer and in the 
social combinations of the labour process.
[1974: 457]
Or as Brewster et al [1981] argue, the values and problems 
of the workplace depend on the ways in which the 
technology and equipment constrains or enhances the ways
[40]
in which work and workers are organised. Management 
literature does not always give explicit recognition of 
the role of technology in work organisation. A major 
exception to this is the work of the Tavistock Institute, 
as exemplified in Mumford's [1980] work on the 
socio-technical approaches to the organisation of work. 
{1981]
This is not to take the technological determinist view 
of Sayles [1958] which gives inadequate attention to 
historical and social factors. A strong body of 
literature exists, however which demonstrates the 
significance of technology on work and workplace 
relations. [Beynon, 1973; Zimbalist, 1979; Lazonick, 
1983] As others note, [Edwards and Scullion,1982; Burawoy, 
1979; Nichols and Beynon, 1977] it is not the technology 
alone which affects workplace relations, but also the 
actions taken by workers/unions and employers/managers. 
These two facets of workplace relations, action and 
structure, continuously interact with each other within 
the context of the wider environment of the plant, 
company, industry, and beyond. To pinpoint the .exact 
nature of the workplace therefore requires a clear 
understanding of both the technology and the work 
organisation which management puts in place at each 
sub-unit within the larger plant, (the structure) and the 
ways in which the workers and managers act to optimise 
their control over work and work processes. [Hyman, 1987: 
48-50]
[41]
This section began with the aim of defining the
workplace and overcoming the vagueness which has
characterised such definitions. While the plant or 
establishment has often been perceived as also being the 
workplace, such vague boundaries are inadequate for
understanding the frame of reference of the workers or 
managers in larger plants. It is essential therefore to 
recognise that there are sub-units within larger plants 
and firms. For the workers and managers within them, the
imperatives of their working-lives come from within the
workplaces, the units of production within the larger 
plant or establishment. As the next section will
demonstrate, the plants or establishments, rather than the 
workplaces themselves have been the centre of attention in 
many studies which attempt to analyse the workplace. This 
approach elides some important aspects of work and work 
relations.
Workplace literature: A survey and some problems
In Australian industrial relations, almost all studies 
which intend to examine workplace industrial relations, 
take as their guiding principle the point of production. 
That is, they examine the specific goods or services are 
produced across a plant or establishment. Zappala and 
Callus [1988:3] state this specifically in their 
introduction to the bibliography of Australian workplace
relations
...workplace industrial relations is
concerned with the myriad processes and
[42]
issues commonly referred to as industrial 
relations at a plant level or at the point 
of production.
But the point of production frequently turns out to be 
several points of production u/ithin a plant or enterprise, 
so that workers' specific work environments are ignored or 
treated as a given universal. Thus in Frenkel's lucid 
analysis of workplace rulemaking in the Pilbara, the 
actual workplaces are ephemeral, and in the final 
paragraphs, 'workplace' comparisons become company 
comparisons [Frenkel, 1978].
It is the same with Lumley's [1983] comparative analysis 
of five workplaces. In this article Lumley takes the 
shopfloor organisation of unions and their responses to 
employer strategies for control as the primary focus. 
While the article provides valuable insights into the 
diversity of union organisation at shopfloor level, the 
nature of the workplaces is not considered. In part, this 
reflects Lumley's [ 1983: 301-5] uncritical acceptance of
the view that the arbitration system has determined the 
shape of the relations of production at all levels in 
Australia.
Mason and Muller [1978: 16] noted this tendency in their
comparative study of two plants, in which they examine
aspects such as custom and practice and grievance handling
at shopfloor level. They argue that
A full understanding of job regulation, 
the distribution of power and the 
underlying causes of industrial conflict 
will only become apparent when more time 
and space is devoted to the study of 
industrial relations in the workplace.
[43]
Despite this assertion, their study is still in the
broader focus of plant and company level industrial
relations, albeit from the perspective of the shopfloor.
This perhaps reflects the size of Australian firms which,
in general, are relatively small in comparison with
overseas counterparts. [MTIA, 1983]
The problems of defining the workplace is evident in the
work of Fells and Mulvey. [1985] In their criticism of
the Hancock Report for its failure to address problems of
workplace industrial relations, they offer a definition of
the concept. Yet they base their work on Marsh and Evans'
[1973: 240] definition of plant, rather than workshop or
workplace bargaining. This encompasses "...all or...
significant groups of employees at plant or works level",
a definition which they expand upon by reference to
...activities between an employer and his 
[sic] employees... Workplace industrial 
relations therefore is a company-based 
activity. [cited in Fells and Mulvey,
1985: 16]
In taking this focus, Fells and Mulvey have clearly 
moved away from the point of production to a much broader 
definition which takes the plant or the enterprise as the 
workplace. In part, this view reflects the reality that 
much formal rulemaking in Australia has taken place at the 
higher levels. This has occurred as a consequence of the 
arbitration system of award-making and the patterns of 
national wage determination. The dominance of the 
tribunal system over these processes is not questioned in 
this thesis. However the assumption that tribunals shape
[44]
behaviour at the workplace, neglects both the significance 
of management at all levels in workplace and plant level 
relations, and the nature of workplace characteristics in 
shaping behaviour.
For some industrial relations analysts, acceptance of 
this assumption has meant that the workplace or shopfloor 
has been presented as less significant than in countries 
where the degree of involvement of those at the workplace 
is more obvious. Thus while Fells and Mulvey's intention 
was to emphasise the general shopfloor, they have taken 
the reality of formal rulemaking at plant and enterprise 
levels as the basis for analysis.
In this section, we have examined the problems within 
some Australian industrial relations literature with 
regard to studying of the workplace. There is general, if 
sometimes implicit, acknowledgement that the workplace is 
a point of production, although the differences between 
points of production tend to be ignored or generalised. 
Even this generalisation of workplaces within the plant 
does not always receive adequate attention. Scholars have 
tended to move their focus away from the point of 
production to the level where formal industrial relations 
processes take place.
To perceive the structural elements of workplace 
relations as the same across a plant or a company can lead 
to an incomplete picture. In large or complex plants, 
especially, the nature of technology and work organisation 
can be significantly different within a single plant.
[45]
[Marchington and Loveridge, 1983; Batstone et al,1979: 
5-8] This is true not of only metal-processing industries, 
but also public sector organisations such as 
telecommunications organisations, and public u/orks or 
transport departments. [Hall, 1987; Giles, 1985; 
Williams, 1986; Reinecke and Schultz, 1983]
Technological change case studies often highlight the 
significance of technology as a central structural element 
at the workplace in a way that many workplace studies 
ignore. In technological case studies the point to be
made is often shown explicitly to be the alteration in the 
pattern of workplace relations. Giles' [1985] study of 
technology bargaining in Telecom, and Hill's [1984] 
analysis of technological change in printing exemplify the 
centrality of technology for workplace relations. If, as 
many writers show, the technological change destabilises 
workplace relations, [Markey, 1981; Daniels and Millward, 
1987; Cornfield, 1987] then the technology extant is also 
a central factor in workplace relations. The problem with 
focussing on the plant or the company or utility as a 
whole is that the technology may be taken as a given, as 
the same for all workers across a plant.
This is not to ignore the importance of plant and 
enterprise level strategies for shopfloor relations. 
These must be considered as influences on the workplace, 
perhaps very significant influences as Batstone et al 
[1977; 1979] clearly demonstrate. Recruitment policies, 
the nature of pay determination, union strategies, and the
[46]
like [Edwards and Scullion, 1982; Kerr et al, 1960: 
248-50;] are all important factors influencing the nature 
of workplace relations. The trend towards increasing 
centralisation of these kinds of activities removed much 
of the earlier autonomy of action from the workplace. 
Nevertheless, the impact of these policies may vary from 
workplace to workplace and centralised decision making may 
be diffused by workplace policies and practices.
Moreover the recent trends towards decentralised 
management organisation and "flexible management 
strategies" have emphasised a belief in greater autonomy 
at the workplace. These new directions which began 
overseas some years ago became widely expressed in 
Australia only in the 1980s. Bongarzoni and Compton 
[1987] have clearly expressed the new Australian 
management concern that the traditional industrial 
relations practices have not been sufficently concerned 
with
improving productivity and employee 
contributions through the elimination 
/reduction of non-productive practices, 
changing job methods and work 
organisation, and more flexible labour 
utilisation.
The movement towards more flexible work organisation has 
led to changing patterns of industrial relations at the 
workplace. The increasing use of grievance procedures and 
the preoccupation of some writers with the removal of work 
practices as a panacea for increasing productivity have 
led to changing agenda and roles for workplace industrial 
relations. Some unions have accepted these kinds of
[47]
changes with a fair degree of alacrity in exchange for 
greater job security and closer consultation over other 
policy issues.
Others [Guille, Sappey and Winter, 1989: 35-6ff] have 
expressed concerns that new industrial relations practices 
may further weaken the rights of workers at the workplace. 
As Storey [1980: 13] noted of the efforts in Britain to 
formalise hitherto informal elements of workplace 
industrial relations, plant and workplace level bargaining 
is a two way process. In the new industrial relations 
climate, management may negotiate with unions over manning 
and technological change, but also over custom and 
practice which was previously not on the formal industrial 
relations agenda. Once it becomes part of management's 
agenda, custom and practice both "may become attenuated 
when Industrial Relations managers add them [aspects of 
custom and practice] to their shopping lists”. [Storey, 
1980: 13-4] The new approaches therefore demand careful 
responses and changing structures from unions if they wish 
to act effectively within the changing system. [Ewer et 
al, 1987:96-118 esp.; Frenkel, 1987]
By the end of the 1980s, the areas of employer concern 
expressed by Bongarzoni and Compton have begun to be 
addressed within the industrial relations system, in 
Australia often within a corporatist framework. [Rimmer 
and Zappala, 1988] As Frenkel [1989: 25] notes "the 
existing tension between dualist (or decentralised) and 
corporatist tendencies are likely to persist." If they do
[48]
so, then the need to understand the workplace in much 
closer detail than has generally been attempted, will also 
remain.
Steel industry literature
Industrial relations in the steel industry has received 
only sporadic attention in this country, although it has 
been more widely studied overseas. Yet it is an industry 
with a far longer history than most current forms of 
manufacturing, and one in which there has been a strong 
sense of tradition. Until well into the postwar years the 
basic processes were little changed from those known to 
Marx and the Webbs in the nineteenth century. It is worth 
briefly reviewing some of the recent and historical 
literature which highlight the particular nature of work 
processes in ironmaking and steelmaking and aspects of the 
industry's industrial relations. Some overseas literature 
is included in this section, in light of the British 
origins of Australian metal industry unions, on the one 
hand and the historical links which are ascribed to the 
American steel industry by some writers. [Cochrane, 1983; 
Quinlan, 1986; Wright, 1988]
In Australia, the economic history of the steel industry 
by Hughes, [1964], and the briefer work by Wills [1963] 
make only passing mention of work and industrial 
relations. They do, however, offer some useful 
illustrations of the orientations of senior managers. As 
the work of Eather [1988] demonstrates, however, it is
[49]
important to consider rather more than the directives or
rhetoric of BHP Head Office managers. In this regard,
Palmer [1983: 216] has noted that,
business organisations are not totally 
structured and rationally administered by 
central management but contain numerous 
internal conflicts which are resolved by 
many different bargains.
This was particularly true of BHP where the centralised 
Head Office, distant from any of the steel plants, 
attempted to enforce a particular style of industrial 
relations, which did not take account of the local 
differences.
A most telling example is offered by Eather in his paper 
on the Australian steel industry during World War II. In 
describing one of the wartime lockouts he cites from 
Company archives the proposals for industrial peace in the 
industry promulgated by the then General Manager and 
former part-owner of Port Kembla steelworks, Cecil 
Hoskins. In a
lengthy and passionate letter ... Hoskins 
advocated closer cooperation with the 
trade unions, a closed shop and the 
formation of works councils and shop 
committees... [Hoskins to Lewis, 11 
October 1943. BHP A A26/19 cited in 
Eather, 1988]
Hoskins' proposals were quite firmly rejected. As 
Sheridan [1981a; 1981b; 1982] has demonstrated, the
traditional BHP approach dominated thereafter. The long 
and disruptive 1945 Steel Strike bore many of the 
hallmarks of the BHP style of industrial relations which 
was to continue for many years. Nevertheless, it is
[50]
arguable that the approach of Port Kembla management was 
at least tempered by Hoskins' approach. Even after 
Hoskins' retirement, Port Kembla managers were often local 
appointments, and so more likely to take local 
considerations into account.
The differences between the steel plants in later years 
was also an outcome of the rapid pace of development at 
Port Kembla in the postwar years. Severe labour shortages 
meant a reliance on an immigrant workforce, divided by a 
multiplicity of languages and cultural backgrounds. 
Quinlan [1986; 1984; 1983] demonstrates the problems which 
arose for the workforce and for management as a result of 
the rapid growth in production capacity and in the highly 
diverse workforce. Despite demonstrating very clearly the 
differences between Port Kembla and Newcastle steelworks, 
Quinlan sometimes reduces the force of his argument 
through his acceptance of Head Office memos or data from 
Newcastle as applicable to Port Kembla. [see also 
Donaldson, 1981] These writers, like the Central 
Industrial Relations Directorate believed central company 
policies held sway with little modification throughout all 
BHP plants. However, the differences in the patterns of 
industrial relations and the major differences in patterns 
of growth between the two largest plants suggest that the 
assumption does not hold true. Anecdotal evidence, from 
^ 0rviews with some workers and supervisors who had 
worked at both plants, suggests there were differences. 
In the view of some interviewees, management at Port
[51]
Kembla, while highly oppressive until the 1980s, was not 
as rigidly opposed to workers' activities as management at 
Newcastle. However this hypothesis is one which needs 
much more rigorous investigation.
Nevertheless, an approach which assumes identical 
responses to workers by management in all BHP plants, such 
as Kreigler [1980] does on the basis of his time in the 
remote town of Whyalla, is one which should be treated 
with caution. It is the same with the historical 
investigations of Cochrane, [1983], Quinlan, [1986] and 
Wright [1988]. These writers treat the early management 
of BHP Newcastle, which was devoutly American, as 
illustrative of the then new repressive management styles 
invoked as 'Scientific Management*. From this, they draw 
generalisations about later BHP management at all 
establishments within the enterprise. There are some 
difficulties with making such generalisations. For 
example, BHP's confrontationist approach to its workers 
was already apparent during the actual Broken Hill era. 
[Hughes, 1964: 60; McKinlay, 1978: 384-9] In any case the 
context for industrial relations in Australia has been 
quite different to that in the United States.
Unions in the Australian steel industry have received 
only occasional attention. In their history of the 
Federated Ironworkers' Association (FIA), Murray and White 
[1982] offer some insights into the role of the union 
prior to the election of the locally based Rank and File 
Team at Port Kembla in 1970. Thereafter their attention
[52]
is minimal, as befits their focus on the role of the union 
at national level. Dickenson's treatment [1980] is more 
thorough, focussing, as it does in large part, on the Port 
Kembla Branch of the FIA. However her reliance on the 
Minutes of the National Council of the FIA, which is 
politically opposed to the Port Kembla Branch, and on the 
Illawarra Mercury, the local newspaper, depletes the force 
of her exposition of the local branch. However, her 
recognition that the "maverick" local branch and the more 
conciliatory national leadership have for a long time 
esablished "mutual levels of tolerance", reinforces 
Schultz' [1984] similar assertion, that the local branch
is not totally divorced from the National Office. As 
these writers have stated, especially outside election 
times, the two parts of the FIA have a reasonably 
effective working relationship. Beyond these studies 
however recent steel union history in the Port Kembla - 
Illawarra region or the Australian steel industry is very 
thin.
In the Australian steel industry context, account must 
be taken of the arbitration system. This is despite 
doubts expressed earlier, about problems for workplace 
analysis arising from too close a focus on the formal 
institutional rulemaking aspects of industrial relations. 
Not only has award making been of central importance in 
Australian industrial relations. Also, more than most 
industries in Australia, BHP management attempted to 
utilise the New South Wales Industrial Commission (NSWIC),
[53]
as a form of control of workplace relations well into the 
1980s. [Quinlan, 1986; Donaldson and Donaldson, 1983] 
Studies of industrial relations in the steel industry in 
Britain have been more common. Indeed the nationalisation 
of the steel industry in Britain after World War II, and 
then the widespread closure of old steel plants in the 
1970s, have led to this being a most widely studied 
industry. [See e.g. Rowley, 1971; Bowen, 1974; Rowthorn 
and Ward, 1979; McEachern, 1980; Upham, 1980; Mainwaring, 
1981; Hartley, Kelly and Nicholson, 1983] Some of these 
studies are economic histories which offer some insights 
into union and management. A most useful study is
Pollard's [1959] history of labour in Sheffield, which is 
rigorous and meticulous in approach. In his study, 
Pollard offers, inter alia, description and analysis of 
the development of workplace specific skills in the steel 
industry. This is an area expanded with similar rigour by 
More [1980]. Both Pollard and More draw on reminiscences 
or personal histories of people like Harry Brearly [1922] 
and Patrick McGeown [1967]. Their observations of the 
processes of work and skill acguisition enhance 
understanding of the steel traditions which clearly 
sustained workers in an immensely difficult work 
environment. A vivid portrayal in words and photographs 
of the early steelmaking work environment is also to be 
found in Pagnamenta and Overy [1980].
The fact that these descriptions of work in steelmaking 
is readily understandable nearly a century later says much
[54]
about the slow pace of technical change, the nature of 
work processes and the strength of steel traditions in 
steelmaking until recent years. It is the same with 
More's [1980; see also Seymour, 1966.] description of the 
development of skills, in which he analyses the learning 
processes of the open hearth skills. As Chapter 3 of this 
thesis shows, the Port Kembla steelworkers gained their 
skills in the open hearth in much the same ways as their 
nineteenth century counterparts had done. Bowen's study 
of Ironhill offers the same powerful sense of tradition. 
Bowen's studies [1976; Bowen et al, 1974] take a 
sociological approach to a plant level study which also 
present many close parallels in the nature of work in the 
iron and steel industry in Britain and Australia.
These historical examples are, however, streets away 
from recent developments at British Steel Corporation's 
plant at Scunthorpe for example. Mclnnes [1987] shows 
this plant as having expanded upon the traditional 
core-periphery tendency of steelmaking to a singular 
degree. Since the nineteenth century, production in the 
iron and steel industry has relied on an internal labour 
market, where some workers developed considerable skill 
"which could not be bought or made but could only be 
acquired by years of hard work and experience". [Jackson, 
1965: 2] Many other workers, however, performed basic 
heavy manual tasks under circumstances of very limited job 
security. There was thus a core-periphery structure to 
steel industry employment long before the Conservative
[55]
government propounded the necessity for this kind of 
flexibility throughout the economy. [Fox, 1985: 414-20]
British steel union studies are diverse and useful. 
Bamber's [1985] study of managerial unionism in the steel 
industry provides another perspective on industrial 
relations. Bamber highlights the new problems under which 
managerial employees found themselves when the pressures 
on the British steel industry led to new demands on all 
employees. However, the classic source for understanding 
steelmaking unionism in Britain is Pugh's [1951] massive 
history of the steel unions.[see also Docherty, 1983] 
Pugh's work, though entirely descriptive and singularly 
partial in sections, is nevertheless a major source of 
information about the impact the steel unions have had on 
work organisation and industrial relations. All of these 
sources reinforce the Webb's [1921: 403] perception of the 
steel unions in the late nineteenth century. They saw 
these steel unions as having a strong effect on the 
development of traditions such as as seniority, internal 
labour markets, and clearly defined job descriptions which 
insist on areas of demarcation. The importance of such 
studies is that the Australian unions drew on the same 
kinds of traditions as the British unions, as the 
similarities in work and union traditions between the two 
countries demonstrate.
By contrast, many Australian industrial relations 
studies rely on Katherine Stone's [1973] investigation of 
the changes in work organisation in American steel plants
[56]
at the turn of the century. [Quinlan, 1983; Cochrane, 
1985; Wright, 1988] In her study, Stone argues that craft 
skills u/ere removed from the steel workforce in the late 
nineteenth century as open hearth steelmaking was 
introduced. The sub-contracting system whereby craftsmen 
hired their own labourers and virtually set the production
and wage levels was replaced by a more direct employment 
relationship with the steel owners. Wage differentials,
she argues, became compressed and in the wake of the 
Homestead strike and other anti-union tactics the steel 
workforce was restructured. For Stone the outcome was a 
deskilled and powerless workforce, closely controlled by 
large numbers of foremen. As Clawson [1980] notes 
however, Stone has rather romanticised the role of the 
craftsmen who acted as inside contractors before the 
restructuring of the workforce. That they had control 
over production within their own areas is unquestioned. 
Most of the workers employed by the contractor/craftsmen 
were nevertheless paid only a small proportion of the rate 
struck between sub-contractors and the steel owners.
Moreover, Brown and Nuwer [1987] demonstrate the 
weakness of Stone's contention that the highest skilled 
were rendered powerless through deskilling. Drawing on 
the British - American comparisons of Elbaum and Wilkinson 
[1979], Brown and Nuwer show clearly that while the 
workplace autonomy of the former contractor craftsmen was 
attenuated by the changing work organisation of the early 
twentieth century,
[57]
[T]he strategic location of a job and 
industrial skills related to attentiveness 
and social coordination emerged as a new 
basis for worker bargaining leverage.
[Brown and Nuwer, 1987: 257]
As this thesis shows in Chapter 4 the conversion from open 
hearth to BOS was to replicate the changes which occurred 
in the conversion from Bessemer to open hearth in late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century 
steelmaking.
The other major significance of changing job structures 
in the steel industry for this thesis draws from the fact 
that as Elbaum and Wilkinson [1979; see also Wilkinson, 
1977] show, the British steel worker was able to depend on 
union orientation and union-derived structures of 
seniority to a far greater extent than his American 
counterpart. This again weakens Stone's contentions 
regarding what she argues are management-derived plans for 
reducing the bargaining power of workers.
The same structures that Stone deplores, in what she 
perceives as new tactics of management in steelmaking in 
the United States, had been longstanding worker traditions 
of internal labour markets in Britain. These traditions 
of demarcation of work and unions between so-called 
semi-skilled production workers and craft workers were, as 
Hyman and Eiger [1985] demonstrate, to prove the undoing 
of the British steelworkers in the 1970s. However in the 
earlier years when steel traditions were being set, it was 
British union traditions which gave British steelworkers 
traditional practices which provided for worker autonomy
[58]
and job controls. As Herding [1976] notes these 
traditions such as seniority and security had become the 
basis for union strength for U.S. steelworkers by the 
mid-twentieth century. The brief criticism of Stone's 
work has been necessary because a significant number of 
Australian industrial relations theoreticians have drawn 
rather heavily and uncritically on Stone's work. Yet the 
weight of evidence is that her assessment was 
over-simplified and exaggerated.
On the other hand the experiences of the steelworker, 
Walker, [1925; see also Fitch, 1910; Brody, 1960; Clawson; 
1980; for the employer perspective see Bridge, 1925] 
immediately after World War I, suggest that work in the 
American steel plants during the non-union era not only 
set the pattern of aggressive bargaining in the American 
steel industry, but was also conveyed to other countries. 
The degree to which the American steel industry influenced 
the pattern of relations in the Australian steel plants 
deserves further rigorous attention.
More recently, focus on steel industrial relations in 
the U.S.A. has reflected the American focus on bargaining 
strategies to the neglect of work organisation and the 
role of the workplace. [Craypo, 1983; Stieber, 1978] In 
the same way, where the central point of formal industrial 
relations processes in Australia has been the tribunals, 
these institutional elements have also been the point of 
focus of industrial relations academic studies in 
Australia. A similar link between the close attention to
[59]
formalised processes given by industrial relations 
practitioners, and the focal point of academic studies is 
also apparent in the American steel industry. The 
hard-won bargaining rights, issues and processes u/hich 
have occurred outside the workplace have been the major 
area of interest. Ahlburg et al, [1986] provide a partial 
exception to this neglect of the relationship between work 
and industrial relations in the steel industry. In 
general, however, there has been little work done on 
recent developments in workplace relations in the American 
steel industry. An important exception is Spence's [1982] 
case study approach. Herding's [1972] comparative study 
of American and German steelmaking offers rich information 
on both accommodation structures and work relations, but 
it is highly disjointed.
So far this chapter has surveyed both workplace and 
steel industry literature in order to explore the nature 
of work processes and the ways in which these are linked 
to patterns of industrial relations, especially in the 
steel industry. In some cases the nature of the workplace 
itself was shown to be ephemeral. This indeterminacy 
derives from the emphasis that writers place on formal 
rulemaking and industrial relations institutions. Rather 
than disregard formal processes in workplace studies, 
these should be seen as important contextual influences on 
workplace industrial relations. However, as many of the 
steel industry studies demonstrate, workplace industrial 
relations and the pattern of work organisation are an
[60]
outcome of the historical, social and technological 
aspects of the workplace. Steel industry studies also 
note the significance of traditional practices in 
steelmaking and the ways in which these have changed as a 
consequence of new technology and changing economic 
imperatives. This thesis also attempts to address the 
problem of conceptual indeterminacy in Australian studies 
of workplace industrial relations - that is, the nature of 
the workplace and its influence on industrial relations - 
by examining two steelmaking workplaces. In doing so the 
thesis draws on the insights from overseas steel industry 
and workplace studies. This has demanded a variety of 
research methods.
Thesis: Outline, Methodology and Research Strategy
The next chapter includes an analysis of the environment 
for steel in terms of technology and markets. Other 
economic influences on the industry and industrial 
relations are considered, covering the two decades from 
the late 1960s, with most focus on the 1970s and 1980s. 
This sets the context for the nature of workplace 
relations during these crucial decades. The following two 
chapters examine the nature of work and industrial 
relations first (Chapter 3) in the old open hearths, and 
then (Chapter 4) in the BOS. The two case study chapters 
take as their guide the major question for the thesis: "To 
what extent, and in what ways, do the specific 
characteristics of the workplace influence industrial
[61]
relations processes?" These workplace studies have 
required a variety of research approaches to ensure that 
the workplace is examined fully, but within the context of 
the plant, wider company policies, and the economic and 
political environment.
Assessment of work processes and the relations of 
production in a workplace also requires a knowledge of the 
technology in place, and the ways in which workplace 
relations are influenced by the technology. Library 
searches yielded useful insights into the technical and 
organisational aspects of steelmaking. As well the 
searches provided the wealth of overseas studies which 
illuminated aspects of workplace relations which may not 
have otherwise been identified as significant. Visits to 
the BOS, observing work and management processes clarified 
many aspects of the interaction between employees and the 
technology, and between 'wages' and staff employees.
The case of the open hearth was a little more difficult 
since open hearth steelmaking has not taken place since 
1982, although I had made several visits there prior to 
closure. To gain understanding of workplace relations in 
a now defunct workplace, such as the open hearths at Port 
Kembla, required close examination of awards, transcripts 
of tribunal cases, and company and union data. The 
cross-examination of workers and superintendents from the 
open hearth, in work value and margins cases, yielded 
particularly useful material. As well former and current 
workers, supervisors, and managers were interviewed,
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sometimes several times. Their recollections of
incidents, work processes, and the nature of personal and 
workplace relations were extremely useful in highlighting 
aspects not only of the open hearth, but also of the BOS. 
Frequently such recollections have identified aspects of 
workplace relations not readily apparent from examination 
of other sources. Films and photographs of the open 
hearths and the BOS also clarified the way in which work 
was organised in previous years.
In these kinds of ways the formal and informal research 
sources have been combined to ensure a picture of the 
workplace which is as clear and complete as possible. But 
the steelmaking workplace, no matter how large, is simply 
a sub-unit of production. For its complete analysis, an 
understanding of the context for the workplaces under 
study is necessary. This is the concern of the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 2 THE CONTEXT OF INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS FOR THE AUSTRALIAN STEEL INDUSTRY, 1967-87
Any analysis of industrial relations must take account 
of the wider context which influences the choices to be 
made by managers and workers at all levels of industrial 
relations. The national economic context will not only 
influence the political context. At the level of the 
enterprise and plant, decisions to alter production levels 
or costs will also take national economic matters into 
account. These processes will not take clearly 
predictable patterns, but will reflect union and 
management perceptions of other elements of the context in 
which they operate. As was noted in the previous chapter, 
each of the Australian steel plants operated in different 
ways. This was because the goals and imperatives of the 
managers in each of the plants differed. Regional 
industrial relations also differed. To a large extent 
however, the changing product market for steel was a major 
factor affecting the context for workplace industrial 
relations in the steel industry in Australia from the late 
1960s until the late 1980s. As the international steel 
market changed, so too did the imperatives, style and 
tactics of management, the organisation of work, and the 
pattern of industrial relations.
The ways in which the changing fortunes of the steel 
industry and the changes in the national economic and 
political situations are interlinked with the nature of
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plant level organisation and industrial relations at Port 
Kembla steelworks is the brief of this chapter. First, 
changes in the international steel market from the late 
1960s will be examined briefly to consider how these led 
to changing economic and industrial relations strategies 
in steel industries throughout the world. Since 
Australia's response to the international downturn was 
later than most, the steel crisis of 1981-3 demanded 
urgent and broad ranging action. The description of these 
events is followed by a discussion of plant level 
industrial relations at the Port Kembla steelworks before, 
during and after the Australian steel crisis when the 
Steel Industry Plan had been implemented.
It is argued that the movement away from the long-term 
confrontational industrial relations began before the 
Steel Plan, as a result of broader economic and political 
changes prior to the announcement of the plan. The effect 
of the Steel Industry Plan on the steel industry and its 
industrial relations is then examined. In this section 
most focus is on the commitments that the Steel Industry 
Plan required of the government, the steel unions, and 
BHP. In placing emphasis on the plan in this chapter, it 
is recognised that open hearth steelmaking, the topic of 
the next chapter, was no longer in production by the time 
the plan was announced. On the other hand, as Chapter 4 
demonstrates, the new imperatives which invoked 
implementation of the plan were also the same kinds of 
imperatives which led to some of the changing attitudes
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and tactics by management and unions in workplace 
industrial relations at the BOS. The notable feature of 
the Steel Industry Plan u/as that it enhanced the new 
approach to industrial relations, an approach quite unlike 
that taken in any BHP plant in the company's history. 
Central to changing industrial relations in the Australian 
steel industry in the 1980s was the marked change in the 
international steel industry from the 1970s.
World steel in the 1970s
While international steel production peaked in 1974, the 
effective world steelmaking capacity continued to 
increase. [See Appendix 3] The output and capacity of new 
steelmaking countries such as Korea, Brazil and Taiwan 
expanded rapidly, while older steelmakers such as Japan, 
the U.S. and Germany upgraded technology to meet 
increasingly specific customer requirements in an ever 
tighter world market. Growing competition for the 
traditional steel producers came not only from the 
increased and technologically superior steel of new 
plants, but also from the capability of materials such as 
plastics and aluminium to fulfil the functions 
traditionally the preserve of steel. In the face of 
shrinking markets and intense competition, many steel 
industries throughout the world began a restructuring and 
rationalisation process, closing old labour-intensive 
plant, and utilising new technology to produce a greater 
variety of steels. [OECD, 1985:7-31] By 1977 French
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steelmakers announced redundancy plans affecting 10 per 
cent of the nation's 155,000 steelworkers, with 50,000 
workers already on short time. From 1974 to 1980 steel 
employment in the EEC countries fell by 27 per cent or by 
157,000 workers. Similarly production halved in Britain 
between 1974 and 1980, with the consequent loss of 64,000 
steel jobs. In Europe this process of restructuring 
included a significant level of government assistance, 
often in the form of redundancy schemes. In the U.S., 
steel employment had fallen by 1982 to less than the 
employment levels of the 1930s. [See Appendix 3; 
Kassalow, 1985; 'Steel in the 1980s', 1980: 3-10; 'The 
Crisis in World Steel', 1977; National Office of the 
AMWSU, 1978; Guercia and Treichler, 1986; U.S. Steel 
News, July 1982: 16]
However, BHP experienced few of the stresses evident in 
the world steel industry from the mid-1970s because it was 
cushioned by some protection, a monopoly of a strong 
domestic market, and expectation of a resources boom. 
[Extracts from the Report to the New South Wales 
Government, 1983, (Fisher Judgement); BHP Outlook, 1980] 
In Australia, steel production had trebled between 1950 
and 1960, when just under four million tons of steel were 
produced. These were the years when the demand for steel 
seemed limitless, and by the 1970s production had doubled. 
In the late 1970s there was only a very slight downward 
trend in steel industry employment and production, from 
the peak 1974-5 levels when just over 39000 workers
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produced eight million ingot tons. [See Appendix 3; BHP 
Annual Reports 1970-80; Hurford, 1978; National Office of 
the AMWSU, 1978.]
Nevertheless the unions expressed concern over the 
industry's future in the late 1970s. For the steel unions 
the downward international trends and a significant 
national rise in unemployment and inflation augured 
serious problems for the Australian steel industry. In 
1978 a seminar was organised by the Amalgamated Metal 
Workers and Shipwrights Union (AMWSU) and the Port Kembla 
branch of the Federated Ironworkers' Association (FIA) to 
articulate concerns over the future of the Australian 
steel industry. It was attended by senior members of 
government and parliamentary opposition, public service 
and steel-user industries. Neither BHP nor its Port 
Kembla subsidiary, Australian Iron and Steel (AI&S), was 
present because company officials felt that the seminar 
would achieve nothing except to heighten concern over the 
state of the industry. At the seminar the organisers 
cited part of the letter from the AI&S officials which 
stated that:
We do not consider that the Seminar you have 
proposed will produce any tangible benefits and, 
on the contrary could heighten concern for the 
company's future. [National Office of AMWSU, 
1978.]
Certainly at this seminar substantial evidence was 
presented to suggest that the Australian industry, should 
be considering ways of restructuring which would minimise 
the disruptive effects on steelworkers and steel regions 
in the likely event of a major crisis.
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However in 1980, those who had initiated the seminar 
were taken to task by Port Kembla steelworkers for 
scaremongering and overstating their case, as Australia 
prepared to enjoy the fruits of the anticipated 'resources 
boom' . [Donaldson, 1982] It was believed that this boom 
would greatly increase demand for steel - a belief which 
was quickly seen to be mistaken. [Fisher Judgement, s2.3] 
In 1980 despite declining world steel markets, [see 
Appendix 3] BHP was still projecting growth in employment 
and output, largely in expectation of this boom. Although 
it never properly materialised, the company continued 
introducing new plant and equipment. These included new 
roiling processes but more particularly in the form of 
electronic units for process control, and data and 
materials recording and analysis at all steel plants 
within the enterprise, but particularly at Port Kembla. 
fHoskins Kembla Works, 1980]
It is notable that much plant introduced from the 1970s 
had two significant characteristics. First, in response 
to increasingly specific customer requirements, new plant 
offered higher quality output in smaller batches, thus 
allowing also for greater flexibility. The aim was to 
move away from old processes such as the cumbersome and 
costly ingot route. The latter was the process whereby 
newly made steel was poured into ingot moulds. These were 
later stripped from the cooling ingots which were carried 
by rail to reheating furnaces (soaking pits). The ingots 
were placed in the soaking pits until they were
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sufficiently malleable to be rolled into slabs capable of 
further rolling into sheets. This multi-stage process u/as 
simply not sustainable in the new intensely competitive 
environment because of the costs and problems arising from 
transporting and reheating large batches of metal. 
Steelmaking, developments in refractories, and alloy mixes 
which allowed for more even steel quality, augmented the 
gains in quality arising from modern processes such as the 
continuous caster which was commissioned in 1978 at Port 
Kembla. [BHP Annual Report, 1979; Hoskins Kembla Works. 
1980.] Continuous casting bypasses the entire ingot route, 
with liquid steel being cast continuously into slabs or 
other shapes suitable for the rolling mills according to 
the capacity of the caster and customer requirements. 
This emphasis on fulfilling customer specifications in 
smaller batches in an increasingly computerised 
environment created considerable pressures for a more 
flexible highly trained workforce.
The second characteristic of much of the new equipment 
and technology was that it offered the option of being 
more flexible with respect to world market conditions. 
Changes to the rolling mills, and the slabcaster itself 
for example, were equally able to meet increased demand 
should the world steel market change or, alternatively, 
increase productivity in a declining market. By late 1981 
it was the latter situation which was clearly evident as 
world steel prices fell sharply and a rapid increase in 
imports reduced BHP's share of the shrinking domestic
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market. [See Appendix 3; IAC Report, 1983]
The Australian Steel Crisis, 1980-3
Because BHP had expected the 'resources boom' to 
compensate for the slump in the world steel market, the 
company's response to the international downturn was 
delayed. As a result the company found itself having to 
effect massive reductions in capacity, output and 
employment in a very brief period from late 1981 to 1983. 
The elderly No. 1 Open Hearth Shop at Port Kembla had 
been decommissioned in July 1977, but other old plant now 
quickly came under scrutiny. At Port Kembla steelworks, 
No. 3 Blast Furnace, No. 2 Open Hearth, the Rail Mill 
and No. 1 Coke Ovens Battery, were all at least over 25 
years old, and were closed by 1983. Operations and 
employment levels at most other production and service 
areas were greatly reduced. [Company data; See Appendix 
4; Submission by The Broken Hill Proprietary to the IAC, 
1982.]
A general feeling of unease among workers had been 
apparent from much earlier. In 1981 strike levels were 
again increasing. [See Appendix 4; Company data] An 
increase in disputes over employment levels and 
classifications indicated a generally high level of 
industrial conflict. It also suggested that unions were 
trying to consolidate gains made in earlier years when the 
industry was expanding. There was also a significant 
increase in the number of registered disputes over
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dismissals of individual u/orkers, from less than 10 
throughout the whole decade of the 1960s, to about 10 each 
year by 1980, suggesting increasing union concern over 
employment security. [ Figures derived from company 
dispute data; see also BHP Annual Report. 1980: 12-4; 
Donaldson, 1982]
In September 1981 the company stopped all new employment 
(except for tradesmen with some specific skills), and a 
voluntary retirement scheme was implemented. Amid 
pessimistic speculation about the future of the steel 
industry, a large number of resignations began to occur. 
Further reductions were required however and in mid-1982 
retrenchments began. Overall, in the 20 months from 
November 1981 till June 1983 the workforce at Port Kembla 
steelworks was reduced by 5,000 workers which was 30 per 
cent of the workforce. [See Appendix 4] A further 2000 
jobs were lost at Port Kembla after mid-1983, primarily 
through natural attrition and voluntary retirement. Of 
the total reduction in 1981-3, fifteen per cent occurred 
through enforced retrenchments, over 50 per cent through 
the voluntary retirement scheme with the remainder 
achieved through natural attrition. [See Appendix 4] 
About two-thirds of these workforce reductions took place 
in the latter half of 1982 and the first months of 1983. 
It is difficult to identify how many resignations and 
voluntary retirements took place through fear of 
retrenchments in the highly charged climate fuelled by 
intense media speculation. Even the seemingly more staid
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publications, such as Business Review Weekly, carried 
vivid cover stories about the crisis in BHP and opined the 
closure of at least one major steelworks. [Business 
Review Weekly (BRW), September 1982-June 1983; Schultz, 
1983: 91-111; Thirlwell, 1986] '
Union concerns were twofold. First, unions were deeply 
concerned over the level of workforce reductions, 
especially through retrenchment. Secondly, they held 
strong fears for the long-term future of the steel 
industry. These apprehensions originated in the media 
speculation, the pattern of plant closure overseas, and 
the paucity of information from BHP about its plans. In 
Wollongong these fears were identified in terms of the 
probable effect of a high level of redundancies on the 
Illawarra region as a whole. In 1980-1, the Port Kembla 
steelworks had, directly and indirectly, accounted for 
over 70 per cent of Wollongong's employment. Rapid 
workforce reductions further accentuated the fact that 
Wollongong was already experiencing unemployment rates 
significantly greater than the rapidly increasing national 
unemployment level. High unemployment in the Illawarra at 
the beginning of the 1980s was largely a consequence of 
the importance to the region of the depressed coal and 
heavy engineering industries. These industries were also 
closely linked to the iron and steel industry. [Mangan 
and Guest, 1983a: 11-15; Mangan and Guest, 1983b; Schultz, 
1984: 32-40] Wollongong/Port Kembla unions then, were 
faced with the generally held belief that their members
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u/ere employed in an industry in danger of collapse, or at 
best large scale labour-shedding, in a depressed national 
and local economy. The long-time confrontationist nature 
of industrial relations at Port Kembla steelworks, briefly 
described in Chapter 1, could only serve to deepen union 
fears.
Industrial Relations in the Steel Industry before 1980
Port Kembla steelworks is the largest in Australia, with 
double the employment and output capacity of Newcastle 
steelworks. Whyalla has a third, much smaller steel 
producing plant, while Kwinana works contains steel 
rolling plant and unused ironmaking capacity but does not 
produce steel. The latter two plants were built primarily 
as political trade-offs for raw material, in agreement 
with respective state governments. All plants are owned 
by BHP, either directly, or as wholly owned subsidiaries. 
The first three plants produced most steel needed in 
Australia in the 1970s, with excess output being exported. 
[See Appendix 3; Fagan, 1984; McLennan, 1973; Gottiiebsen, 
BRW, July 7-14, 1984.]
At Port Kembla, most workers are covered by the Iron and 
Steel Works Employees (Australian Iron and Steel Pty 
Limited - Port Kembla) Award under the auspices of the New 
South Wales Industrial Commission. (hereafter, NSWIC) 
[Company Information Booklet, (n.d) :3] The company 
recognises thirteen unions on the plant, although by far 
the majority of unionists belong to the Federated
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Ironworkers' Association (FIA) and the Amalgamated Metal 
Workers' Union (AMWU; because of name changes during the 
years under study, this union is also referred to as 
AMWSU). The Electrical Trades' Union (ETU) and 
Association of Draughting Supervisory and Technical 
Employees (ADSTE), also have a significant number of 
members at the plant. Of the remainder only the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) and Building 
Workers' Industrial Union (BWIU) have more than 100 
members.
From 1970, when an active left-wing 'Rank and File' 
leadership was elected to the local FIA, the Port Kembla 
tradition of radicalism was rejuvenated. The ‘Rank and 
File' team, which stated it was committed to workers' 
rights through strong workplace organisation, stood in 
marked contrast to the outgoing leadership, which it had 
criticised for following a collaborative and overly 
conciliatory policy in most industrial relations matters. 
From the early 1970s, the steelworks' and the region's 
reputation for militancy also increased greatly. However, 
although it has been argued that the region was always 
more militant than Newcastle, [see e.g. Gottliebsen, BRW 
June 18-24, 1983:32] recently available data based on per 
capita strike levels suggests such beliefs have little 
foundation. [Company data; R Markey, Illawarra Mercury,
1987]
On the other hand, earlier sections of this thesis 
identified BHP's long tradition of confrontation in
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industrial relations. The company, some said, preferred 
"an adversary role with the unions" to direct negotiation. 
[Murray and White, 268] This contributed to the reputation 
of poor industrial relations at all plants, but 
particularly at Port Kembla because of its greater size. 
Although little data exists to positively substantiate 
this claim, there are several important indicators of the 
practices and priorities of the company's industrial 
relations at plant and enterprise levels.
Whether or not these practices formed a strategy, in 
terms of a set of plans with a definable goal, as Quinlan 
believes, is a moot point. His belief that decision 
making was centralised and purposive leads to him to 
generalise for all BHP plants on the basis of memos from 
one plant. As noted earlier, industrial relations at Port 
Kembla was probably less hostile than at Newcastle 
steelworks which had been a BHP plant from the first. 
Moreover, as Sheridan points out, of earlier industrial 
relations,
...Because of employers' past secretiveness we 
tend to endow employers with vastly superior 
powers of foresighted planning. [Sheridan, 
1982: 107]
As subsequent chapters demonstrate, industrial relations
at Port Kembla during much of the period under study
validate this claim. It is not to deny the
confrontationist nature of steel industry industrial
relations, but rather to argue that much of the
confrontation was a reflexive assertion of managerial 
prerogative. In large multi-sited companies, policies may
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be diluted at each level, according to the priorities of 
each level.
Quinlan [1986:35-8,43-6] argues on the basis of internal 
company memos and interviews with union officials that the 
high number of registered disputes each year in all plants 
was in large part a consequence of a policy of 
confrontationism and the low level of discretion available 
to plant industrial relations departments. [See also 
Murray and White, 1982, 273] These, Quinlan argues, worked 
at the behest of policy set by BHP head office in 
Melbourne, and BHP in Sydney.
The Director of Industrial Relations in the late 1970s 
acknowledged the role played by Central Industrial 
Relations Directorate, which was in Sydney, in 
co-ordinating the "implementation of the company's 
industrial relations policy". However, while it was 
Central Industrial Relation Directorate that made policy, 
its director maintained that 'in the final analysis the 
action taken in a particular area is decided by their 
[plant] General Manager'. ['An area that cannot be 
ignored' BHP Review, September 1977] The high number of 
registered disputes suggested low trust relations between 
management and unions. Certainly, many would agree with 
the company's self-perception that BHP 'had a reputation 
for being tough, for being a hard-liner...', in the 1970s. 
['An area that cannot be ignored', BHP Review September, 
1977] A union spokesperson claimed at the public seminar 
in 1978, that
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BHP has the most pernicious and vindictive 
industrial relations in Australia, with the 
exception of Utah. [National Office of the 
AMWSU, 1978]
This is perhaps more colourful than true, given that in 
the previous year working days lost per thousand employees 
were less than 80 per cent of those in all Australian 
manufacturing, although Port Kembla figures were higher 
for the next three years. [ABS Cat. 6321.0; See also 
Appendix 4]
But strike levels during or before the 1970s may not be
a clear guide to the depth of industrial conflict at the
Port Kembla plant. Management worked to suppress strikes
through overtime penalties, stand-downs and other
sanctions in the event of industrial action. For example,
at Port Kembla, a consequence of individual absence or
involvement in a group absence, 'without reasonable
excuse1, as in a strike, was that,
an employee will not be called upon to work any 
overtime ... following his [sic] return to work 
after the absence for a period which is normally 
14 days. The exact duration may be subject to 
consideration in particular cases. [NSWIC, In 
re AI&S Award, December 8, 1971. Industrial 
Reports, 1971, 922]
The union outburst above certainly reflects the atmosphere
of plant level industrial relations at Port Kembla in the
1960s and 1970s. Workers, union officials and industrial
officers alike, recollect many instances of deep mutual
suspicion and mistrust. One company official is cited in
a company publication in the 1970s as believing that
There is no field of company endeavour as 
complex and frustrating and, in some cases, 
vicious and certainly less rewarding than that
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of industrial relations and the Company should 
be continually reviewing its efforts to see u/hat 
can be done to improve matters. [ 'An area that 
cannot be ignored', BHP Review. 1977:13]
Other Port Kembla officers in personal interviews 
admitted that, at the behest of company policy in former 
years, they would go to great lengths to avoid 
non-adversarial contact with the unions. Even in small 
matters such as collecting union membership numbers for 
company records, company policy was to avoid contact with 
the unions. Union officials could only enter the plant in 
the company of a security guard, and then only in extreme 
cases and with formal advance notice. These low-trust 
company attitudes of the 1970s are exemplified by an 
incident in 1975. Local union officials were not told of 
a serious accident, which included one fatality, even 
though the officials were at the plant at the time of the 
accident. [NSWIC, In re AI&S P/L Re Right of Entry, No 
351 of 1975]
The usually authoritarian, as opposed to human relations 
or participative, style of line management and heavy 
reliance on arbitration, even in minor issues, by 
industrial relations management were countered by an 
aggressive union approach to industrial relations. 
Stoppages could cause considerable losses in output, since 
ironmaking, and steelmaking and rolling are consecutive 
and interdependent processes. A stoppage in one area 
affects both upstream and downstream production. Hours 
lost through strikes fluctuated markedly from the 
mid-1970s, but were frequently at record levels whether
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measured in hours lost or numbers of strikes. From the
last years of the 1970s however, the number of strikes and 
work bans began to increase significantly, as did hours 
lost through strikes. [See Table 3.3 and Appendix 4; 
Quinlan, 1986]
The pressures of rising strike levels in an increasingly 
competitive world steel market were noted by BHP 
management in the late 1970s, and the company appears to 
have reassessed its management education programmes at the 
end of the decade. Company reports and publications 
displayed a new emphasis on human relations management 
education for supervisors who seem to have had little 
training previously. These attempts appeared to have 
little effect. The pattern of plant level industrial 
relations scarcely altered, apart from a slight drop in 
working days lost through strikes at Port Kembla in 1980. 
It is worth noting that this also mirrored a national 
trend in manufacturing. [See Table 3.3 and Appendix 4; 
BHP Annual Report, 1980: 14; ABS Labour Statistics, 1980]
Industrial relations during the steel crisis
As can be seen in Appendix 4 strike levels fluctuated 
markedly, as the toll of resignations and retrenchments 
increased towards the latter half of 1982. After a record 
number of hours lost in 1981 a sharp drop in the first 
half of 1982 is responsible for the apparent decline in 
strike levels for the year as a whole. However, in the 
second half of the year a record number of employees was
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involved in strike activity. By contrast, the first half 
of 1983 was characterised by a very marked reduction in 
strikes, a trend which was to be sustained for some years.
The reasons for these fluctuation are not clear. Lustig 
[1985] argues, from the context of American plant closures 
in single-industry dependent regions, that these kinds of 
workforce reductions are a part of managerial tactics 
designed to achieve 'an isolated and demobilised 
workforce'. In conditions of closure or heavy 
rationalisation of the workforce in a dependent region, 
there are few alternative opportunities for the displaced 
workers. In this case, the effect of mass job losses is 
to dislodge communities and create barriers between those 
with jobs and those without. Certainly, the impact of the 
retrenchment shocks was immense in Wollongong with its 
narrow industrial base and already high levels of 
unemployment. A complete shutdown of Newcastle steel 
works and a partial shutdown at Port Kembla over Christmas 
1982, the first since the 1930s depression, emphasised to 
workers BHP's determination to reduce its operations 
considerably. In this respect the high number of strikes 
in late 1982, most of which were directly related to the 
manner and timing of retrenchments, can be seen as the 
last attempt by unions for some time to use industrial 
action to any great degree. [Simson, 'BHP Crisis Plan - 
Newcastle May Shut' BRW September 11, 1982: 8-11; Fisher 
Judgement; Schultz, 1984: 63-120; Taylor, 'Unions Get The 
Message, BRW, November 6 1982: 34-5; Thirlwell, 1986: 5]
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The other major response of workers and unions to the 
rapid and intense period of rationalisation was an array 
of actions via the Industrial Commission for whatever 
protection could be found. These formal responses by the 
unions were primarily reactive, attempting first to stop 
redundancy. When that failed, and the inevitability and 
expected magnitude of job losses was recognised, unions 
tried to achieve the best redundancy scheme possible. 
Even prior to retrenchments, unions had begun a series of 
actions designed to ameliorate the impact of 
rationalisation on workers. The first of these was the 
Margins/Hours Case decided in February 1982. This case 
was one outcome of an intensive national campaign for a 
shorter working week in selected 'leader' industries.[ 
NSWIC, No 754 of 1981; Seminar on the Steel Industry, 
1986: 42-4; Hearn, 1982: 101-2]
The significant gains of the Margins/Hours case, besides 
a 38 hour week for all employees, included:
- increased margins for tradesmen and skilled workers
- a strengthening of the union preference clause
- a better deal for union officials at the plant, including 
easier access to members
- introduction of a dispute settlement procedure
- union agreement to no further claims for three years, 
outside national wage movements
- agreement to examine and negotiate over inefficient work 
practices.
By late 1982 however, the rapid reduction in the
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workforce was the primary concern of the Port Kembla 
unions. Contrary to previous practice, very few of the 
600 apprentices were to be kept on at the end of their 
training. The voluntary resignation scheme had been 
expanded to cover nearly all job classifications at the 
plant and the pace of retrenchments was increasing. This 
led to:
- two major redundancy cases (the Redundancy Suspension 
Case and the Redundancy Pay Case)
- an application to vary Awards by the insertion of a 
technological change clause
- a significant inquiry into the problems of the Steel 
Industry (hereafter Fisher Inquiry, not to be confused 
with the separate outcome of the Inquiry referred to 
subsequently as the Fisher Judgement)
All of these took place in the NSW Industrial 
Commission. At the same time as these hearings, intensive 
union-management discussions took place at the steelworks 
over the timing and criteria for retrenchments.
In the Redundancy Suspension case in September - October 
1982, [Australian Industrial Law Review, (AILR), Vol 24, 
1982: 462] the Industrial Commission dismissed company
claims that it lacked jurisdiction over such matters as 
redundancies. It also rejected union claims that 
retrenchments should be suspended until the Commission had 
examined matters relating to the BHP justifications for 
the retrenchments which the Minister for Industrial 
Relations had referred to the Commission.
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The full extent of union claims was not accepted in the 
Redundancy Pay case which was heard by Mr. Justice Fisher 
shortly after the Redundancy Suspension Case. 
Retrenchment benefits were increased, especially for those 
who had between six and twelve months employment at BHP 
steel plant. These employees were to receive 1.25 weeks' 
basic pay (basic wage, plus margin plus average bonus, but 
not shift allowances or overtime payments) for each year 
or part year of service if they were less than 55 years of 
age, and 1.5 weeks' basic pay for each year and part year 
if they were 55 or over. These rates were also to apply 
to longer term employees. All retrenched employees were 
also to receive an additional lump sum severance payment 
equivalent to four weeks ordinary pay. With the addition 
of severance pay and a higher rate of pay for each week of 
service, retrenchment benefits exceeded Voluntary 
Retirement Scheme benefits. They still, however, fell 
short of the union claims for four weeks pay for each year 
of service and other benefits in line with ACTU redundancy 
policy. Non-monetary gains were closer to union claims, 
with the Commission deciding in favour of union claims for 
increased notification of pending redundancies, new 
obligations for the company in notifying unions as well as 
employees of likely retrenchments, and paid leave for 
those notified of retrenchment to look for alternative 
employment. f AILR, 25, 8, 1983:154-7; 'ACTU Working
Conditions Policy', 1983]
The Report of the Steel Industry Inquiry (hereafter the
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Fisher Judgement) was much broader than the specific 
redundancy cases. The Fisher Judgement summarised and 
discussed the main issues and events. The Inquiry had 
taken considerable evidence from unions, governments, BHP, 
and organisations and industries linked to basic iron and 
steelmaking. The main findings of the Inquiry were 
related to a proposal for a steel industry crisis plan. 
In part, this closely resembled BHP's earlier proposals 
which the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) had 
rejected. These had included a guaranteed high level of 
BHP investment in capital equipment over several years in 
return for government assistance in the form of tax 
allowances and increased protection. Mr. Justice Fisher 
also strongly propounded bipartite and tripartite 
approaches to the problems of employment, industrial 
relations and industrial restructuring. In doing so he 
argued that “without some sense of partnership and without 
common objectives, the rescue operation is unlikely to 
succeed." [Fisher Judgement]
In November 1982 while the Fisher Inquiry was first 
hearing evidence, the Combined Steel Unions also mounted a 
case to insert a technological change clause under Section 
88G of the NSW Industrial Arbitration Act. This section, 
which had been added in 1964, prescribed minimum periods 
of notice for employees to be displaced by the 
introduction of technological change. The Commission 
accepted inclusion of such a technological change clause 
into the awards, albeit disapprovingly, given the 'no
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further claims clause' inserted into the award after the
Margins/Hours Case earlier in the year. Because of this 
clause, and in light of the fact that the technological 
change clause had been available for inclusion for nearly 
twenty years, the Commission refused union claims for 
retrospectivity, and set the inclusion date a month after 
the decision. [MLR, 25,3, 1983: 56-60]
As has been shown in this section, the unions' responses 
to the steel industry crisis had utilised the traditional 
approaches in the steel industry of recourse to industrial 
tribunals. The tactics were defensive in intent, but 
provided some gains. For example the Margins/ Hours Case 
provided for easier access to members for union officials, 
and the development of some formal mechanisms for 
consultation and dispute resolution. Though not much 
utilised immediately, the new structures indicated some 
potential for less aggressive industrial relations at Port 
Kembla steelworks.
BHP's role in industrial relations during the crisis of 
1981-3 has been shown in this section to be aimed at 
withstanding any pressures to increase its redundancy 
payout or alter the timing and nature of workforce 
reductions. The company management believed that 
contraction in production and workforce size was an urgent 
need. Consequently, managers were willing to change 
formerly unshakeable attitudes to bargaining with the 
unions, in order to meet the new imperatives.
The Margins/Hours case was a notable example of this
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shift in attitudes. It contained strong indications that 
BHP u/as beginning to modify its attitudes to industrial 
relations. Included in the Margins/Hours agreement was a 
specific agreement from management to consultative 
procedures and to closer communications with union 
officials. Later these would have a significant effect on 
the nature of union-management relations, especially at 
Port Kembla. The appointment of John Clark as General 
Manager at Port Kembla, in early 1982, accelerated the 
trend towards a more open human relations style of 
management which was noticeably different from the 
traditional BHP attitude. [Schultz, 1984: 66]
However while remarkable in comparison with 1970s 
industrial relations, most of the gains were buried under 
the stresses of a continuing decline in steel demand with 
resultant cost pressures. These also led to BHP's strong 
stand before the IAC for a high level of assistance and 
protection contingent upon a heavy programme of capital 
investment. In this the company failed. It was the same 
in its lobbying of the Fraser Liberal government, which 
responded with widely publicised criticisms of the BHP 
board and the way it managed its business. [Simson, 
'Don't Take Fraser for granted', BRW, September 4, 
1982:28; Penberthy, 'Comment', BRW, September 4, 1982: 4; 
Simson, 'BHP to Win on Steel - At a Cost', BRW, April 9, 
1983: 16; BHP Annual Report. 1983: 89; Wentworth, 1983: 
83-5]
By 1983 the inadequacy of the piecemeal approach in
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times of crises, with BHP applying to governments for 
assistance of various kinds, while the unions worked 
through the Industrial Commission, was evident to all. It 
became clear to the parties that a more unified approach 
to the industry's problems may benefit them more.
The Steel Industry Plan
In March 1983 a Federal Labor government was elected. 
It was committed to national industrial development 
through bipartism and tripartism, and so presented the 
opportunity to develop an integrated approach to the
problems of the steel industry. [Stilwell, 1986:101-3; 
Higgins and Ewer, 1987: 78-95; Ewer, Higgins and Stevens,
1987: 96-118] As a consequence, BHP increased pressure on 
the new government for its assistance in resolving the 
industry's problems. In this BHP was aided by the timely 
recommendation from the Fisher Inquiry in May 1983 for a 
Steel Industry Crisis Plan. By this time the rate of
workforce reductions had slackened greatly but low
productivity, and cost and market pressures were still of 
great public concern to BHP. Steel regions reeled under 
the impact of very high unemployment levels and the
possibility of continuing job losses. In this context 
negotiations between the new Labor government, BHP, the 
ACTU, and some steel union representatives began in the 
middle of 1983.
The outcomes of these negotiations was announced as the 
Steel Industry Plan by Senator John Button in August 1983.
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[Senator J. Button, Minister for Industry and Commerce, 
News Release on Steel Industry Plan, August, 1983. 
(Hereafter SIPNR)] The primary objective of the Steel 
Industry Plan was to reestablish a viable and 
internationally competitive steel industry, which in turn 
would aid the recovery of other steel-dependent 
industries. The Steel Industry Plan was to be effected 
through the joint efforts and individual commitments from 
government, employers and unions.
For its part, the Federal Government would:
- set up a Steel Industry Authority (SIA) to monitor, 
analyse, and report on the plan, and on the parties 
within it.
- provide up to $70.lm dollar bounty payments annually on 
certain types of steel.
- impose import quotas on certain products.
- develop safety mechanisms to monitor and act upon changes 
in import levels and production levels.
- provide other assistance in order to make the plan fully 
effective, using if necessary organisations such as the 
IAC and Temporary Assistance Authority (TAA).
To achieve such improvements, the plan required 
commitment from steel unions and their workers
- to keep wage costs within guidelines of the Prices and 
Incomes Accord.
- to improve productivity in excess of the national 
productivity changes.
- fulfil other commitments through a specific BHP/Unions
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If these u/ere fulfilled, together with the inputs from 
government and BHP, then workers and their unions stood to 
gain a cessation of compulsory retrenchments for the life 
of the plan, greater job security and 'good industrial 
relations'. [SIPNR: 6-7; Steel Industry Authority 
Quarterly Report, (hereafter SIAQR), March, 1984: 18-28]
For its part, BHP was:
- expected to invest about $800m over 5 years in capital
equipment which would induce productivity increases and 
better steel quality. In August 1983 $500m of this was 
firmly committed, although the agreement specified that 
each item "would however be subject to a normal
commercial evaluation at the time the project was to be 
undertaken". [SIPNR: 4]
- The second major commitment from BHP was in its
acceptance of the monitoring aspects of the plan, which 
required that the SIA record production and price levels 
of a variety of steel types, as well as employment and 
industrial relations indicators, data which BHP had 
previously kept confidential.
- The third aspect of its commitment to the Plan was BHP's
negotiation of the Steel Accord, which demanded a much
higher level of mutual trust than had featured previously 
across the industry.
It is interesting to note that the Australian steel 
industry 'Accord' had some similarities in intent with 
similar and sometimes like-named agreements between U.S.
'Accord' (hereafter the Steel Accord).
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steel companies and their unions since 1984. [See 
'Steelworkers Bend and Bow' The Economist, 29 March, 1986: 
26-7] Beside their bipartite rather than tripartite 
nature, the main difference between the steel agreements 
of the two countries was that wage cuts were a central 
feature of the American response. This approach partly 
reflected the fact the U.S. steel workers have been the 
highest paid in the world, as well as being highly paid 
relative to workers in other industries within the United 
States. [Kassalow, 1985; US Steel News. July 1982: 4-6] 
Unlike the American agreements, a major focus of the 
Australian Steel Accord, was on productivity increases. 
Part of the Steel Accord also set down procedures for 
joint setting of productivity targets at each plant. To 
effect such targets, the Steel Accord also required joint 
assessment of work practices which might affect 
productivity. These discussions had in fact been 
occurring sporadically since the 1982 Margins/Hours case.
A dispute settlement procedure was introduced in the 
Margins/Hours agreement, though not widely practised at 
the shop floor. The procedure outlined a defined set of 
steps to be taken to attempt to remedy a workplace 
grievance. Like many other such dispute settlement 
procedures, the procedure moved in hierarchical lines. 
Grievances were to be raised first with supervisors, then 
superintendents and so on, with industrial action and 
recourse to tribunals as the last resort. The Steel 
Accord reaffirmed the role of the dispute settlement
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procedure as a means of dealing u/ith disputes at workplace 
level. The aim of the dispute settlement procedure was to 
prevent the former practices of implementing sanctions 
with little negotiation, or one of the parties retreating 
quickly to the Commission. These practices had led to the 
escalation of many minor disputes. In line with these 
changes, there was also a new emphasis on stronger, more 
formalised channels of information sharing between unions 
and the company over an array of economic and industrial 
matters. [Seminar on the Steel Industry, 1986: 42-6]
The third major area of the joint agreement was in wage 
determination. The unions agreed to wage changes only 
within the constraints of the ACTU/ALP Accord. In its 
first three years of operation, the National Accord 
designated wage increases tied to movements in the 
consumer price index, barring a few exceptions. The steel 
unions kept their claims within these limits which varied 
after 1983 in the face of changing economic circumstances 
and resultant changes in the national system of wage 
determination. This flexibility which underpinned the 
continuation of the Accord was evident in 'Accord Mark 
III1 of 1986 with its intimations of further plant level 
bargaining from 1987. [Castle and Hagan, 1985; Castle and 
Hagan 1987; Dabscheck, 1989]
Much of its content of Steel Accord was not new. Its 
strength appears to derive from the national context of 
consensus based industrial relations, and from the way in 
which the Steel Industry Plan integrated a variety of
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earlier agreements. Some of these arose out of the 
Margins/Hours case of 1982, and other negotiations which 
took place in 1982-3, such as the no-further-redundancies 
agreement between BHP and the FIA prior to publication of 
the Fisher Judgement. [Personal interviews, Organisers, 
Federated Ironworkers' Association (Port Kembla Branch), 
August - September, 1986] Together with the formal 
union/management negotiations over work practices and 
jointly set productivity targets, these processes, seen 
separately, constitute an admixture of plant, enterprise 
and national industrial relations processes. The Steel 
Industry Plan attempted to provide them with direction and 
focus.
At the centre of the Steel Industry Plan was the Steel 
Industry Authority (SIA). Its role was to facilitate 
bipartite and tripartite communications, and monitor, 
analyse and advise on the progress and needs of the plan. 
Theoretically much of the success of the Steel Industry 
Plan would depend on the effectiveness and credibility of 
the Authority despite the fact that the SIA was the one 
new structure. Certainly the vagueness of its objectives, 
as set out in the SIA Act (January 1984), "to analyse 
steel industry matters and conduct enquiries and make 
recommendations", [SIAQR, March 1984: 32], offered the 
potential for ineffectuality.
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The working and impact of the Steel Industry Plan was 
far broader than this. Even at its commencement in 
January 1984 the SIA noted that relationships between the 
employers and unions had already improved. Output and 
productivity were increasing, negotiations of the Steel 
Accord were in the final stages, and the trend to lower 
strike levels seemed to be sustained. [SIAQR, March 1984: 
18-9]
If the success of the plan is to be judged by strike 
levels, then its effects, until the end of 1985 at least, 
appeared remarkable. [SIAQR, September 1986: Table 11; 
SIAQR, December 1985: 19. Note-:The SIA used the more 
traditional "hours lost per employee, unlike most strike 
calculations in this thesis which are based on "hours lost 
per 'wages' worker".] Strike hours lost per worker at Port 
Kembla were about one-sixth of those in 1981, and even 
during the more strike prone year of 1986 strike hours 
lost per worker were less than a third of 1981 levels. 
But even before the Steel Industry Plan was implemented, 
strike levels had halved. Although the downward trend was 
sustained through 1984-5, the reasons for neither the 
initial drop in strikes nor the continuing fall in strike 
levels are clear.
The initial reduction in part reflected the anticipation 
of a Steel Industry Plan, in a pervading climate of 
national consensus politics in 1983. The demoralising
Industrial Relations under the Steel Plan 1983-7
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effect of job losses on workers in the depressed steel 
regions also had considerable impact. The SIA attributed 
the fall in strike levels to a commitment to the Steel 
Accord, particularly the exercise of the grievance 
procedures. However strikes or adherence to grievance 
procedures are usually a reflection of union-management 
relationships at plant level, while the Steel Industry 
Plan was an agreement negotiated at national level with 
variable local input.
Conversely, the episodes of higher strike levels in 1986 
and early 1987 do not necessarily indicate a lack of 
commitment to grievance procedures or the Steel Industry 
Plan. Rather they were a consequence of events external 
to the framework of the Steel Industry Plan. Grievance 
procedures are not designed to deal with broader issues. 
They have been devised to reduce the escalation of 
workplace disputes by dealing with grievances at their 
source. The episodes of increased strike activity at Port 
Kembla in 1986 and 1987 were related to issues well beyond 
the limits of workplace grievances.
Strike .levels in 1986 rose noticeably first as a 
consequence of union dissatisfaction throughout Australia 
with the very slow progress of the National Wage Case. 
Later in the year strikes were seemingly related to a 
strong challenge from FIA National Office candidates to 
the local FIA Rank and File Team, prior to the FIA 
elections in November. The same pattern of higher strike 
levels shortly before FIA elections was discernible during
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the 1970s. It possibly reflected the impact on plant 
level industrial relations of the competing factions 
within the FIA. The National Office has campaigned very 
actively to regain control over the Port Kembla branch 
since it was voted out in 1970.
From November 1986 hours lost through strikes again 
began to resemble the earlier low levels until the 
Workers' Compensation strikes from March 1987. Port 
Kembla unions attempted concerted action to pressure the 
NSW Unsworth Labor Government to reverse its radical 
legislative changes to Workers' Compensation in which 
access to Common Law rights in the case of work injuries 
was removed. [IM, May 1987; see especially, 29 May 1987] 
Once the unsuccessful campaign to reverse this legislation 
was ended, strike levels again fell markedly and remained 
very low thereafter. Each of the issues which led to the 
episodes of high strike levels came from outside the steel 
industry so that use of the dispute settlement procedure 
was inappropriate. Consequently the impact of the Steel 
Industry Plan was diffused or mitigated by circumstances 
external to its framework.
A more easily identifiable factor in overall improvement 
in industrial relations was the change in managerial style 
and tactics at Port Kembla in thhe early 1980s. This had 
occurred largely independent of the Steel Industry Plan, 
and was increasingly evident from the beginning of the 
decade. In this, the roles of economic recession, 
retrenchment shocks and the Steel Industry Plan are
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reinforcing influences rather than determinants of change. 
As noted above, there was an evident change in attitudes 
to the management of industrial relations in the outcomes 
of the Margins/Hours case of 1982. The new emphasis on 
management training, a more consultative approach to the 
implementation of new technology, more open and frequent 
management/union communications, and the provision of 
joint union/management seminars for plant workers and the 
local community, all pointed to a significant change in 
management style. [Seminar on the Steel Industry. 1986: 
30-9]
The marked shift in BHP managerial tactics was 
reinforced by the processes and aims of the Steel Industry 
Plan. Particularly through its executive arm, the SIA, 
the plan promoted and prescribed bipartite and tripartite 
consultation at all levels. The role of the SIA was quite 
different to other government organisations which have 
previously dealt with industry policies or problems. It 
consistently attempted to follow the role of active 
coordinator and facilitator of the Steel Industry Plan, 
monitoring and guiding the plan without recourse to its 
formal powers, few though they were.
In the same way that the SIA used its monitoring and 
organising capabilities to oversee the relationships 
between the parties, it also monitored the investment 
activities of BHP. A major aspect of the plan had been 
BHP1 s agreement to invest $800 million during the life of 
the plan, and some writers have seen this high level of
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capital investment as central to the restructuring and 
stabilising of the steel industry. [Fisher Judgement; 
Larcombe, 1983: 130-9] As SIA reports have shown the final 
amount of investment was much higher than this, with well 
over $800m authorised in the first two and a half years 
and $1350m to June 1987. The Port Kembla steelworks was 
the major beneficiary of this investment. However Port 
Kembla was the most modern plant in Australia before the 
Steel Industry Plan was introduced and so most likely to 
return gains in the longer term.
Considerations of BHP investment options should also 
include the widely held belief that plant closure was a 
serious option in 1982. Another possibility was to 
operate steel plants with minimal investment until such 
plant became too rundown to be economically viable, as 
occurred in the U.S. in the 1970s. [Wilshire et al, 1983: 
66; Fisher Judgement, 1983; Laver, 1983; Rosegger, 1986: 
310-3;] From the industrial relations perspective BHP 
investment commitments were sufficient to identify BHP's 
continuing commitment to the steel industry, especially at 
Port Kembla.
Much of the new investment was necessary maintenance or 
essential upgrading to current technology. Many European 
steel plants had taken this approach when faced with the 
new competitiveness in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
[Wilshire et al, 1983: 45-7ff; Messerlin and Saunders, 
1983; Schro"ter, 1986: 361-408; Ewer, Higgins and Stevens, 
1987: 52-82] Just as BHP did during the years of the Steel
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Industry Plan, European steel plants divested themselves 
completely of older processes such as the labour intensive 
open hearth process of steelmaking and the ingot route. 
The second slabcaster almost entirely removed this 
process. The low proportion of continuous casting in 
Australian steelmaking by the early 1980s had been the 
source of much criticism from observers who believed that 
this signified low investment in new technology, which 
then reduced the industry's competitiveness. Comparisons, 
however, between steel industries in different countries 
need to be treated with caution. Continuous casting, for 
example, was initially developed and utilised to reduce 
energy costs in countries with low energy resources, which 
was not the case in Australia. Like many of the new 
capital works, the second caster was also aimed at 
improving steel quality and fulfilling customer 
specifications more exactly, since continuous casting 
offers a far higher degree of evenness, specificity, and 
precision. [Simson, 'We will Reshape the Pork Barrel', 
BRW, May 8 1982: 16-8; Schultz, 1984: 96; Donaldson, 1982; 
Larcombe, 1983; Simson, 'BHP may Shut Newcastle' BRW, 
September, 11 1982: Interviews, Company managers, 1987]
Conclusion
The dominant contextual influence on industrial 
relations in Australian steel plants has been the nature 
of the product market. From its monopoly position, BHP 
simplv expanded its capacity by very considerable degrees
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during the postwar years to meet the increasing demand for 
steel in Australia and world-wide. This demand began to 
slacken in the 1970s, but for BHP this was not so much a 
problem as it was overseas. The capacity to produce 
relatively cheap steel in Australia, together with 
expectation of major gas, oil and minerals development at 
the end of the 1970s directed the company's attention away 
from the international steel market. In all this, the 
practice of industrial relations at steel plants retained 
the unmistakeable stamp of BHP, although each plant 
reflected local variations. In a market which appeared 
expansionary, BHP managers at company level saw little 
reason to move away from the traditional confrontationist, 
and sometimes repressive, approach to industrial 
relations.
Once the effect of the declining product market in a 
recessive national economic environment became apparent, 
BHP began to reassess its management styles and approaches 
for the first time in the late 1970s. However as the 
steel industry crisis deepened from the end of 1981, BHP 
publicly expressed fears for the very viability of the 
Australian steel industry. Major rationalisation of steel 
production and employment took place from the end of 1981 
until mid-1983. This was followed by a tripartite 
national rescue operation, the Steel Industry Plan, which 
was to run from 1984 until 1988 with the aim of a viable 
national steel industry by the end of the Plan. Adherents 
of the Steel Industry Plan claim that it not only led to a
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viable steel industry, but it also achieved a change in 
company - union relations, a change which was markedly 
more consultative and cooperative than BHP plants had ever 
been.
It is difficult however to identify fully the impact of 
the Steel Industry Plan since it was implemented after a 
period of intensive change. On its own, the changes prior 
to the plan brought about shifts affecting the nature of 
industrial relations in BHP1s plants. As well, the role 
of SIA was centralised, whereas plant level relationships 
depend considerably on local managers and local unions. 
From a wider perspective too, the effect of the Steel 
Industry Plan was diffused by the improved national 
economic outlook and environment for industrial relations 
from 1983.
Sometime after 1980 but prior to the Steel Industry 
Plan, there was noticeable alteration in the pattern and 
nature of industrial relations at Port Kembla steelworks. 
It was characterised by a significant move away from the 
traditional confrontationist and aggressive 
management-union interaction. This was, in part at least, 
an outcome of changes in managerial style towards a more 
consultative approach which accepted the particular 
requirements of workers and officials as valid. The 
changing managerial approach was a consequence of the 
economic pressures on BHP to manage its workforce less 
aggressively in the increasingly competitive domestic and 
international environment for steel.
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The first evidence of this change was in the 
Margins-Hours case of early 1982 which may be seen as the 
first union response to impending rationalisation of 
employment and production. As part of this agreement a 
grievance procedure was introduced at all plants, and 
union officials were given easier access to the plant. 
These, as were agreements to examine work practices and 
set productivity targets, were also central to a BHP - 
steel unions agreement which was a significant element of 
the Steel Industry Plan. The SIA attributed the early 
reduction in strike levels and overall productivity 
increases to the plan itself. However, this view ignores 
the changes in union-management relations at plant level 
and the existence of the new procedures prior to the plan.
As well, the impact of retrenchment shocks especially in 
the six months from 1982 clearly had a significant effect 
on strikes for some time and so also diffuses the role 
played by the Steel Industry Plan. Certainly in contrast 
to the very low level of industrial action in 1983-5, 
strike levels increased rapidly in 1986-7, albeit as a 
consequence of events over which the SIA had little 
control. By late 1987 dispute levels had returned to 
those of the first years of the plan. The effect of the 
Steel Industry Plan can be seen to have enhanced the 
changes in industrial relations which occurred prior to 
the announcement of the plan. It integrated the economic 
and industrial relations needs of all the protagonists in 
a specific tripartite agreement. In doing so, it built
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upon changes that became quite evident in management and 
union attitudes as a consequence of the steel crisis in 
1981-3. It had become apparent to employers, steel unions 
and the state by these years that their different needs 
u/ere interdependent and so required a unified response. 
The Steel Industry Plan was an attempt to fulfil the needs 
of each party and demanded commitments from each.
It might be argued that the effectiveness of the Steel 
Industry Plan was negated by the high strike levels or 
variable productivity levels since the inception of the 
plan. Certainly these pinpoint some vulnerability in 
agreements negotiated at national level for implementation 
at plant level. The causes of the periods of strike 
activity in 1986 and 1987 were well beyond the framework 
of the Steel Industry Plan agreements but this does not 
signify that the Steel Industry Plan was ineffective. 
Similarly weak improvements in productivity after 1984 do 
not imply lack of commitment to the Steel Industry Plan. 
While the initial target of 250 tonnes per employee per 
annum was achieved with remarkable rapidity, further 
sustained improvements were not evident. But this was a 
consequence of technical difficulties with new plant, as 
well as arising from such causes as shortages of iron 
which reflected production problems in older plant. These 
unanticipated weaknesses do not negate the Steel Industry 
Plan but suggest that future national tripartite industry 
strategies may need to take greater account of other 
issues such as the specific needs of particular regions
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and the validity of expectations of output growth where 
new technology is primarily designed to promote quality 
rather than increased production.
The degree and nature of change in plant level 
industrial relations between the 1960s and 1980s was thus 
an outcome of the changing product market. As long as the 
product market offered the opportunity for expansion and 
high profits, there was little incentive for company and 
plant management to alter their traditional industrial 
relations practices. Once the context for industrial 
relations at the Port Kembla steelworks required a 
diminished, but cooperative and committed workforce, 
management altered its industrial relations practices. 
These changes in plant level industrial relations were 
enhanced by the Steel Industry Plan. But the pattern of 
plant level relations conceals a wealth of variations in 
workplace level industrial relations. At the level of the 
workplace, company and plant level priorities are diluted. 
Differences in technology, work and management at 
different workplaces generate different patterns in 





TRADITIONS AND OLD TECHNOLOGY:
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE OPEN HEARTHS« 1967 - 1982
Open hearth steelmaking dates from the late nineteenth 
century u/hen it superseded puddling, and later the 
Bessemer process which had been developed about the same 
time. [Stone, 1974; Pollard, 1959; Fitch, 1910; 
Wilkinson, 1977] As an old technology, the norms and 
traditions of open hearth steelmaking were clearly defined 
for its workers and managers at Port Kembla steelworks 
during the decades under study in this thesis. As this 
chapter will demonstrate, workplace relations at the open 
hearths in these years were characterised by settled 
patterns of both work organisation and labour - management 
relations. The chapter describes and analyses the effect 
of this stability of traditions as well as the fragmented 
nature of the large and diverse workforce at the periphery 
of the production process. It is argued that it was these 
factors that led to very peaceful industrial relations in 
the open hearth during the last years of this form of 
steelmaking in Australia.
As in most aspects of work organisation and work 
relations in the Australian steel industry, the origins of 
open hearth management and work organisation were a blend 
of American and British traditions, as Chapter 1 
described. The internal labour market and the high esteem 
in which the most experienced operators were held, derived
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from the British open hearths. From the U.S.A came the 
singularly high levels of authority and power accorded to 
the foremen. In both Australia and the United States, 
foremen had the power to fire workers or discipline them 
in a variety of ways with little reference to higher 
management, although this began to be limited in Australia 
in the 1970s. Union traditions in Australia also tempered 
this power, just as the mystique of British melters was 
tempered by the differing patterns of work organisation in 
Australia. All workers in open hearths shared the dusty 
and hot conditions. Most jobs included considerable heavy 
manual work, even in the latter years of open hearth 
steelmaking when forklifts and mobile cranes had removed 
the need for some of the most back-breaking tasks. 
[Kembla News, Special Edition, 1980]
This chapter will examine the links between three sets 
of factors - the demands and traditions of open hearth 
work, the role of management in organising work and work 
processes, and the relative lack of disputes at the open 
hearth from the end of the 1960s until the closure of No 2 
Open Hearth in 1982. It will be argued that the 
peacefulness of open hearth industrial relations during 
its last years, at a time when steel industry industrial 
relations were increasingly aggressive, was a consequence 
of these interrelated factors. Some of these factors, 
such as the company's employment and confrontationist 
labour relations policies acted in contradiction to other 
policies, such as the efforts to develop a stable core
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workforce dependent on steel employment. Overlaid on 
these kinds of contradictions was BHP's imperative to 
maintain a high level of production. In response to
senior management's imperatives, workplace management 
tended to tolerate customs and practices which provided 
for better industrial relations and more efficient
production.
To clarify the links between the workplace and wider 
imperatives, and also the links between work and
industrial relations, requires firstly an examination of 
the nature of open hearth steelmaking, and the ways in 
which company, plant and workplace management sought to 
determine output and workplace relations. This will be 
followed by an analysis of work processes in the open 
hearth shops, the workplaces which contained several open 
hearth furnaces. In this analysis, workers' responses to 
management's tactics will be surveyed and discussed, as 
well as the constraints on worker behaviour which came 
from the age of the open hearth technology. The final 
section assesses the implications of these factors for 
industrial relations in the open hearth at Port Kembla 
until their closure in the early 1980s.
In doing so, considerable importance is attached to the
role and impact on workplace relations of the internal
labour market. This term is used as originally defined by
Doeringer and Piore [1971: 1] as
an administrative unit ...within which the 
pricing and allocation of labour is 
governed by a set of administrative rules 
and procedures.
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As Creedy and Whitfield, [1987: 1] drawing on Doeringer
and Piore [1971] note, internal labour markets have
several primary distinguishing features including,
the low turnover of employees, the 
attachment of wages to jobs rather than 
workers, the restriction of entry to lower 
level positions, the filling of higher 
level positions by internal promotions and 
a heavy emphasis on seniority in 
promotion.
One factor which enhances the function of internal labour 
markets is the presence of significant elements of skill 
specificity, that is specific skills for a particular 
classification or job. Such skills are not readily 
portable to other workplaces.
An important aspect of strong work traditions in 
steelmaking in Australia and overseas was the esteem given 
to particular skills acquired in on-the-job training, such 
as those of the melter. As is discussed below, the strong 
internal labour market in the open hearth derived from the 
need for specific skills in open hearths, which depended, 
far more than later steelmaking technology, on the skills 
acquired at the workplace. At the same time, the internal 
labour market, by its structure, was part of the 
management control system. The traditions of the outgoing 
steelmaking technology were enhanced by the strong 
workplace identification, while the internal labour market 
created further conditions for 'mild1 approaches to 
industrial relations at the open hearth.
Further, the basis of the internal labour market was
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that it led to the acquisition of skills, which u/ere 
highly workplace specific. During the 1970s the very 
likelihood of the closure of the old open hearth shops 
also served to influence longer serving workers' fears for 
their job security. The fragmented nature of the more 
recently employed workforce and the company's punitive 
industrial relations policies before the steel crisis of 
1981-3, as described in the previous chapter, also 
weakened the potential for strong collective responses at 
the workplace. It is also possible, however, that the 
very placidity of open hearth industrial relations until 
the 1970s was a reason for its continued production, 
despite the outmoded nature of the technology and relative 
inefficiency of open hearth steelmaking.
Open hearth steelmaking: work and production processes 
An open hearth shop comprised a series of large furnaces 
linked by two clearly defined production areas, the 
charging floor at the front of the furnace, and the 
casting pit at the rear of the furnace. Adjacent to these 
areas but still integral to the open hearth were the mould 
house, where ingot moulds were rebuilt and maintained, the 
stockyard, where scrap steel was baled and sorted for the 
furnace, and the hot metal area, where molten iron from 
the nearby blast furnaces was sampled and weighed prior to 
charging into an open hearth furnace. There were also 
several other smaller work areas where open hearth 
equipment was maintained or repaired, to allow the whole
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process to be quite self-contained. As u/ell there u/as an 
array of cranes to transfer equipment and metal around the 
workplace. [Sources for this whole section include-: 
Steel, BHP n.d. (1978?); Hoskins-Kembla Works. AI&S, n.d. 
various issues; U.S. Steel Corporation, 1971: 450-93; 
Jackson, 1967: 118-21, 239-54]
This brief description of the technology does not convey 
the overpowering presence of the furnaces, which were 
housed in the equivalent of seven-storey buildings, with 
up to eight furnaces in any one shop in Australia. Mostly 
the furnaces were capable of producing about 300 tons of 
steel in each tap, the name given to the poured batch of 
steel. The largest furnace at Port Kembla steelworks was 
capable of producing 550 tons per tap, a large furnace by 
world standards. At the beginning of the period under 
study the two open hearth shops were producing well over 
three million tons of steel each year in thirteen 
furnaces. The older No 1 Open Hearth had eight furnaces, 
most of which had been built in the late 1930s. By 
contrast No 2 Open Hearth shop had first commenced 
production in 1956, with the last furnace having been 
commissioned, that is put into trial production, in 1962. 
[Hoskins-Kembla Works, n.d. (various issues, 1962-80); 
Kembla News, Special Edition, AI&S Steelmaking 1931 - 
1981, November 1981]
At their peak in the late 1960s and until the 
commissioning of the Basic Oxygen Steelmaking shop (BOS) 
in 1972, the two open hearth shops were the workplaces of
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over 1500 employees. [See Appendix 4; Company data] 
Although this made them larger than many Australian firms, 
the open hearths were undeniably workplaces as was defined 
in Chapter 1. Despite their size, the open hearths were 
production units within the larger plant. They retained a 
workplace ethos with which workers and management alike 
identified. This identification with the workplace was 
characterised by a kind of pride in the particular dangers 
of work in open hearths, and in the sometimes appalling 
conditions under which work was done. Workers also held 
traditions of mutual assistance, which derived 
primarily from the heavy demands of tasks, as a peculiarly 
open hearth trait.
This identification with the workplace extended to 
management and supervisors. Their pride in the workplace, 
however, derived more from their deep interest in the 
technology, and the metallurgical challenges and 
traditions which this rule of thumb process required. 
Interviews with former long-term open hearth employees 
left little doubt that the links with the workplace had 
been rather more than those required in the employment 
contract. What the open hearth offered was an old, stable 
rule of thumb process characterised by its almost 
unchanging nature. Modern steelmaking contrasts with this 
in almost every way.
Steelmaking involves the mixing and heating of iron, and 
scrap steel, with the addition of other materials (alloys) 
as required to give the steel particular qualities.
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Unlike the modern Basic Oxygen Steelmaking (BOS) process, 
open hearth steelmaking allowed for a widely variable mix 
of iron and scrap steel, a useful capability in the years 
prior to the commissioning of the large No 5 blast furnace 
in 1972. Boxes of scrap steel and other cold metal were 
charged through the furnace doors and heated. This was 
followed by the molten iron which was carried in 120 ton 
ladles from the hot metal area and poured into the 
furnace. Fluxes such as limestone were added so that a 
slag of the unwanted materials was formed. Once the scrap 
steel, molten iron and fluxes were charged into the 
furnace, the process of heating and firing was reversed 
automatically over the "bath" at regular intervals, during 
the seven or eight hour melting process. [BHP, Steel, 
n.d., (1978)]
In earlier times the process had taken much longer, so 
that usually steelmaking plants had a large number of 
furnaces to ensure continuous feed for the rolling mills. 
From the late 1950s however the introduction of oxygen 
injection reduced melting times by over twenty per cent. 
The introduction of oxygen injection into steelmaking was 
a significant technological change. Like many other 
changes in process technology, oxygen injection passed 
almost unnoticed outside the industry because it was an 
extension of already extant processes developed by 
suppliers to the industry. There were only few such 
changes in open hearth steelmaking however, and many of 
these involved pollution control. fHoskins-Kembla Works,
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n.d. (various issues, 1962-80); Kembla Neu/s. Special 
Edition, AI&S Steelmaking 1931 - 1981, November 1981]
At the workplace, the effects of oxygen injection on 
work processes were apparently slight, beyond increasing 
the size of the workforce as a consequence of new work in 
operating and maintaining the new equipment. However 
there is some evidence of dissatisfaction with the 
responsibilities placed on the first and second helpers, 
two of the most experienced non-trades production workers. 
[Company dispute data, April/May, 1957) Their union, the 
Federated Ironworkers' Association, (FIA), appears not to 
have taken up the matter, possibly a reflection of the 
centralised nature of the union at the time. The 
increased pace of production after the introduction of 
oxygen injection did nothing to change the generally rough 
and ready basis for defining the completion of the process 
of conversion from iron to steel. This was still a 
primarily a matter for judgement based on observation of 
the appearance of the molten metal in the furnace. 
Sampling and analysis were also done, but workers gave 
most credence to observed changes.
At Port Kembla, the decision to tap the steel was 
formally the decision of the melter foreman. More often, 
however, the decision was taken cooperatively or 
determined by the first helper, who was basically 
responsible for the metal from the charging until the 
decision to tap was effected. Once the steel was 
considered ready, the taphole on the casting side was
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blown open with the aid of compressed oxygen. The steel 
then poured, or was 'cast', into large brick ladles. 
Alloys were added and then the molten steel was poured 
into brick ingot moulds, a process called 'teeming'. 
Later when the steel had solidified, the moulds were 
stripped from the ingots. The red hot ingots were then 
transferred by rail to the mills for reheating and rolling 
[U.S Steel Corporation, 1971: 12-3; BHP, Steel, n.d.: 
12-14]
After the steel had been cast, the furnace was emptied 
of slag and then repaired. These repairs could be quite 
extensive and included the furnace roof, base, tapholes, 
doors, and oxygen lances. The metal and the condition of 
the furnace were inspected through spyholes around the 
furnace during the melting process. However, repairs 
could only be done through the open doors, when the 
furnace was empty. The heat emanating from the open 
furnace was immense. As a result, the workers responsible 
for effecting the repairs were generally assisted by 
workers in other classifications who, in turn, would be 
given assistance in their most arduous tasks. [New South 
Wales Industrial Comission (NSWIC) Transcripts; see e.g. 
Steelworks Employees (AI&S P/L) - Port Kembla Award, June 
1968, 316/1967; Personal Interviews, former open hearth 
employees]
This element of mutual assistance however was limited by 
clearly defined workplace rules of demarcation. These 
rules mainly reflected the boundaries of work set by the
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craft unions. At the open hearth, the Building Workers' 
Industrial Union (BWIU), for example, had long defined the 
boundaries between the short-term repair work, which 
non-trades workers could do on the furnaces ladles and 
launders (brick channels down which the molten steel 
flowed), and their own building and major repair work 
which required craft skills. [Company dispute data, 1969] 
Such boundaries were respected by all workers and 
generally by workplace management. Even within the 
non-trades classifications there were defined boundaries 
of mutual assistance. Minor repairs to furnaces were done 
only by those for whom such work was defined in their job 
classifications. Where there was pressure to effect 
repairs quickly, or under particularly difficult 
conditions or there were major repairs, the first helpers, 
who had prime responsibility for furnace repair, were 
aided by workers in other classifications. In these kinds 
of ways workers could achieve some degree of relief from 
the most arduous of tasks. At the same time open hearth 
management could meet its own imperatives of maintaining 
both the equipment and production levels by apparently 
ignoring the rigid job descriptions which were given 
considerable importance at plant and company levels, 
especially in award negotiations before the tribunal. 
[NSWIC work value and award transcripts; see e.g. 
Transcript of Steelworks Employees (AI&S P/L) - Port 
Kembla Award, June 1968, 316/1967: 1150-59; Personal 
Interviews former open hearth employees]
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Enhancing both the ethos of mutual assistance and the 
clear inter-union demarcation lines, was the nature of the 
external labour market during the postwar era until the 
mid-1970s. There was a significant shortage of workers 
for the Australian steel plants through most of the 
period, but the demand for steel was seemingly endless, 
in this situation, meeting production imperatives was 
highly important but so too was the maintenance of 
managerial prerogatives. This was a matter which had 
always been almost an article of faith with BHP 
management. During the era under the direction of 
Essington Lewis, it was even more strongly voiced. 
[Sheridan, 1981; Blainey, 1971; Dufty and Fells, 1989: 
230]. BHP and AIS attempted to meet the needs of worker 
shortages and an expansionary market for steel, while 
still retaining managerial prerogatives. They achieved 
this by strengthening the structures of management and 
workforce hierarchies and implementing a variety of 
tactics against unions. Overall the company was 
apparently successful, but as the following sections 
demonstrate, centralised management control strategies 
have a way of being diffused at workplace level.
Organisational structure and management of the open hearth
The management structure in the open hearth shops 
involved a seemingly clear hierarchy from the plant 
general manager to the manager of the steelmaking 
processes to the superintendent of each open hearth shop.
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The superintendent was the primary controller of
production, in complete charge of the allocation of
labour, equipment and materials. Much of this he
delegated to his assistant superintendents and foremen. 
He had the right to dismiss or discipline workers, 
although again these powers were also delegated to 
foremen. The superintendent was also expected to make all 
policies germane to the open hearth shop, except those 
limited by engineering and economic constraints. The form 
and nature of rosters and bonus settings, often highly 
contentious industrial relations issues at plant and 
workplace levels, were also an important responsibility of 
the open hearth superintendent. [Interviews with former 
open hearth management staff; Quinlan, 1983: 29]
Superintendents were usually metallurgists or engineers 
who had come through the company's technical ranks to this 
relatively senior position, with apparent responsibility 
for the working lives of 900 or more employees in an open 
hearth shop. Moreover, they identified with the older 
technology on which they had trained as junior engineers 
at a time when open hearth steelmaking was the dominant 
process. This meant that their identification with the 
technology was stronger than with newer technologies, 
which placed greater emphasis on automation and electronic 
equipment, and with which they were less familiar. An 
early manager of the BOS was quoted as saying of the end 
of open hearth steelmaking
It [the end of open hearth steelmaking]
will change the character of steelmaking
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as far as the men who operate it are 
concerned. It will leave a gap in the 
relationship between people and their work 
environment... In the old process you can 
look into the furnace and see what's 
happening. You'd run it by your own 
observation and you improve as you widen 
your experience and knowledge. [“A time 
for change", BHP Review. December, 1981:
13]
Just as the knowledge of the open hearth steelmaking 
process was based on experience and observation, so too 
was much of the training in techniques of management and 
supervision at the steelworks, until well into the 1970s. 
Superintendents had little, if any, management training. 
Generally they had reached these positions on the basis of 
seniority, combined with apparent technical and
organisational ability in more junior positions in the 
engineering career track.
Like other senior personnel, the superintendent worked a 
nine to five work day in a five day work week, but working 
such overtime as he chose, to fulfil the requirements of 
his job. This was part of the nature of the
superintendent's position within the company. It included 
the status of being on "monthly staff" rather than the 
more junior staff category of "fortnightly staff".
Thus the organisational structure of the open hearth was 
of three tiers, the managers at monthly staff level, the 
supervisors at "fortnightly" staff level and the 'wages' 
employees. As Storey [1980: 25] has argued the
differences in the treatment of the different levels of 
employees,
all spell out the message clearly: some
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[employees] are less trusted than others 
and the attachment of some is expected to 
be less forthcoming than that of others.
... Disparities of treatment reflect the 
institutionalized power which finds 
expression within the workplace...
These disparities also served as a form of control over
those aspiring to promotion through the recognised company
codes of behaviour of those at each level. The
expectation that staff, as against wages employees, would
not become union members for example, required particular
orientations to work which were not required of the
'wages' employees. Late in the 1980s, the company came to
recognise that one outcome of this kind of stratification
of employees was that it worked against, an effective
unitarist policy, whereby workers might identify more
emphatically with company goals. But until the steel
crisis, the clearly defined strata of two levels of staff
plus the 'wages' workers was central to the organisational
structure at workplace and establishment level.
Staff also had their own promotion systems, with 
movement upwards depending, in part, on identification 
with company goals. This was explicit in company policies 
to some extent, such as the preference for trainees 
(post-school students) who acquired their tertiary 
qualifications as company employees. It was only in the 
mid-1970s that the company began to employ tertiary 
graduates in significant numbers. Until then it preferred 
to employ those with professional education who had worked 
for the company from the time they left school. In this 
way, the structure of management and the resultant control
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system was maintained. It also allowed for workplaces to 
develop and maintain their own patterns of relationships, 
by continually reinforcing the internal promotion systems. 
This process of continuous reinforcement of workplace and 
company goals in the metallurgists and engineers, who 
would become workplace managers and who gained their 
professional experience in the production units, also 
reinforced the predominance of technical considerations.
The concern for technical imperatives was augmented 
through the system of promoting foremen from within the 
workplace. The complexity and cumbersome nature of open 
hearth steelmaking, and the place of steelmaking as a 
central point in an integrated plant meant that foremen 
had considerable importance in ensuring uninterrupted 
production. Foremen had significant powers over the daily 
worklives, pay levels and job security of workers. While 
their formal powers to fire workers were reduced during 
the 1970s, these supervisors of 'wages' workers 
nevertheless continued to wield considerable power. Given 
the very diverse workforce and rising levels of union 
activity on the plant it is not surprising that plant 
management at Port Kembla sought to increase the 
proportion of supervisory staff compared to numbers of 
'wages' employees during the 1970s. Thus despite almost 
unchanging total workforce numbers in the plant as a 
whole, the number of supervisors increased from under 1200 
to a peak of around 1600 in 1975 where it stayed 
throughout the 1970s. At the open hearth many of these
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foremen had u/orked their way through the hierarchy of 
wages classifications before their appointment to 
supervisory levels. However, the increasing applications 
of process control technology, even in the open hearths, 
led to new requirements for foremen to have qualifications 
in process technology, rather than shopfloor training. As 
a result the proportion of foremen promoted from the floor 
began to decline in the late 1960s in favour of those with 
formal technical qualifications.
The most obvious example of the pervading power of 
foremen has come from descriptions of a General Foreman in 
No 2 Open Hearth in the early 1970s. Russ Penrose had 
risen to this position from the labouring ranks of the 
open hearth. After the superintendent in the open hearth, 
the most power over day to day operations accrued to the 
General Foreman. He was assisted by the daywork foremen 
who only worked on dayshift, but who had a general 
responsibility for particular work areas and the 
ironworkers within these areas. Each shift was supervised 
by a Shift General Foreman, who had the responsibility for 
the work processes and production of that shift. He was 
assisted by the foremen and assistant foremen who were 
responsible for the overseeing the ironworkers in specific 
work areas in the shift. As well, each of the trades had 
their own foreman structure in a similar pattern to that 
of the non-trades production workers. Each shift had its 
own permanent staff crew, so that foremen were familiar 
with those they supervised.
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Certainly the General Foreman could u/ield significant 
power in this respect. Almost all of those former open 
hearth workers and managers interviewed in the process of 
researching this workplace offered vivid anecdotes 
describing Penrose's authoritarianism and unusually 
demanding requirements for a tidy workplace. While 
ultimate decision making responsibility rested with the 
superintendents, it was a rare superintendent who 
intervened in the General Foreman's supervision of the 
movement of metal or the allocation of overtime. Russ 
Penrose was probably the last of the General Foremen to 
have reached this senior position without further 
education. [Personal interviews, former open hearth 
employees]
The management structure at the open hearth then, rested 
on clearly defined lines of authority with two distinct 
categories of 'wages' and staff employees. Superimposed 
on this structure were the two strands of trades and 
non-trades production workers, each with occupation based 
or workplace based supervision. Each shift was 
coordinated by the shift general foremen, who were 
supervised by the General Foreman. He, in turn, was 
directly responsible to the superintendent. For trades 
and production workers, movement up the hierarchy was 
based on seniority, together with some acknowledgement of 
skills in particular areas and perceptions of suitability 
for promotion. With increasing requirements for 
post-school technical qualifications, the demand for
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shopfloor trained supervisors declined. By the end of the 
open hearth era, only about 50% of foremen had not gained 
technical certificates. Within the distinct hierarchical 
and occupational divisions in the open hearth there was a 
myriad of further divisions. These reflected both the 
complexity and cumbersome nature of open hearth 
technology, as well as the historical structures of its 
work organisation. Worker and union responses to the 
changing patterns of the labour market and job regulation 
were also influenced.
Workers and work relations in the open hearth
The technology of the open hearth was based on the 
plentiful availability of uneducated workers and had been 
designed at a time when steelmaking was highly labour 
intensive. Some of these workers could expect to learn 
and develop significant workplace-specific skills through 
observation and "helping out" in a hierarchy of jobs. 
Even the most skilled of the production tasks demanded a 
fair degree of heavy manual labour until the worker 
attained foreman status. The skills gained in the open 
hearth were not simply in the actual production and 
casting of steel, though these areas generally received 
the highest margins.
By the 1970s, there were several cranes on both the 
charging and casting sides of the open hearth shop. To 
operate each crane required different and particular 
abilities and experience. As well, there were areas such
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as the stoppermaking area, the mould house where ingot 
moulds were prepared and repaired, and the stripper house 
where ingot moulds were stripped from the ingots. The 
work processes in the open hearth were dependent on 
physical strength and the capacity to work under difficult 
and sometimes very hot conditions. Workers who stayed in 
the workplace long enough could move up the hierarchy of 
jobs and eventually into the staff category of foremen, as 
Russ Penrose had done.
The open hearths thus depended on an internal labour 
market with all the characteristics described above by 
Creedy and Whitfield. [1987: 1] It offered workers who 
had no recognised trade training, opportunities to gain 
skills and an element of job security. The jobs at the 
highest margins also offered respect for these skills and 
autonomy in decision making. The internal labour market, 
with its understandable and attainable hierarchy of jobs 
for those who stayed in the work unit, enhanced the 
traditional workplace ethos of mutual assistance, borne of 
the arduous nature of many tasks. In these kinds of ways, 
some open hearth workers provided a core of workers who 
identified strongly with the workplace and the old 
cumbersome technology.
Tradesmen formed another general group of employees in 
the open hearth, besides the ironworkers and staff. On an 
open hearth, there were daywork maintenance foremen 
responsible for bricklayers, electricians and metal trades 
workers and their “ironworker" assistants. On each shift
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there were up to twenty qualified bricklayers building or 
repairing ladles, moulds, although some specific types of 
brick repair work was done by ironworkers. When "down", 
(i.e. not operating) bricklayers also repaired or relined 
the open hearths with the special refractory bricks needed 
to withstand the immense temperatures- of steel making. 
Fitters, turners, and other workers with metal trades 
qualifications were responsible for repairs to plant or 
equipment, while electricians were responsible for 
maintenance of electrical and later, electronic process 
control equipment. All tradesmen experienced increasing 
demands on their skill throughout the 1970s because of 
technological change, albeit very gradual in the open 
hearth. Arguably this made much greater demands on their 
job performance than the demands on the ironworkers. The 
jobs of the latter had improved from the late 1950s as a 
consequence of "new" technology, such as forklifts to 
shift raw materials around the plant. ["Port Kembla 
celebrates 50 years of steelmaking", BHP Review. December 
1981: 11]
Tradesmen played a significant and increasingly 
important role in providing the necessary equipment 
maintenance for steel production. From the late 1960s the 
number of tradesmen increased throughout the plant as a 
consequence of changing technology and growing awareness 
of the importance of equipment maintenance, an increase 
which was especially noticeable in the steelmaking areas. 
In the open hearth, as Table 3.1 and Table 3.2
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demonstrate, the proportion of employees u/ho u/ere 
tradesmen rose from about 8% to about 13% between 1967 and 
1980.
As well, tradesmen had considerable effect on work 
organisation and workplace rulemaking as part of their 
leading role in workplace and plant level industrial 
relations. This leading role was a largely consequence of 
the strong craft union traditions, and the fact that their 
skills were not workplace specific, and so much more 
portable. It is probable that the centralised nature of 
the FIA until 1970 also shaped the craft union role at the 
open hearth. However, this role was dispersed through the 
variety of crafts, with tradesmen workers from a variety 
of unions having a significant impact on workplace 
relations.
For the purposes of highlighting the specific 
characteristics of the open hearth, it is important to 
recognise that many of the tradesmen, despite the 
portability and scarcity of their skills, identified with 
their workplace in much the same ways as did the 
ironworkers. Thus the tradesmen saw themselves as much 
open hearth workers dealing with an old and familiar 
technology, as they were tradesmen with a strong 
occupational identity. In general they shared many of the 
same physical working conditions, although their section 
of the steel award allowed for traditional tradesmen's 
needs, and was tied to the general metal trades award 
rather than the steel award per se.
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The largest group of u/orkers at the open hearths was the 
ironworkers as can be seen from the Graph 1, Table 3.1 and 
Table 3.2 below. While there was a small reduction in the 
proportion of ironworkers in the open hearths during the 
1970s, they were still, by far, the largest category of 
open hearth employees. These workers covered a very broad 
skill range from the unskilled whose job descriptions 
specified floor sweeping as a major component of their 
tasks to the skilled first helpers and steel pourers. The 
work of the last two required important decision making 
about the nature of the steel, and the maintenance of 
equipment. These more highly skilled ironworkers were 
paid higher bonuses and margins because of their skills 
and their contribution to the final output of the plant. 
To achieve these positions took up to two or three years 
working at a range of jobs in the open hearth.
Between the very skilled work and the unskilled 
labouring was an array of jobs at varying skill levels 
performed by the ironworkers. By the late 1960s a great 
many of them were from rural areas overseas and were 
unfamiliar with the demands of heavy industry. A high 
proportion were non-Anglophone, that is their first 
language was not English. For the managers at the 
steelworks, they provided a ready source of labour at a 
time when few Australian workers were willing to work in 
the steel industry. By their diversity of languages and 
unfamiliarity with heavy industry these immigrant workers 




WORKFORCE TOTAL & COMPOSITION 
1967-82
NO. 1 OPEN HEARTH
TOTAL STAFF AS TRADES AS FIA as%
EMPLOY % ALL OH1 % ALL OH1 ALL OH1
MAY 67 907 8% 6.5% 84%
NOV 67 915 8% 7.1% 82%
MAY 68 907 8% 7.3% 83%
NOV 68 928 9% 6.7% 82%
MAY 69 941 9% 7.3% 82%
NOV 69 928 9% 7.5% 81%
MAY 70 932 9% 7.5% 81%
NOV 70 928 9% 7.5% 81%
MAY 71 919 9% 7.7% 80%
NOV 71 932 10% 7.3% 81%
MAY 72 968 10% 6.6% 81%
NOV 72 868 10% 7.6% 79%
MAY 73 778 11% 8.4% 78%
NOV 73 746 10% 8.7% 78%
MAY 74 786 9% 8.7% 79%
NOV 74 764 10% 8.8% 78%
MAY 75 780 11% 8.8% 78%
NOV 75 782 10% 8.4% 79%
MAY 76 743 10% 9.2% 78%
NOV 76 690 9% 10.0% 78%
MAY 77 510 13% 9.8% 75%




NOV 79 OH1 CEASED PRODUCTION
MAY 80 JULY 1977
NOV 80 
MAY 81
SOURCE: COMP AN'/ DATA




OPEN HEARTH : WORKFORCE TOTAL & COMPOSITION
1967-82
NO. 2 OPEN HEARTH
TOTAL STAFF AS FIA AS % TRADES AS
EMPLOYEES % all OH2 all OH2 % all OH2
MAY 67 877 9% 79% 9%
NOV 67 911 9% 80% 8%
MAY 68 944 10% 79% 8%
NOV 68 861 10% 77% 9%
MAY 69 890 11% 76% 9%
NOV 69 879 10% 77% 9%
MAY 70 895 11% 76% 9%
NOV 70 895 11% 76% 9%
MAY 71 862 12% 76% 9%
NOV 71 893 12% 76% 8%
MAY 72 918 11% 78% 8%
NOV 72 833 12% 76% 7%
MAY 73 674 15% 73% 9%
NOV 73 628 14% 74% 8%
MAY 74 229 36% 60% 3%
NOV 74 605 15% 72% 9%
MAY 75 586 15% 73% 9%
NOV 75 601 14% 74% 8%
MAY 76 714 12% 75% 10%
NOV 76 694 14% 71% 11%
MAY 77 691 13% 71% 13%
NOV 77 830 12% 73% 10%
MAY 78 826 12% 75% 10%
NOV 78 849 12% 75% 10%
MAY 79 966 12% 74% 11%
NOV 79 883 13% 74% 11%
MAY 80 908 12% 72% 12%
NOV 80 925 13% 74% 11%
MAY 81 897 13% 72% 12%
NOV 81 724 15% 71% 11%
MAY 82 572 15% 70% 12%
NOV 82 402 11% 76% 9%
MAY 83 76 11% 89% 0%
NOV 83 73 n.o n
MAY 84 71 n. o n
OH2 CEASED PRODUCTION 
DECEMBER 1982
SOURCE: COMPANY DATA 
NOTE: MAJOR CAMPAIGN 1974
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organise than a more homogeneous workforce might have 
been. The open hearth was the first workplace in 
Australia for many of these workers since its prevalent 
dust and fume levels led to a high turnover of workers in 
the labour gang and in less skilled jobs which received 
lower margins. [Company reports]
. Once at the open hearth, a worker with no recognised 
qualifications was allotted to a particular shift crew 
where there was a vacancy. In general this was, at least 
initially, as a floor labourer, sweeping and barrowing 
away dust and loose metal. Movement to other jobs 
depended largely on the foremen's perceptions of workers' 
capabilities. Although the union seniority rules were 
generally accorded recognition by foremen, language 
difficulties and other ostensible job requirements were 
also taken into account. From the interviews with former 
open hearth employees and evidence given at tribunals, it 
seems that the time spent as a floor labourer was 
sometimes only a few days. From floor labourer, there was 
a series of steps that could be taken to reach first 
helper or ladleman. . The latter was the highest 
classification on the casting side of the open hearth. To 
reach these more senior 'wages' positions generally took 
up to two or three years, since the skill of these workers 
depended on experience, rather than technical knowledge 
acquired through formal training. From the position of 
first helper or similar, workers could expect that, with 
further experience, they might be promoted to foreman.
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Most open hearth classifications were based on the 
traditional jobs which had been performed by ironworkers 
for nearly a century. The hot metal attendant's job, for 
example, involved testing and weighing the molten iron 
when it arrived from the blast furnace, and overseeing 
metal transfer from the torpedo shaped Treadwell car to 
the hot metal ladle. Work for those in classifications 
such as the hot metal attendant's contained equivalent 
tasks throughout the world. Changes had come with the 
increasing capacity of cranes to move large amounts of 
metal, but like many open hearth ironworkers' jobs the hot 
metal attendant's job was semi-skilled and had comprised 
many of the same tasks over the years.
Some workers would elect to stay in such jobs 
permanently. These workers were the "stoppers", who were 
known for their preference for a particular job and who 
did not wish to move upwards in the ski 11/margins 
hierarchy. They were part of the stable core workforce 
which the company wanted, but they were sometimes 
perceived as a problem by management. This was because a 
major advantage of the internal labour market for 
management was for skill acquisition to be a continuous 
process. The movement up the classifications was a 
progressive one, with acquisition of skills at a lower 
margin as a prerequisite for the next classification. If 
this pattern was halted by a "stopper", it made the 
process vulnerable to shortages of skilled workers in the 
event of resignations. However, workers usually responded
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more positively to offers of movement up the hierarchy.
The job of the first helper, the top classification on
the charging floor, offers evidence of both these
workplace- specific skills and the nature of open hearth
work processes in general. Although there were many like
him, including those on similar margins, such as the
ladlemen on the casting floor, the first helper has been
chosen for focus because his job was one that had clear
parallels overseas. In Britain for example, the melter
performed much of the work done by the first helper at
Port Kembla. [More, 1980: 119-22] There were strong
traditions and a mystique surrounding the British melters.
Their ability to "read" the furnace and the state of metal
has been portrayed frequently in hallowed terms:
It was an art, not a science. It was 
termed black magic because of the 
knowledge they had. No textbooks. They 
had to do their work by the eye. The eye 
was the important thing. You had to know 
the colour of the flame. [Pagnamenta and 
Overy, 1980: 77]
The first helper at Port Kembla was not venerated in quite 
the same terms as the British melter of former times, but 
his experience and ability in recognising the readiness of 
the metal was nevertheless highly regarded. It was also 
much more demanding and complex than knowing the colour of 
the flame.
Besides overseeing the charging of the furnace for which 
he was responsible, and controlling the energy inputs to 
the furnace during melting, the first helper was 
responsible for the inspection of the furnace after
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tapping and repair work to the furnace walls and doors. 
These were necessary after each "heat", or complete batch 
of made steel, in order to prevent the furnace getting 
large holes in it. NSWIC work value and margins cases 
offer evidence that the first helper often took the 
decision to tap the steel, despite that worker's apparent 
lack of technical qualifications. What gave the first 
helper this stature was his recognised skill and 
experience in understanding the open hearth and its steel, 
not technically, but as an observable process. The melter 
foremen officially held ultimate responsibility for the 
melting process and furnace maintenance. However, a 
reliable first helper was generally left to make decisions 
about readiness for tapping and to complete the assessment 
and repairs without further reference to any more senior 
person.
Although the first helper's job was highly respected, 
his work was far from supervisory or non-manual. One 
example of this was the job of fettling the furnace, that 
is, blowing out holes in the furnace walls, then filling 
them with a filling compound. In this job the first 
helper shovelled sizeable amounts of the compound on to a 
specific area of the furnace. Even when empty the open 
hearth is immensely hot with temperatures exceeding 
1000° c. This meant that repair work had to be done very 
quickly and skilfully, since pockets and blockages within 
the furnace could be dangerous. On the other hand, the 
first helper and assisting labourers were working close to
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the intense heat emanating from the furnace, since the 
furnace doors had to be fully open for access to the 
problem areas. Fettling the furnace was, unquestionably, 
the first helper's responsibility. The arduousness of the 
task offers some idea why an ethos of mutual assistance 
pervaded the work relations in the open hearth. _ 
. At NSWIC work value cases this flexible responsibility 
was often a source of considerable irritation to the 
company's legal representative. He would go to great 
lengths to diminish the day-to-day responsibilities of 
first helpers and other ironworkers. In this he was not 
assisted by the evidence from the cross-examination of 
open hearth superintendents who appeared to perceive the 
work processes of the plant operators just as they were 
described by the ironworkers in their evidence.
The basis for cross-examination of ironworkers in work 
value and margins cases were the official job descriptions 
for each job in the steelworks. Wright [1988] argues 
that, like the insistence on the internal labour market, 
and the bonus incentive system, these avowedly definitive 
job descriptions had been derived initially as a form of 
control over workers. It was, he argues, an attempt to 
delimit jobs, reduce mutual assistance and opportunities 
for decision making. However this was not the quite the 
case at the Port Kembla steelworks.
Certainly, the job descriptions were explicit, 
describing as they did the duties of each helper for 
example in clear detail. Basically the first helper's
[134]
main area of responsibility was at the front of the 
furnace, while the second helper's main work area was on 
the casting side of the furnace with some allowance to 
undertake the first helper's work at crib time. The third 
helper was attached to the first helper but had specific 
jobs at the charging floor beyond simply assisting the 
first helper. These three increasingly skilled jobs, 
third, second, and first helper, formed a clear promotion 
ladder which provided experience and skill in the practice 
of steelmaking. Access to these positions came only to 
workers who had demonstrated their capability in less 
skilled jobs, which sustains the assertion of many first 
and second helpers at NSWIC hearings that they did not 
receive or need supervision. The foremen's jobs then, 
revolved around the labourers and the technology. The 
latter was becoming more sophisticated by very gradual 
accretions and, concomitantly, the requirement for 
technically educated workers.
However, prior to the late 1970s, most of the foremen in 
the open hearth were former 'wages' staff drawn from the 
top classifications such as first helpers. They had a 
knowledge of the jobs they were supervising and an 
understanding of the custom and practice which underpinned 
them. Some of these customs, such as the unwritten rules 
of who might assist whom, had been developed by workers 
over many years. The agreements over the demarcation of 
assistance between craft jobs and ironworker jobs was an 
example of the ways in which these customs had been
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developed through inter-union agreements but also accepted 
by management. In all this, the role of the internal 
labour market was to reinforce the workplace ethos of 
which foremen were as much a part as the 'wages' workers. 
From a company perspective the role of the foremen was 
thus to oversee processes with which they were familiar, 
but which limited the responsibility simply because they 
were familiar and stable. [Lever-Tracy, 1987]. The 
specific character- istics of the workplace, such as the 
stable patterns of work organisation, widespread 
acceptance of customs and practices, and a high level of 
workplace identification, had several consequences for 
industrial relations in the open hearth shops in their 
last years of operation.
Industrial relations in the open hearth
During the 1960s industrial relations at the Port Kembla 
steelworks were characterised by a repressive role of 
management, the conciliatory stance of the FIA, and a more 
assertive role taken by the various craft unions. Strike 
levels were very low. A change to this pattern began to 
occur from 1970 when the local FIA branch unionists 
elected a locally based action orientated executive. The 
1970s were also a time of increasing union activity, 
including industrial action, throughout Australia. At 
Port Kembla there was a trend of rising strike levels and 
increasing resort to bans, which continued well into the 
1980s. The pattern of industrial relations at the open
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hearths ran quite counter to this trend of increasing 
strikes.
In the latter 1960s, strike levels were generally higher 
at the open hearths than in the following decade. 
However,the number of strikes at the open hearth was still 
relatively low given that almost ten per cent of the 
steelworks workforce was employed in the two open hearth 
shops. Throughout the 1970s industrial relations at the 
open hearth tended to be peaceful in terms of strikes.
Absolute figures of strikes at a steel plant, or 
workplace within it, do not clearly indicate the nature of 
industrial relations at different parts of the plant. 
Workplaces are different sizes and have different 
proportions of 'wages' workers, those workers most likely 
to strike. Since the strike levels are used simply as an 
indicator of manifest industrial conflict in this thesis, 
the most effective criterion for measuring strike activity 
is one which relates the hours lost through strikes in a 
particular area to the number of 'wages' workers. Hours 
lost per 'wages' worker, rather than hours lost per all 
employees, is thus a more telling indicator of plant and 
workplace level industrial activity. By use of this 
criterion open hearth strike levels can be compared to 
plant level strike activity, or indeed to any other 
workplace.
The mildness of open hearth industrial relations, as 
measured by its strike activity, is evident from such 
comparisons. The only noticeably industrially active
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period, at the open hearths in the 1970s, occurred in 
1971, with another flare of activity in the last years of 
the decade. As Table 3.3 below shows, hours lost per 
'wages' worker per annum in the open hearth only rarely 
exceeded ten whereas on a plantwide basis hours lost per 
'wages' worker per annum was almost always in double 
figures after 1973. Moreover, there are no recorded 
strikes in the company's industrial records in 1972 or 
1974. [See also Graph 4.3 in Appendix 4]
However, open hearth records do show that there was in 
fact some minor industrial action in 1974. This indicates 
one of the problems of assessing workplace industrial 
relations. There is a.dependence on plant level records 
which are written for a different set of readers. In the 
case of the Port Kembla steelworks strike records and 
reports were written for the Central Industrial Relations 
Directorate. While the records appear comprehensive and 
meticulous, it is possible that they tended to understate 
strikes. The recording of strikes was done by the 
steelworks' industrial relations office. The industrial 
relations staff relied on information from workplace 
managers, who may not always have wanted strikes recorded 
or simply may have neglected to send on required 
information. Nevertheless the strike data available from 
official company strike data is close enough to the 
patterns noted in workplace reports to be clearly 
acceptable as a reliable indicator of the trends in 
workplace dispute levels.
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All available evidence [Company dispute data; AI&S Six 
Monthly Reports (Various issues)] points to very little 
"crisis" industrial relations originating in the open 
hearth in the 1970s, especially from the FIA members. The 
craft unions at the open hearths were more active than the 
FIA, although there were far fewer craft-trained workers 
than non- trades trained workers. Thus the few disputes 
that did occur were often craft based. They reflected the 
traditional craft concerns in the open hearth. By 
contrast there was a disproportionately low level of 
strikes over ironworkers' concerns, relative to dispute 
levels at the rest of the plant in 1970s
A survey of notified disputes, (that is, those which did 
not necessarily involve strikes but which required 
compulsory conferences), in the same years, suggests that 
the FIA was more closely involved in workplace issues than 
open hearth strike levels suggest. These were often 
related to dismissals and other management issues. 
Workers continued to reject any threats to workplace 
rules, such as unacceptable implementation of mixed 
function duties where employees might be asked to do 
duties of a higher paid classification without requisite 
reward. There were regulations within the steel award 
over such items, but they were subject to interpretation 
at the workplace. Custom and practice could be invoked to 
achieve a more positive outcome for the workers than that 
implicit or explicit in the award. Many of these notified 
disputes thus reflected workers' intentions to retain
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customs and practices.
There was also increased conflict over bonus and roster 
issues at No 2 Open Hearth in the last years of the 1970s. 
Always a complex issue, bonuses and other elements of the 
complicated system of pay determination at the open 
hearth, [See Appendix 5] gained greater urgency in the 
last years of open hearth operation. These issues were 
the source of the higher strike rate of 1978-80. 
Workplace management changed both rosters and bonuses in 
these years. However, reflecting the divisive impact that 
could accrue from such a complex system, there was not a 
high degree of cohesion over these issues. Workers 
affected by the changes had mixed perceptions of the 
benefits or disbenefits of these. Roster changes alter 
the organisation of hours worked, without necessarily 
changing the total hours worked in a specific period. 
Changes in roster or bonus levels have the potential to 
destabilise workplace relations when some workers perceive 
that they are being disadvantaged relative to their 
previous rosters or bonuses, or relative to other workers.
Bonuses have probably been one of the major sources of 
workplace and plant level disputes. [See Appendix 5] In 
the 1970s this was partly because bonuses were seen by 
many workers and managers as over-award payments, at a 
time when the average earnings of steelworkers was lower 
than average weekly earnings. In this context, changes to 
bonus levels highlighted unfavourable comparisons with 
other workers at the workplace and plant. Bonuses were
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originally designated as incentive payments, but in 
general they have not worked this way. The basic 
assumption of bonus systems, which is usually attributed 
to so-called Taylorist forms of work organisation, is 
that, as incentive payments, the production bonus would 
induce output increases through competitiveness between 
workers.
At the Port Kembla steelworks, bonuses appear to have 
had an opposite effect since they have induced unsettled 
industrial relations and dissatisfaction over relative 
rates between or within workplaces. In the open hearth in 
the last years of the 1970s, the dissatisfaction over 
bonus changes was certainly evident in the level and 
nature of disputes. This does not negate the validity of 
the proposal that industrial relations was relatively much 
more peaceful at the open hearth than overall plant level 
industrial relations. In the unusually high strike year 
of 1980, there were 11 hours lost per 'wages' worker for 
the year at No 2 Open Hearth, less than sixty per cent of 
hours lost per 'wages' worker per annum at plant level. 
[See Table 3.3 below and Appendix 4]
When attempting to measure the nature of industrial 
conflict, other indicators such as absenteeism and 
turnover are sometimes applied. These are difficult to 
quantify however. Although the company maintained 
comprehensive records on such indicators, the 
record-keeping of these data at Port Kembla was generally 
at an individual and plant level. There are few clear
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time series statistics for departments or production units 
of this kind of information. Moreover, as Kelly [1982: 
44-6] argues, the nature of such indicators is not always 
clearly directly related to industrial conflict. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that plant wide turnover 
rates were very high in the early to mid 1970s with 
frequency rate sometimes well in excess of forty per cent. 
This partly reflected the continual labour shortage in the 
steel industry which was particularly severe in 1973/4. 
In these last years of full employment, the ease of 
obtaining other jobs offered workers the opportunity of 
"democratically voting with their feet".
High levels of turnover are also individual, rather than 
collective, responses to dissatisfaction with work or pay. 
At Port Kembla in the early 1970s the high turnover was 
possibly a consequence of the fact that for many workers, 
especially non-Anglophone migrant workers, collective 
action was not seen as a possible response to work 
conditions and pay. Turnover levels appear to have 
declined in the latter half of the 1970s as full 
employment gave way to rapidly rising national 
unemployment levels. Plant level strike activity 
increased in the same years. However the significance of 
links between turnover and industrial conflict is unclear. 
The mills seem to have had the highest turnover rates but 
No 1 Open Hearth reports also noted high turnover rates in 
1973/4. [Company data] One reason for this is found in 
the apparent lack of industrial experience of many of the
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workers.
At the No 2 Open Hearth, for example , management found 
the lack of clear understanding or knowledge of the 
demands of work in Australian industry to be a problem in 
workplace production operations. To overcome workers' 
unfamiliarity with industrial production, open hearth 
management organised internal courses on the nature of 
open hearth steelmaking and the responsibilities of 
workers. While the courses ceased within a year or two, 
they signify the problems facing the isolated and 
inexperienced workers at the open hearth, as well as the 
difficulties of a diverse and changing workforce for 
workplace management. A brief survey of some workplace 
reports suggests that most of the workers who left were 
those least familiar with the plant, rather than workers 
who were being promoted within the workplace. At plant 
level, sixty per cent of workers, who left in 1974, had 
been at the plant less than one year. [Company data] They 
were thus unlikely to have moved beyond the lowest 
classifications.
What turnover rates do not show is the transfers between 
and within departments, which were a common form of 
attempting to ameliorate job dissatisfaction. Until the 
late 1970s the company had exit interviews with all 
employees who gave notice of resignation. The aim of 
these interviews was to identify causes of 
dissatisfaction, and where possible remedy these, 
generally by transferring workers to other areas of the
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plant. [Interviews with company personnel staff] The open 
hearth was not a favourable work area. From interviews 
and available data it is probably safe to assume that open 
hearth turnover, absenteeism and transfer rates were 
higher than most workplaces, but only for part of the 
workforce. The high quit rates were to be found among the 
least experienced workers, who were unfamiliar with the 
workplace, and probably the industry. There remained the 
solid core of ironworkers who felt sufficient attachment 
with the open hearth and its technology.
It is probable that the low levels of apparent union 
activity at the open hearth reflect the responses of 
workers who comprised this core, rather than the alienated 
inexperienced workers who left the plant or workplace. 
The least experienced workers were a fragmented group, 
separated from each other by language and unfamiliarity. 
The difficulty which management experienced of organising 
such workers, was also a factor hampering union 
organisation at the workplace. These elements of 
fragmentation served to diminish collective responses at 
the open hearth until the late 1970s. This diminution was 
aided by plant level management strategies to weaken the 
role of unions and reinforce managerial prerogatives. At 
the workplace, the doubtful future of the technology, 
especially after the successful introduction of BOS 
steelmaking in 1972, and the availability through 
management acceptance of custom and practice, also acted 
to reduce overt expressions of industrial conflict. These
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factors need to be more fully explored to ascertain their 
effect on the notably low levels of industrial action at 
the open hearths.
As with the rest of the steelworks, there was virtually 
a closed shop in effect, although prior to the 
introduction of check-off in 1972 enforcement of union 
membership was difficult. Until that time the maintenance 
of financial membership was ensured through occasional OK 
card days where workers had to produce up to date 
membership cards. [Murray and White, 1982: 279] More than 
seventy-five per cent of 'wages' workers in the open 
hearth were covered by the FIA, although actual levels of 
membership varied. The remainder belonged to the craft 
unions, primarily the Amalgamated Metal Workers' Union 
(AMWU), BWIU and the Electrical Trades' Union (ETU). A 
few of the fitters belonged to the Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers (ASE). Bowen [1976] argues that in the British 
experience, these craft workers generally took a more 
active union role at the workplace than the ironworkers 
who were unskilled or who had workplace specific skills.
Throughout the 1940s, union activity had been high at 
the open hearth. [NSWIC records; Company industrial 
records of disputes by department] This diminished 
significantly through the fifties as a consequence of the 
fragmented and changing nature of the labour force, strong 
repressive tactics by management, and government efforts 
to eliminate radicalism, especially during the "Cold War". 
At Port Kembla the most industrially active union at the
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plant, the Federated Engine Drivers' and Firemen's 
Association (FEDFA) u/as deregistered in 1956. Industrial 
action on a plantwide basis became very rare from this 
time. This enhanced conciliation and arbitration as the 
dominant formal process in workplace and plant level 
industrial relations. The conciliatory modus operandi of 
the national FIA, which was explicitly committed to 
cooperation and arbitration, reinforced reliance on NSWIC 
for dealing with disputes at all levels for many years. 
Despite this, there are indications that union activity in 
the open hearth was well organised in the 1960s although 
most of the workers were covered by the FIA. Workplace 
union activity seems to have revolved around the craft 
unions which continued to be active parties in workplace 
industrial relations processes. In response to any 
proposed reduction in their control over work areas or 
work processes, the craft unions maintained a level of 
union consciousness at the workplace
However, the role of unions in specific workplaces is 
somewhat indistinct. The formal processes of industrial 
relations were, to a very large extent, taken out of the 
workplace and into the tribunal almost as soon as they 
arose. The absence of an agreed permanent formal 
structure or role for workplace officials further conceals
the union role,. It has been this indistinct role for
unions at the workplace which has led some writers to
assume workplace industrial relations is shaped by the
arbitration system. [Lumley, 1983] This view assumes that
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because formal processes occur overwhelmingly through the 
arbitration system, other industrial relations processes 
are of little moment. Yet this ignores the specific 
workplace characteristics, which in the case of the open 
hearth were quite distinctive. In the 1970s informal 
industrial relations depended considerably on the activity 
<pf delegates. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this was 
highly variable, with some delegates taking a very active 
stance, while the role of others appears almost 
negligible. One former open hearth employee maintained 
that one delegate " almost ran the place in the late 
1960s. The foremen could do nothing without his say so.“ 
[Interview, former open hearth employee, October 1986] 
However, this view was not one which other workers offered 
in interviews.
In part, the level of union activity may have reflected 
the attitude of the superintendents to activists. While 
no clear evidence exists pertaining to the open hearth, it 
is fairly widely recognised by employees that in other 
areas of the Port Kembla steelworks, activists were often 
subject to much greater disciplinary action than more 
docile employees. [See e.g. In re Webb and AI&S P/L, 
June 13 1972, No 155 of 1972 NSWIC Arbitration Reports: 
276-75 In this unsuccessful reinstatement case, the 
employee1s employment record and union involvement were 
closely examined.]
From 1970, plant level industrial relations became more 
aggressive, not only reflecting local, but also national
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trends away from the calmer prosperity of the postwar 
years. But this trend was far from apparent in the open 
hearths. This is not to say that the open hearth was 
removed from plant industrial relations - rather that 
there was a reduction in strike activity originating from 
purely workplace issues in the open hearth from the early 
1970s. At this time, across the steelworks as a whole, 
pay disputes were a notable source of industrial action. 
Issues included demands for company- wide bonus changes or 
dissatisfaction with the progress in the award 
negotiations, rather than localised workplace pay issues - 
at least for open hearth workers. Plantwide strikes over 
a range of issues increased significantly for a time 
during the middle years of the 1970s as the local FIA and 
the other local unions worked together to improve wage 
levels and working conditions. When plantwide strikes 
were called, open hearth employees participated.
In other words, open hearth workers were not separate 
from the increasingly active union movement at Port 
Kembla. The low level of disputes originating at the open 
hearth was primarily the result of the stable core 
workforce identifying with the workplace, and other 
workers being too fragmented to develop collective 
responses. The peaceful workplace industrial relations at 
the open hearth were also a consequence of several other 
factors related to the nature of the technology and the 
choices it offered for the workplace relations.
One interviewee [Interview, union official, Wollongong,
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1986] suggested that the reason for low levels of 
workplace-based open hearth strikes was linked to the 
various aspects of union activity in earlier years, 
especially the 1960s. [See pp.125-7 above] The 
interviewee proposed that disputing open hearth workers 
had rarely been supported by the FIA officials. 
Consistent with the NSW and national union policy, they 
frequently acceded to the company's view in tribunal 
hearings. Ultimately, so this proposition goes, this 
resulted in a discouraged attitude toward workplace based 
industrial action. There is some evidence to support this 
in the NSWIC transcripts of industrial disputes. The 
state branch of the FIA often agreed to company demands, 
and sometimes offered in the Commission to order a return 
to work. However the open hearth experience in this 
respect was no different to other workplaces in the rest 
of the plant. Thus when Traffic Department employees took 
part in a solidarity strike with teachers the National 
Secretary of the FIA stated to the Industrial Commission 
that
...we are opposed to members of the F.I.A. 
becoming involved in strike action about 
this. We are especially opposed to strike 
action on this issue because we know a 
strike in this department leads to the 
loss of employment for hundreds - and if 
the strike is prolonged thousands - of 
ironworkers. We will ...take appropriate 
action about the strikes in the Traffic 
Department at AI&S Port Kembla. [NSWIC 
Arbitration Reports. 1972: 154]
On the other hand open hearth employees stood to lose 
most from the rising levels of strike activity in the
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early 1970s. At that time the company had recommenced a 
policy of standing down workers where there was a strike 
which affected the movement of metal around the plant. 
[Company dispute data] This meant that open hearth workers 
were stood down fairly frequently since these were the 
years when traffic department strikes were very common. 
Traffic strikes halted the movement of metal around the 
plant, which offered the workers in this department 
strategic bargaining power. In the first few years of the 
1970s, management often stood workers down even in 
anticipation of a strike. In this way management was 
looking to discouraging strikes by attempting to penalise 
workers other than the strikers themselves. As a result, 
stand-down hours often exceeded the strike hours for a few 
years until this tactic fell into disuse. [Company 
dispute data]
Some indication of the factors which contributed to the 
open hearth inactivity in the 1970s, are to be found in 
the largest open hearth strike in the decade, the 1971 
"bunched heats" dispute. [In re Dispute - AI&S P/L Re 
Work of Ladlemen, NSWIC Arbitration Reports, 1970-1 
(various)] The dispute first arose in 1970 when the 
production of some new steels led to a change in 
production patterns at times. This change had significant 
effect on the jobs of those on the casting floor. Tapping 
and teeming were bunched together, which meant that the 
pitman could not do his job. As a consequence the company 
required the ladlemen to assist the more lowly pitmen in
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addition to their own duties. In the original decision 
the NSWIC came down on the side of the company with the 
slight proviso that it should agree to ensure that a 
ladleman was called upon to do no more than a fair shift's 
work.
The job of the ladlemen was to organise the large brick 
ladles into which molten steel would be poured. The 
ladleman would first replace the stopper rods, the ceramic 
cylinders which functioned like plugs in the ladle. He 
would also check the nozzles in the ladles, assessing 
damage that may have been done in previous taps and remove 
the solidified slag from ladle edges. As well as these 
physically demanding semi- skilled manual tasks, ladlemen 
were also responsible for more highly skilled tasks which 
relied on the exercise of dexterity and judgement. During 
the teeming of the heats, the ladleman was responsible for 
guiding just the right amount of molten steel into the 
ingot moulds and ensuring that the metal was cleanly shut 
off after each mould was filled.
The pitmen, on the other hand were responsible for the 
organisation and quality of the ingot moulds into which 
the molten steel was poured. During this process, known 
as teeming, the pitmen acted as the crane chasers for the 
teeming crane drivers. The pitmen also added any special 
materials to the moulds. Sometimes the stopper rod would 
fail. Instead of the metal flow being stopped after each 
mould, it would run out between the moulds. If this 
happened the pitmen was required to shovel dirt between
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the moulds in advance of the metal flow. Pitmen also 
acted as crane chasers for the stripper crane driver, who 
drove the special crane which stripped the moulds from the 
solidified, but still red-hot ingots. To finish the job a 
electro-magnet would be used to remove overflow steel from 
on and around the mould.
It is clear from these descriptions that both jobs were 
particularly demanding during teeming. Not only was it 
important to teem the molten metal quickly, but also the 
process of teeming was continuous. It could not cease 
until the ladle was empty. As was shown above, the jobs 
of ladlemen and pitmen also had significant work 
requirements before and after teeming. The ladlemen 
objected strongly to the additional and more lowly 
classified work of pitmen's duties when there were 
"bunched heats”.
After the original NSWIC decision of October 1970, 
ladlemen initially responded by usually refusing to do the 
pitmen's work. By May 1971 however, this was not enough, 
and all open hearth workers went on strike for forty-eight 
hours. Several compulsory conferences followed, but the 
company was adamant that "bunched heats" were required 
only on very few occasions. Therefore, the company 
argued, the requirement for ladlemen to do additional 
pitmen's duties was a reasonable request. The matter went 
before Mr. Justice Kelleher, in June when the decision 
reiterated that the company's request was reasonable, as 
long as the company only asked what was fair of the
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individual workers. The "bunched heats dispute" 
epitomises some central aspects of open hearth industrial 
relations.
Because work patterns were generally stable but work 
demands were physically arduous, an array of practices and 
customary restrictions ensured that skills and status 
remained valued, and the physical work effort was shared 
to some degree. These practices were of no great concern 
to workplace management, whose concerns were with 
equipment and output. Indeed, the customs and practices 
were to management's advantage. Such practices ensured 
that work operations which enabled stable production were 
maintained. When, as in the "bunched heats dispute", the 
structures and practices were threatened, so too were 
workplace industrial relations.
The "bunched heats dispute" also highlights the capacity
of open hearth workers to respond collectively to
perceived threats to work structures or practices. The
"bunched heats" affected the ladlemen, but the dispute was 
not limited to these workers or those on the casting 
floor, but all the open hearth. The mildness of workplace 
industrial relations during the years that followed was 
therefore not simply the result of an absence of 
commitment to unions on the part of the workers. This was 
demonstrated in their involvement in plant level union 
activity, and from their responses in the 1971 dispute and 
in the strikes at the end of the decade over changes in 
bonus and roster changes. Rather the open hearth workers
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who were FIA members, can be likened to Bowen's workers at
Ironhill in Britain in the 1970s. In examining this old
steelworks he found that groups of employees were
positively attached ...to their work 
systems and traditional values on which 
[they] are based and [which] have proved 
so effective in limiting conflict in face 
of so many problems. [Bowen, 1976]
As with the open hearth workers at Port Kembla, the 
identification of Ironhill production workers with the 
workplace did not exclude union consciousness.
There is another significant parallel between Ironhill 
workplaces and the open hearths at Port Kembla. Both were 
under threat of closure. [Bowen, 1976: 88] The dispute of 
1971 precedes the commissioning of the BOS in 1972, a year 
of apparently no industrial action in the steelmaking 
workplaces at Port Kembla. Workers were not convinced by 
the plant manager, T.K. Duncan who, shortly after the 
announcement of plans for the BOS in 1969, stated that 
open hearth steelmaking could never be entirely replaced. 
[Duncan, 1969: 27] Once the BOS demonstrated its capacity 
to produce steel much more efficiently than the open 
hearths, workers in the latter area feared the loss of 
jobs and job skills. This insecurity was augmented by the 
very attachment which the stable core of workers held for 
their workplace and its technology.
Conclusion
Work conditions in the open hearth were often unpleasant 
and for many of the workers, work was very demanding. A
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gritty graphite dust pervaded the atmosphere most of the 
time. Workplace organisation was characterised by a 
formal structure set by both traditional open hearth 
practice, BHP organisational and industrial relations 
policies and union policies. In many respects the 
organisational structure u/ithin the open hearths at Port 
Kembla u/as very similar to those in American and British 
open hearths. There u/as something close to an 
international historical tradition in open hearth 
steelmaking job structures u/hich offered stability for 
workers and managers alike. At Port Kembla, this strong 
structure included the actual practices of mutual 
assistance at the workplace. This last was also a 
tradition within open hearths, but made explicit through 
work practices developed over time and through union 
involvement.
The training of ironworkers was on-the-job up to first 
helper or a similar level. Until the 1960s, foremen were 
drawn primarily from those at these highest wages 
classifications. This meant that the shopfloor ethos, 
other open hearth traditions and workplace identification, 
came to play an important role for some workers who gained 
highly specialised skills within the open hearth. For 
others, the floor labourers and those on the lowest 
margins, the open hearth was simply a stepping stone to a 
better workplace or a different source of employment 
altogether. In the postwar years over two fifths of the 
workforce at the steelworks were newly arrived
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non-Anglophone migrants. They began u/ork at the 
steelworks simply because they had been directed there as 
assisted migrants. The open hearth was the first place of 
work for a high proportion of these, but many stayed only 
briefly.
For those who stayed at the open hearth, there was the 
opportunity for gaining job skills and greater job 
security. However these skills were highly workplace 
specific and thus tied workers to the open hearth. For 
the company, these were the workers who mattered. The 
high turnover of floor labourers was not a severe problem 
for management, except when there was serious labour 
shortage. Such a turnover, however suggests that the work 
for floor labourers was particularly onerous.
The consequences for industrial relations were mixed. 
For those at higher classifications, there was clearly a 
certain degree of worker control over work processes. 
Because training was on the shopfloor, the reliance on the 
internal labour market also meant that there was strong 
workplace identification and a definable workplace ethos. 
This in turn could be a source of strong collectivism 
against the company as it had been in earlier decades.
However this was not the case in the open hearth in the 
1970s for several reasons. A significant section of the 
workforce was fragmented by the multiplicity of languages 
reflecting the diverse origins of the migrant workforce. 
Little was done to assist these workers, many of whom were 
unfamiliar with industrial production. The local FIA,
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which came to power in 1970, had a policy of remedying the 
problems, but the union's efforts were directed at a broad 
array of difficulties for workers over the plant as a 
whole. Its focus of action was initially on departments 
such as Traffic where there were a great many problems 
originating in the workplace and where strategic 
bargaining power was greater than in other areas. This 
meant that u/hile union activity across the plant increased 
greatly, workplace issues at the open hearth were 
apparently not of sufficient moment to generate a high 
level of workplace-based activity. Open hearth employees 
were nevertheless active in plantwide issues. Moreover, 
when the stability of workplace relations was disrupted, 
through management attempts to alter the content of jobs, 
then the open hearth workers responded strongly. However 
work organisation at the open hearth generally remained 
stable. So too, did the low level of industrial activity.
This was reinforced by the expected demise of open 
hearth steelmaking. It was an old, labour intensive 
technology at a plant where the new technology was capable 
of much greater labour productivity and more exact steel 
quality control. It seems likely that this led to a 
concomitant tendency to greater docility in workplace 
industrial relations through fears of job losses once the 
BOS had commenced production. For those with workplace 
specific skills, it seemed many of these skills were to be 
outmoded shortly. It was unlikely that these workers 
would achieve the same degree of job satisfaction or
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controls in the BOS. Work patterns in the more modern 
workplace offered few historical traditions or the open 
hearth ethos of mutual assistance and close workplace 
identification.
Other factors also reinforced these fears for future 
jobs, and the related mild industrial relations in the 
open hearths in the 1970s. For example open hearth 
employees were often the first to be stood down in the 
early 1970s when the company attempted to deal with 
strikes by enforcing an unusually high level of stand 
downs. A high level of labour turnover in the early 1970s 
may also indicate that many employees were expressing 
their dissatisfaction individually, rather than 
collectively. However, while high, turnover does not 
appear greater than other workplaces.
The level of labour turnover may well have been masked 
at the open hearth, through the working of the internal 
labour market which led to a dual labour market effect. 
In this, there was one section of the open hearth 
workforce which was the relatively stable core moving up 
the margins scale. The outer section comprised workers on 
the lowest classifications who had higher quit rates and 
who were more likely to be stood down in the event of 
furnace repair ■campaignsu. There has been no systematic 
recording of workplace turnover figures however, which 
makes this problematic in quantifying to any great degree.
The increasing level of supervision might be considered 
as a possible factor in the docility of open hearth
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workplace industrial relations during the 1970s. However, 
as has been shown, there was a noticeable plantwide 
increase in foreman/supervisors between the late 1960s and 
mid-1970s at the same time as strike levels rose across 
the plant. Indeed the growing number of supervisors was 
probably implemented to oversee more thoroughly the 
increasingly industrially active workforce, although this 
may not have been the primary motive. The diversity in 
the workforce, as a consequence of increasing company 
dependence on newly arrived migrants, may also have led 
management to employ more supervisory staff. However, the 
increasing number of foremen also signified a return to 
the much earlier BHP policy of a high ratio of staff 
workers to 'wages' workers as a means of maintaining 
production capability during strikes. While the threat of 
strike-breaking is of itself an aggressive management 
tactic, it also conveys the production imperative of the 
employers, rather than a control imperative per se. 
Certainly output at Port Kembla remained at high constant 
levels throughout the 1970s, despite rising strike levels. 
[See Appendix 4]
At the open hearth, the impact of a higher level of 
supervision was clearly not a necessary control strategy 
in response to workplace industrial activity. Experienced 
and sometimes qualified staff labour was needed for the 
relatively high level of short plantwide strikes and for 
the times when the company stood down workers because of 
strikes in other departments. On the other hand, the
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introduction of special courses for workers unfamiliar 
with work in steel plants, such as those run in the open 
hearth in 1972, point to a management perception of the 
need for greater control over the newly arrived workers. 
For the secure open hearth employees, control was already 
achieved through the internal labour market and workplace 
identification. All those interviewed, who had been long 
term open hearth workers, emphasised the mateship and 
pattern of mutual assistance at the open hearth. These 
workers contrasted these traditions with the apparently 
weaker social relations of production at the BOS.
This degree of workplace identification was enhanced by 
- the nature of management at the open hearth. As with many 
of the plant managers, the superintendents were engineers 
or metallurgists for whom the technology and production of 
metal was of central concern. They had trained as junior 
engineers when open hearth steelmaking was dominant and 
had come to identify with the technology. This abiding 
concern with the technology complemented and reinforced 
attitudes and behaviours which arose out of the internal 
labour market. 'Wages' employees on the promotion track 
also identified with the technology and its imperatives.
This reinforced the prevailing managerial strategy to 
exclude unions as much as possible from the plant. This 
could be seen in efforts aimed at preventing access of 
union officials, continuing attempts to induce competition 
between workers through wage differentials and access to 
promotion through the internal labour market. But these
[160]
u/ere seemingly not needed at the open hearth. Many of the 
ironworkers had a fair degree of control over their jobs, 
because the historical structure of open hearth work 
organisation provided for a higher level of decision 
making within the framework of the technology. This stood 
in contrast to the low trust relations of management at 
the plant and company level.
The close identification with technology found in the 
technically educated workplace manager at the open hearth, 
also presents an important aspect of plant and workplace 
organisation. It would be too much to see internal labour 
markets and other facets of work organisation as 
management strategy in terms of purposive plan in order to 
attain an organisational goal. The workplace managers 
were engineers, not managers. Their focus was on the 
technology, a familiar technology which they had learned 
in their tertiary training. In the absence of significant 
management training, their technical bias prevailed and 
their management of workers was adaptive rather than 
strategic at workplace.
The overall pattern was one in which the organisational 
structure was heavily influenced not only by the 
technology, but also traditional patterns of social 
relations in the open hearth. It was underpinned by 
strategies and tactics devised and insisted upon by 
personnel/industrial relations officers at plant and 
enterprise level, and strengthened by union policies which 
looked to adherence to custom and practice. Plant and
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company personnel policies were also diluted at workplace 
level by the engineer-managers who conveyed their 
technological obsession to plant operators which also 
emphasised workplace identification with the technology. 
Thus a classic human relations model was inadvertantly 
achieved in a company whose industrial relations 
strategies were far from this model. Added to this, the 
union role had been weakened from the very active days of 
1940s by a conciliatory and centralised FIA until the 
1970s, so that in the open hearth especially, the 
technical biases of workplace management predominated.
During the 1970s the open hearths followed a 
countervailing pattern of industrial relations for an 
interdependent set of factors which had their basis in the 
traditional structure of jobs at the open hearth. In 
highlighting elements of this structure and the variations 
on it at the Port Kembla steelworks in the 1970s, this 
chapter has shown that there are aspects of industrial 
relations which need to be studied from a workplace 
perspective. Any study of the plant at the same period 
would have elided important processes and issues which are 
nevertheless central to an understanding of industrial 
relations in the steel industry. What is clear is then, 
is the way in which a workplace analysis such as this, 
offers perspectives on work processes and industrial 
relations which are not identifiable when examining plant 
or industry level industrial relations. This is clearly 
































and the BOS, neither of which clearly mirrored plant 
norms.
FIA EMPLOYEES IN OPEN HEARTHS
1967 TO 1982 (PER CENT) •
□ NO. 1 OPEN HEARTH + NO. 2 OPEN HEARTH
TABLE 3.3
STRIKE LEVELS - PORT KEMBLA STEELWORKS 
COMPARISON - PLANT AND STEELMAKING WORKPLACES
1966 TO 1986
PLANT BOS OH OH HLWW as BOS HLWW as
HLWW HLWW HLWW Ji PLANT HLWW % PLANT HLWW
1966 n . a n . o n.a n.a n.o
1967 n.a n . o 1.39 n.a n.o
1968 n.a n . o 0.01 n.a n.o
1969 0.85 n . o 0.76 89.63% n.o
1970 1.73 n . o 0.00 0.00% n.o
1971 9.40 n.o 16.90 179.74% n . o
1972 2.48 0.00 0.00 0.00% n.o
1973 26.70 0.52 9.16 34.32% 1.95%
1974 14.41 7.88 0.00 0.00% 54.70%
1975 7.97 15.36 0.06 0.70% 192.72%
1976 18.92 31.04 1.93 10.22% 164.08%
1977 9.19 32.53 5.17 56.31% 354.05%
1978 22.83 30.21 10.02 43.88% 132.33%
1979 23.23 32.52 8.08 34.76% 139.99%
1980 18.90 26.93 11.29 59.74% 142.43%
1981 19.23 54.50 7.16 37.24% 283.49%
1982 12.24 47.92 0.31 2.55% 391.59%
1983 8.50 14.68 n.o n.o 172.73%
1984 4.21 6.63 n.o n.o 157.25%
1985 2.67 2.39 n.o n.o 89.42%
1986 8.85 2.32 n.o n.o 26.23%
HLWW: HOURS LOST PER WAGES WORKER
n .a . - NOT AVAILABLE 
n.o. - NO OPERATING




WORKPLACE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN 
BASIC OXYGEN STEELMAKING, (BOSK 1972 TO 1987
The BOS process is a modern form of steelmaking 
developed after the Second World War and introduced at the
Port Kembla steelworks in 1972. The BOS process is
intrinsically more efficient than the old open hearth
method. By the time of its introduction into Port Kembla 
in the 1970s, the original superiority of this newer
technology had been augmented by advances in computer
technology. The impact of BOS steelmaking on work
processes and industrial relations was highly significant. 
Although it offered a better physical work environment, 
production work was much more intensive in the BOS. For 
those in some job classifications, work was now more akin 
to machine tending than equivalent tasks had been in the 
old open hearth. Work organisation and workplace 
industrial relations were quite different at the BOS from 
those in the open hearth during the 1970s and early 1980s.
During its first decade of operation BOS industrial 
relations were characterised by a high level of disputes 
and low trust relations between workers and unions, and 
their supervisors and managers. Workplace strike data 
show a very much higher per capita strike rate at the BOS 
than either the Open Hearth or the plant as a whole during 
much of the period under study. [Company data] By the
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time of the Steel Industry Plan however management and 
workers had come to believe that new patterns of workplace 
relations were needed if the perceived fears for the 
viability of the Port Kembla plant were to be allayed. 
These changing patterns of workplace relations are the 
focus of this chapter.
The aim of the chapter is to examine the nature of BOS 
industrial relations and analyse the ways in which they 
originated from the work processes and management 
strategies and structure. The argument is advanced that 
understanding of workplace industrial relations can be 
illuminated by recognition that the specific 
characteristics of the work environment in which workers 
and managers operate each day will lead to differences 
throughout plant or enterprise. Contrasts with the open 
hearth will provide further clarification of this 
assertion. In the ensuing sections of this chapter, a 
description of the steelmaking processes precedes a 
discussion of BOS steelmaking which highlights the 
similarities and differences between the BOS.and open 
hearth processes. This provides a basis for the sections 
which examine the nature of management organisation and 
work processes. The impact of these changes on the 
non-trades production workers especially, at the BOS from 
1972 until the mid-1980s will be followed by a close 
analysis of industrial relations at this workplace. This 
analysis will consider the ways in which the specific 
characteristics of BOS work processes and management and
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union activities might be causally related to the 
relatively higher levels of industrial action at the BOS 
until the late 1980s. The concluding sections of this 
chapter will draw together the discussion of the effects 
of the BOS on workers and management in a changing 
economic environment. In doing so it will reiterate the 
view that a study of workplace industrial relations must 
take account of the particular workplaces in which men and 
women work. It is from these that they make their choices 
to act in particular ways based on the constraints and 
advantages they perceive.
Steelmaking Workplaces at Port Kembla Steelworks
There have been three forms of steelmaking at the Port 
Kembla since the plant first commenced steel production in 
1931. The electric steel making process made small 
quantities of special steels from 1941 until 1987. Its 
small size and specialist nature make this process quite 
different from the large-scale processes of open hearth 
and BOS steelmaking where hundreds of tonnes can be made 
at one time. It is the latter two workplaces which have 
employed large numbers of workers. The BOS first 
commenced production at Port Kembla in mid-1972 when the 
world market for steel appeared to be expanding. 
Initially there were two furnaces at the plant, with a 
further furnace added in 1983. The first BOS furnaces 
increased the steelmaking capacity of Port Kembla by over 
two million tonnes per year. The BOS process differed
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from open hearth steelmaking in several respects. It u/as 
much quicker, used less energy, required much less labour 
and u/as much more flexible in the nature of steel it 
produced. On the other hand the process was less flexible 
in the mix of molten iron and scrap steel that could be 
used.
As a consequence, the move by Port Kembla into BOS steel 
making had required a significant increase in its 
ironmaking capacity. This was achieved at the same time 
as the BOS furnace was completed with the commissioning of 
No 5 Blast Furnace, which expanded the plant's ironmaking 
capacity by 1.6 million tonnes per annum [Hoskins Kembla 
Works, 1975]. The interdependence of the processes is an 
important aspect of integrated iron and steel plants. In 
Australia ironmaking depends on the production of sinter, 
(agglomerated and partly treated iron ore), coke, and 
lime, all of which are processed at the plant. Over 
eighty per cent of the energy for the processing and steel 
rolling comes from by-products from within the steelworks 
such as blast furnace gas, coke ovens gas, tar and coal 
middlings. Natural gas which is also piped in and 
electricity, much of which is also generated at the plant, 
make up the balance of energy requirements at Port Kembla. 
The oxygen, on which BOS steelmaking in particular 
depends, is also made at the plant. Ironmaking, 
steelmaking and rolling, therefore, greatly rely on the 
availability of a variety of materials which must be 
processed and transferred to the areas which need them.
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The lack of one element can stall production not only in a 
particular area but also upstream and downstream of the 
problem area. Thus, the introduction of BOS steelmaking 
was not one isolated development, but brought with it a 
variety of other advances.
The effects of the BOS on work and industrial relations 
in steelmaking at Port Kembla were manifold. The 
workforce was more clearly a two tier workforce than it 
had been at the open hearth. First, there was a much 
higher proportion of workers with post-school technical 
training, with a concomitant and significant reduction in 
the proportion of non-trades labour at the BOS. Allied to 
this there was no longer a strong internal labour market 
structure past the 'wages' level as there had been in the 
open hearths. Advancement at the BOS depended more on 
technical qualifications rather than on-the-job training 
and experience. The internal labour market which had been 
a significant feature of control and skill acquisition did 
not entirely disappear. Rather it ended at the higher 
margins of the 'wages' scale, rather than offering 
movement through to staff levels, at least in the 1970s. 
Secondly, despite the smaller physical size of the BOS 
workplace, the work areas of the BOS shop were much more 
physically separate, with less opportunity for mutual 
assistance, a notable feature of open hearth workplace 
relations.
While workers were more separated in their work areas, 
the greater speed and frequency of BOS production meant
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that there was considerable emphasis and reliance by the 
company on team awareness and teamwork. This links to the 
third contrasting factor in BOS steelmaking. Since the 
BOS took only 50-60 minutes, initially, to produce its 
steel, work processes were much more constant. By 
contrast open hearth workers had experienced periods of 
intense activity interspersed with periods of less 
demanding activity.
BOS Steelmaking
Each of the BOS furnaces is a steel beaker shaped 
vessel, broader at the base and with a narrower neck. Of 
225 tonnes capacity, (where open hearth furnace capacity 
at No 2 Open Hearth had been 300-550 tonnes), the BOS 
vessels are capable of rotating a full circle. For the 
process of charging the furnace, a vessel is first tilted 
toward the charging floor and charged from a scrap chute 
loaded with appropriate scrap. This is followed by a 
charge of molten iron from the blast furnace. The molten 
iron is poured into the BOS furnace from a transfer ladle 
with the metal having been weighed and transferred from 
the Treadwell cars in much the same way as the metal for 
the open hearth had been prepared and charged. Once it is 
fully charged the BOS vessel is returned to an upright 
position.
An oxygen lance (a tube over thirty metres tall of about 
fifty centimetres diameter) is lowered to a preset height 
above the metal and pure oxygen is blown on to the metal
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at a high velocity. This causes a violent heat producing 
reaction as the oxygen combines with the impurities in the 
metal. In this way the steel scrap is melted and combines 
with the molten iron. At the same time, lime and other 
fluxes are added automatically to the melting metal. The 
two agents, oxygen and lime, allow for the impurities 
either to be given off as gases, or to form a slag which 
is tipped out into a slag pot after the steel has been 
tapped. Tapping is the name given to the process of 
emptying the furnace of its batch of steel. By the late 
1980s, this occurred after about half an hour or so of 
oxygen blowing, although it took twice that time in the 
early years at Port Kembla.
Before tapping, the furnace is tilted for sampling, and 
decisions are taken as to whether the metal is ready or 
needs either further blowing, or the addition of coolant 
scrap. If it is ready, the BOS furnace is tilted into 
tapping position and all the molten steel is poured 
through the tapping hole into the ladle below. Alloys are 
then added to the newly made steel. In the meantime the 
furnace is tipped the other way so that the slag, which 
had floated above the steel, pours out over the lip of the 
furnace into a slag-pot. The process of charging, 
blowing, and tapping is repeated every 30-40 minutes.
Thus the BOS process was both more highly automated and 
much faster than open hearth steelmaking from the start. 
Moreover it could more readily accept incremental
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TABLE 4.1
STEEL WORKFORCE AND PRODUCTIVITY 1967 - 1985
TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL PRODUCTION - •TONNES' PER
OPEN HEARTH BOS BOS + OH * TONNES'* STEELMAKING
EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES OH + BOS EMPLOYEE
MAY 67 1784 0 1784 1733481 972
NOV 67 1826 0 1826 1827059 1001
MAY 68 1865 0 1865 1800789 966
NOV 68 1789 0 1789 1758704 983
MAY 69 - 1831 0 1831 1859832 1016
NOV 69 1807 0 1807 1877314 1039
MAY 70 1827 0 1827 1664957 911
NOV 70 1774 0 1774 1775905 1001
MAY 71 1781 3 1784 1709220 958
NOV 71 1845 5 1850 1769413 956
MAY 72 1886 66 1952 1778786 911
NOV 72 1701 385 2086 1938032 929
MAY 73 1452 416 1868 1974250 1057
NOV 73 1374 436 1810 2209852 1221
MAY 74 1015 497 1512 2027996 1341
NOV 74 1369 477 1846 2191462 1187
MAY 75 1366 540 1906 2356700 1236
NOV 75 1383 537 1920 2257663 1176
MAY 76 1457 551 2008 2433522 1212
NOV 76 1384 529 1913 2214879 1158
MAY 77 1201 556 1757 2149137 1223
NOV 77 1030 582 1612 2123540 1317
MAY 78 826 604 1430 2243132 1569
NOV 78 849 582 1431 1901540 1329
MAY 79 966 575 1541 2246163 1458
NOV 79 885 588 1473 2441886 1658
MAY 80 905 640 1545 2298926 1488
NOV 80 925 614 1539 1991791 1294
MAY 81 897 678 1575 2477742 1573
NOV 81 724 707 1431 1983640 1386
MAY 82 572 733 1305 2051288 157 2
NOV 82 402 692 1094 1587986 1452
MAY 83 76 627 703 1431527 2036
NOV 83 n . o 677 750 1699950 2267
MAY 84 n . o 676 ”47 1701290 2277
NOV 84 n . o 665 665 1733637 2607
MAY 85 n . o 650 650 1625608 2501
n. o . - NOT OPERATING
SOURCE: COMPANY DATA, (Department Reports)
* N<Dte:- Until May 1972, output was calculated in tons (somet
term “ingot tons" is used in departmental reports, but this appea 
used interchangeably with the term "tons”, although in technic 
"ingot tons" is different to "tons".) Calculations of tonnes 
pgj~2c>d prior to May 1972 were made on the basis that 1 ton — 1.016
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technological changes which were to become a feature of 
the BOS. This capacity for incremental technological 
changes is a feature of modern process technology. A 
consequence of this greater adaptability of equipment is 
that skills are also less permanent. This stands in 
contrast with the older equipment which had been designed 
when engineering processes were more rigid, so that 
equipment could not easily be adapted as technological 
advances occurred.
During the 1950s and 1960s, however, some changes did 
occur in open hearth steelmaking, but these were few by 
contrast with the frequency and magnitude of the changes 
which occur with more modern equipment. At the BOS 
several major technological and organisational changes 
were introduced in the first decade of operation at Port 
Kembla, as well as a continuous upgrading of computers and 
other process control equipment. This frequency of change 
was a source of instability in work processes, rendering 
older skills obsolete.
Changes in BOS technology included a new oxygen 
injection process, the vacuum degasser, the attempts to 
introduce the so-called “2.2" process, in which both 
furnaces would operate at the same time, and the 
slabcaster. This last, which was commissioned in 1978, 
began the process of moving away from the ingot route, in 
which the slab making aspect of steelmaking was quite 
separate from the process of steelmaking itself. [Hoskins 
Kembla Works, various issues; Johnston and Rutnam, 1982;
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Steel (n.d.)] In the ingot route, molten steel was teemed 
into large ingot moulds which were sitting on flat rolling 
stock. These were moved to another part of the BOS or 
open hearth where the moulds were stripped by a crane from 
the cooling and solidified, but still red hot ingots. The 
ingots were then transferred across the plant to the slab 
mill. There, they were reheated and then cast into slabs 
for further rolling elsewhere. By contrast, the 
continuous casting process takes the molten metal and 
rolls it into slab shortly after tapping, thus removing 
the difficult process of teeming into moulds, then 
stripping, reheating, and slab rolling. Since continuous 
casting at Port Kembla was only introduced from the late 
1970s, the process also made very high use of automatic 
process control equipment from the first. All these 
changes in technology were to have significant effects on 
the way in which management organised and supervised work 
processes and allocated tasks.
The Management of the BOS
The management structure of the BOS was largely the same 
as that found in other workplaces at the Port Kembla 
steelworks. There was a strong internal hierarchy, with 
clearly defined divisions between staff and 'wages' 
workers. The BOS technology and the new kinds of 
production processes, together with the expanding capacity 
of Electronic Data Processing and Automatic Process 
Control required different kinds of skills than had the
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old open hearth technology. This is reflected in the 
different proportion of production u/orkers, tradesmen and 
staff at the BOS. [See Table 4.2 below and Appendix 4] 
Moreover there were noticeably fewer employees altogether 
at the BOS, although the original numbers of 300 to 400 in 
the early years expanded to an average total of well over 
600 by the late 1980s. This contrasts with the total of 
over 1800 at the two open hearth shops during the 1960s. 
At the BOS output per employee per annum was almost double 
that of the No 1 Open Hearth and always markedly higher in 
the BOS than it had been in the more modern No 2 Open 
Hearth. [See Appendix 4; Company data]
As previous chapters have shown, management structures 
at Port Kembla were hierarchical and based on the 
interdependence of the ironmaking, steelmaking, steel 
rolling and treating processes. At Port Kembla an array 
of managers were responsible to the plant General Manager. 
A manager of steelmaking was responsible for all the 
steelmaking production, equipment, and steelmaking 
employees, but not for the engineering or personnel 
functions which were separate areas. Moreover, from the 
1970s when the product market tightened, increasing 
importance was given to marketing, commercial, and 
accounting priorities. These, areas also have their own 
hierarchies of managers and staff. Authority from the top 
was thus capable of being diffused to a considerable 
extent.
Nevertheless within production units, such as the BOS,
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power and authority were vested in a complex but clearly 
defined hierarchical structure. The primary basis for 
such clear definition was in the division of all employees 
into two categories, 'staff' and ‘wages'. Technical, 
managerial and white collar workers were 'staff', while 
workers in manual and trade positions were employed in the 
'wages' category. Within each of these two divisions was 
a myriad of hierarchical classifications. Yet, such is 
the overwhelming recognition of the hierarchy of power and 
authority, that generally in any production unit the level 
of seniority of every worker is clearly understood.
As in most production units at Port Kembla, the most 
senior person in the BOS was the superintendent who was 
responsible for all the production, materials, policies, 
and personnel of the BOS. He was responsible for the 
employment levels, discipline and work organisation and 
task allocation, although implementation of these was 
delegated to other staff. The first BOS superintendents 
also had a significant role in organising work processes 
and deciding the educational and training requirements for 
BOS employees. This involved visits to Newcastle 
steelworks and other plants where the BOS process was 
already in place. Some quite different job classi­
fications, job descriptions, and staff/'wages' ratios, 
were developed at Port Kembla. The original decisions of 
work organisation and job descriptions decided on by the 
first superintendents of the BOS, laid the basis for later 
patterns of work and industrial relations. Thus changes
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u/hich have been made as a consequence of technological or 
organisational changes have always been made with 
reference to the original framework. This kind of 
decision making capacity of the superintendent signifies 
the considerable power vested in him. [NSWIC Transcript, 
BOS Margins, 1974 and various other cases]
Assisting the superintendent were one or two assistant 
superintendents who, like the superintendents and 
increasing numbers of other staff (as against 'wages' 
employees) at the BOS, most probably held post-school 
tertiary qualifications in engineering, metallurgy or 
other allied disciplines. Assistant superintendents had 
responsibility for specific aspects of administration and 
technical requirements of the workplace. Generally they 
came from the staff classifications of Observers and 
Technical Assistants within the BOS, or as engineers from 
other workplaces at Port Kembla. In some cases, the 
senior staff at Port Kembla were drawn from other BHP 
steel plants, although this seems to have been
decreasingly so during the 1970s. Nevertheless almost all 
workplace management above the level of foreman shared 
similar educational traits and a commitment to the 
technological aspects of production [Company Interviews, 
1985-7]. While the technical bias of BHP, and indeed most 
steel plant management internationally, was of a
longstanding nature, the increasingly sophisticated 
technology employed in the BOS led to a continuing 
reinforcement for this technical bias.
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Not only were there fewer employees in the BOS, but the 
proportion of staff at or below the level of Technical 
Assistant, was much higher than it had been in the open 
hearth. With the more modern technology of the BOS, those 
in the staff category were no longer always supervisors of 
'wages' workers. Rather, many of the lower level 
workplace staff (as against 'wages') employees at the BOS 
were production workers who performed processes at 
computers or process control equipment that had previously 
been done wholly or partly by 'wages' workers as manual 
labour. In the BOS much of the skill of the first helpers 
in the open hearths had been incorporated into the process 
control equipment which was operated by staff employees 
with necessary technical qualifications. [NSWIC 
Transcripts; Company Interviews, 1985-7]
Qualifications were necessary for two reasons, argued 
management. First, to a much greater degree than the 
older steelmaking technologies, staff were required to 
have technical qualifications. Modern equipment, 
management maintained, required formal technical 
knowledge. Much of this knowledge was programmed into the 
equipment itself to provide the basis for decision making 
on metallurgical and production needs. Secondly, 
management argued, the process control equipment and the 
production plant itself demanded knowledge of electronics, 
hydraulics and metallurgy well beyond the skills learned 
through experience by 'wages' workers [NSWIC Transcript, 
Margins Case, 1980: 344]. Managerial authority was thus
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legitimised and even strengthened at lower levels, through 
the specialist knowledge of the staff/managers. To some 
degree the increased technical qualification offset the 
reduction in foremen's authority from the 1960s, when, 
from the view of the 'wages' worker, it had been seemingly 
absolute.
Where previously, foremen had authority to discipline 
workers and allocate tasks and overtime, these began to be 
reduced from the late 1960s, with more formal procedures 
of action. Foremen retained wide advisory powers over 
discipline and dismissal. However, these were within more 
formal constraints and with the ultimate authority of the 
superintendent. As in many manufacturing industries, the 
authority of foremen in recent times, has thus been 
augmented and legitimised by their superior technical 
knowledge of the processes, as had always been the case 
with superintendents. [see also Marchington and 
Loveridge, 1983 :81]
As well as the increase of technically trained 
production employees on staff at the BOS, there was also 
from the first a small but significant proportion of staff 
whose primary function was supervision. [See Appendix 4] 
While most of these workers had technical qualifications 
in the BOS, their primary role was as supervisors of 
workers and work processes. Indeed, there is some 
evidence that BOS 'wages' workers were more closely 
controlled than open hearth workers. The extended 
internal labour market at the open hearths had an indirect
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effect on workplace controls through the system of 
internal promotion to foremen from 'wages' classifi­
cations. In the open hearths, foremen, through their wide 
experience of the workplace, reinforced familiarity and 
workplace identification. This stands in contrast with 
the BOS. On the other hand, closer supervision in the new 
plant was perhaps not surprising given the high cost of 
new capital equipment and the company's perceived need to 
ensure early returns to investment.
At the BOS a shift general foreman was responsible for 
day-to-day production and the pattern of work of a whole 
shift crew. These crews worked on a rotating shift basis 
on each of the three eight hour shifts, beginning at 
7.20am., (dayshift), 3.20pm., (afternoon shift) or 11.20pm 
(night shift), but crews including foremen, generally 
remained the same. As well as the shift general foreman 
on each shift, there was a multiplicity of foremen for 
specific work areas and processes at each shift. There 
were also assistant foremen in larger work areas or areas 
where processes might require close supervision or 
decision making at levels considered beyond the capability 
of 'wages' employees. Thus the task of tapping the 
newly-made steel required that the furnace attendant 
operate the furnace controls to tilt the furnace. But 
this was done at the direction of the melter foremen, 
whose greater technical knowledge was considered to be 
necessary for steelmaking at the BOS. By contrast, while 
the melter foreman had held a recognised general
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responsibility for the metal in the open hearth, he was 
rarely required to decide on the timing of tapping, or 
other processes.
In the BOS, however, the major controls for the furnace 
were in the control room so that the job of the furnace 
attendant was tied to the decisions made in the control 
room. This was partly because of the nature of BOS 
steelmaking, which was designed for high speed steelmaking 
capable of a high degree of flexibility and specificity of 
the product. One outcome of this was that Port Kembla 
management perceived the need for continuing high levels 
of supervision of the lower proportion of 'wages' staff. 
Moreover in line with traditional company policy the BOS 
required sufficient staff to maintain production or at 
least production readiness during strikes. Since the BOS 
was first put into production at a time when strike levels 
were beginning to increase it is probable that staff 
levels were partly set as sufficient for maintaining 
production capability during a strike.
Supervision of the tradesmen based in the BOS was fairly, 
similar to that in other areas of the plant, in that they 
had their own separate supervisory system. Work processes 
for tradesmen was different to those in the older areas 
because of the higher level of technology and the greater 
dependence on the BOS furnaces because there were only two 
of them initially. The third vessel or furnace was added 
in 1980, but by that time the dependence on BOS 
steelmaking was even greater than previously. The No 1
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Open Hearth had been closed and it u/as generally believed 
that the days of No 2 Open Hearth shop were also numbered. 
As a consequence there was considerable reliance on 
tradesmen for the quick repair and maintenance of vessels, 
as well as increasing demand for higher levels of trade 
training. The role of foremen in this changed environment 
was to ensure that work was carried out at the greater 
pace and accuracy seemingly demanded by the new 
technology.
The greater pace and constancy of production placed new 
stresses on managers, supervisors and staff production 
workers. As well, incremental technological change at the 
BOS meant that any new traditions that might develop were 
jeopardised by changing patterns of operation. The pace 
of both production and change meant supervisors and 
managers were frequently attempting to supervise or 
manage, despite their own incomplete experiences and 
lesser familiarity with the new processes. The number of 
BOS disputes over the actions of foremen in the early 
years suggests that at times hasty and authoritarian 
action was a substitute for more thoughtful supervision. 
[Company dispute data] In an environment where the 
tap-to-tap time decreased almost every year thus 
signifying increasing intensity of work, this is perhaps 
not surprising. These pressures were intensified for 
management in the late 1970s and early 1980s as dependence 
on the BOS for steelmaking increased in an increasingly 
competitive world market. If, as Marchington and
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Loveridge [1983:81] assert, management's perceptions of 
the external environment is conveyed through approaches to 
work relations and the production imperative, then it is 
perhaps not surprising that workplace relations at the BOS 
reflected considerable tensions well into the 1980s when 
plant level industrial relations had become more peaceful, 
[see also Nichols and Beynon,1977; Wilkinson, 1977] But 
these stresses were the same for the 'wages' workers at 
the BOS as well.
Workers and Work Processes in the BOS
The BOS, far more than the open hearth, demanded close 
coordination and teamwork at a much more continuous pace 
from the 'wages' workers and staff workers alike. It was 
not, however, technologically determined in the same way 
as work pace in car production is determined by the 
technology. [Beynon,1973; Linhart, 1976] As the steel 
unions asserted in margins cases, these new demands on BOS 
workers were not a consequence of a machine determined 
pace and intensity. Rather, workers' teamwork and 
coordination allowed the high level of productivity 
[NSWIC, Margins Transcript,1981]. As Nichols and Beynon 
[1977:33] argue "Without workers, sophisticated technology 
counts for nothing."
The new teamwork depended as much on workers' acceptance 
of control from the centralised control room, with much 



































OXYGEN STEELMAKING SHOP (BOS)
WORKFORCE : TOTAL AND COMPOSITION 1971-85
TOTAL STAFF AS FIA AS TRADES
EMPLOY % ALL BOS % ALL BOS AS % ALL
3 100% 0% 0.0%
5 100% 0% 0.0%
66 44% 18% 22.7%
385 16% 61% 11.9%
416 18% 64% 13.0%
436 20% 56% 17.2%
497 17% 61% 16.3%
477 18% 60% 14.5%
540 19% 61% 14.6%
517 20% 59% 14.9%
551 19% 61% 14.0%
529 18% 61% 12.7%
556 19% 62% 15.1%
582 18% 59% 15.3%
604 18% 59% 15.9%
583 19% 61% 14.8%
575 19% 63% 14.3%
588 18% 61% 16.0%
640 20% 61% 14.5%
614 20% 61% 15.8%
678 20% 61% 14.6%
707 19% 61% 15.7%
733 19% 62% 15.6%
692 17% 61% 15.6%
627 19% 62% 14.0%
677 17% 67% 11.8%
676 16% 67% 12.4%
665 17% 67% 11.9%
650 17% 66% 12.9%
COMPANY DATA, (Departmental Reports)
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public address system. While the pace of work may not 
have been technologically determined, there was a 
constancy about BOS production that had not been possible 
at the open hearth. The work processes of BOS workers, 
particularly the non-trades production workers, will be 
examined in this section to identify ways in which the 
newer technology affected their responsibilities, skill 
levels, autonomy, and working conditions.
For tradesmen, BOS production demanded a broadening of 
skills and a faster work pace. In the open hearth there 
had been greater number of furnaces and planned campaigns 
of repair extending over weeks or months. With only two 
or three BOS furnaces, a closer attention to maintenance 
and higher reliability on more finely tuned equipment 
placed new demands on the tradesmen. The shortage of 
trade-trained workers at Port Kembla reinforced the more 
forthright approach of most of the tradesmen's unions. 
Like their overseas counterparts, unions such as the 
Amalgamated Metal Workers' Union (AMWU) acted assiduously 
to retain their craft controls over work organisation and 
work processes [Hyman and Eiger, 1981:128-32], The major 
impact of BOS production on the work processes of 
tradesmen lay in the greater pace of work and the 
increasing skills and knowledge required of them. The 
impact on non-trades workers was much more complex.
As shown briefly above in the technical description of 
the BOS process, the work of BOS production 'wages' 
employees involved operating equipment which processed and
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transferred the metal through the BOS shop. In general 
terms the job descriptions of most classifications, 
initially at least, appeared similar to that of their open 
hearth counterparts. Thus in the u/ork value cases it was 
shown that a crane driver whose crane transferred the 
molten iron from the Treadwell or torpedo ladle to the 
furnace had similar responsibilities to the floor crane 
driver on the charging floor at the open hearth [NSWIC 
Transcript, BOS Margins, 1974].
What differentiated such work was that, firstly, there 
were initially seven to eight "heats" (or completed 
batches or taps) each shift, building up to almost double 
that at the BOS by the end of the 1980s. By contrast, at 
the open hearth there was usually only one heat per 
furnace per shift. Charging ladles however were larger, 
and sometimes four or five furnaces were in operation at 
any one time in the open hearth shop. Secondly, at the 
BOS the new technology included electronic weighing 
equipment where weight of the metal could be automatically 
communicated to the control room which had become the 
control and communication centre of the plant. This meant 
that some decision making formerly done by the crane 
driver now rested with those in the control room. 
Thirdly, the BOS offered a better physical environment 
than in the older production area.
For those in higher non-trades production 
classifications, there was a clear difference in work 
processes between the old and new steelmaking processes.
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At the BOS the work tasks of these workers demanded more 
machine tending rather than cognitive skill and 
experiential knowledge as had been the case for the more 
senior 'wages' classifications in the older technology. 
Two of the most senior of these classifications in the BOS 
were the furnace attendant and the steel pourer, whose 
classifications were roughly equivalent to first helper 
and ladleman in the open hearth. The equivalences are 
however only approximate. [NSWIC Transcripts]
The duties of the steel pourer included preparing 
material and equipment for the teeming of a heat. Teeming 
is the term given to the process whereby the newly made 
steel was poured from the ladle, which was suspended from 
the teeming crane hoist, into ingot moulds. Always a very 
hot, and dirty job where gas fumes were an inherent part 
of the conditions, the job of the steel pourer ceased to 
exist in December 1988 when all teeming ceased at Port 
Kembla. Now all newly made steel goes into the 
slabcaster. Until it was eliminated the job of the steel 
pourer remained one which demanded skill acquired through 
experience, just as it had been required of the ladleman 
in the open hearth.
At the BOS however the new equipment gave the steel 
pourer greater ease in shutting off the flowing metal 
between the moulds, and also greater responsibility in 
determining when the moulds were full. The steel pourer 
determined how full each mould was by the sound of the 
metal, by now at about 1500° c, moving up the mould. At No
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1 Open Hearth this job had been the foremen's 
responsibility. On the other hand the pourer was perhaps 
subject to greater supervision at the BOS, particularly in 
preparing equipment since there were more foremen in his 
work area. Moreover there was a decrease in informal 
decision making responsibilities of the ladleman at the 
open hearth because the greater specificity of BOS steel 
and the availability of electronic equipment to achieve 
this.
The greatest change for the steel pourer was that the 
pace of work of work increased as the number of ladles to 
be teemed each shift increased. This led to the 
appointment of a second pourer on each shift in 1975 and a 
third pourer in 1980. By this time however about a third 
of the steel made at the BOS was directed through the 
slabcaster. Overall then, the steel pourer's job during 
most of the 1970s was more intense and depended on less 
skill in reading the metal. It was more responsible and 
demanding than that of his counterpart in the open hearth 
because the BOS demanded more coordination and because the 
company relied increasingly on BOS steel. [Company 
interviews, 1988; NSWIC Transcripts]
The charging of the furnace and melting on the other 
hand, depended considerably less on the long and skilled 
experience of the furnace attendant than open hearth 
steelmaking had relied on that of the first helper. Much 
of the knowledge that had been resident with the first 
helper was no longer needed. Staff steelmakers and
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computers now provided the skills and made the decisions. 
On the other hand, the BOS equipment was more automated 
and easily operated. As a result there was a reduction in 
the amount and level of heavy physical labour required of 
those on higher margins. However, there was also a 
reduction in the required amount and level of experience 
and skill in being able to assess the state of the metal. 
In the BOS, the foreman melter and process controller (a 
new staff classification not found at other plants) took 
the decision to tap the BOS furnace in the control room. 
Their decision was based on measured metallurgical 
considerations, rather than the skilled visual perception 
of those on the charging floor at the open hearth. [For 
discussion on skill acquisition and content see 
Seymour, 1966; for discussion on skill acquisition in the 
British steel industry, see More, 1980:118-30].
Not all BOS jobs became less skilled as a consequence of 
the new and changing technologies. Rather the new skills 
of the BOS were skills of concentration, adaptation to 
work intensity, and judgement. Work organisation at the 
open hearth had begun to demand these different skills 
around the turn of the century when the old puddling and 
Bessemer processes became outmoded [More, 1980; Brown and 
Nuwer, 1983]. At the BOS these new skills depended less 
on years of learning to "read” the metal, but were 
nevertheless skills upon which the output of BOS 
production depended.
Other new equipment at the BOS meant that other
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responsibilities of the Furnace Attendant, such has 
deskulling the furnace, that is removing excess solidified 
metal, were more easily done than they had been in the 
open hearth. Although such jobs still required some heavy 
labour in hot conditions, and a reliance on teamwork from 
those on the floor there was not the degree of manual 
labour that had been required in the open hearth. Indeed 
the charging floor, like the pit on the casting side, 
required far fewer workers than the equivalent more 
labour-intensive work areas of the open hearth.
This fact also points to a difference in the BOS work 
organisation relative to that in the open hearth - the 
compression of the internal labour market in the BOS. 
While point of entry to the BOS for newly recruited 
non-trades 'wages' workers was still at the lowest 
classification of labourer, there were far fewer 
non-trades 'wages' workers on the floor. This reflected 
the greater utilisation of technology for operating and 
maintaining the equipment. A consequence of this was that 
while the labour gang still comprised a reasonable 
proportion of the non-trades 'wages' workforce, the 
internal promotion available to those who wished to work 
up to higher classifications was reduced. Thus while 
access to promotion still existed, it had become depleted.
Nonetheless the BOS relied on the reduced internal 
labour market for a core workforce in key metal processing 
and transfer areas. The on the job training was as much a 
responsibility of those already trained, as for the
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foremen, in the specific work areas. In the early years 
of BOS production, the creation of a stable core of
experienced 'wages' workers was an expressed imperative of
workplace management [Company data, 1974]. The
informality of job training gave way to closer attention
from foremen, up to and including Shift General Foremen 
during the 1970s. Previously job training had mostly 
depended on observation of, and practice with, the current 
practitioners of particular skills. Management 
perceptions of the changing product market led to the 
requirements on workers to fulfil their tasks more 
accurately.
Similarly, in earlier years observation of workers was
considered a sufficient basis for assessing ability to
fulfil the demands of a job description. This was no
longer seen as adequate. In the new, more competitive,
environment of the early 1980s, informal observation of
workers was replaced by checklist records for each 
classification. Any worker trained on the job was tested 
on each item on the checklist before being considered 
capable of doing a particular job. The added value of the
checklists was that they were more flexible for
management. Changing duties and responsibilities could be
recorded easily and without reference to the arbitration 
system as changes to job descriptions might have required.
Although always much smaller than the open hearth in 
terms of employment, numbers at the BOS gradually
increased despite the end of teeming. Employment in the
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BOS increased as a consequence of the refinements to the 
steelmaking process such as vacuum degassing, as well as 
the increasing pace of steel production and shorter hours 
from early 1982. In 1980 there was an attempt to 
introduce the so-called '2.2' or intensive operations. In 
this process, the two BOS furnaces would operate 
sequentially, instead of one furnace "down" for repairs at 
any time. Extra floor crews were appointed to cover each 
furnace but the new process, which in fact was never 
operated for long, put new pressures on workers. The 
increased pace of production meant a greater intensity of 
work for those directly involved in production. Such 
increases also led to greater wear and tear on ladles, 
vessels and other equipment, which itself required more 
workers and placed new demands on those involved in 
maintenance and repair. Where, in the 1970s there were 
about 450 non-trades 'wages' workers at the BOS, this had 
increased to about 550 in the mid-1980s, or about 180 
workers at each shift. This did not mean a reduction in 
the pace or constancy of work, however .
The greater pace of work at the BOS, relative to the 
open hearths, reflected the emphasis on teamwork and 
coordination to use the equipment to achieve a shift 
production target. The production imperative, based on 
management's focus on the technology, had some paradoxical 
consequences for workplace industrial relations in the BOS 
where relatively few workers operate costly equipment at 
the centre of an integrated plant. The high level of
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importance, attached to the technology and production by 
the technically educated managers, was conveyed to workers 
as a 'given'. This acted as a form of control over 
workers, by directing the basis of management authority to 
the technical needs of production. On the other hand, 
while some deskilling of some production workers' jobs may 
have occurred as a consequence of process technologv, 
dependence on operators in key positions increased.
The greater reliance on workers in the areas where metal 
is processed or transferred meant that these workers 
gained tactical advantages, particularly as the demand for 
greater specificity and improved quality of steel 
increased. Even in the 1970s, when there was less 
pressure on management to meet tight, competitive 
production goals, workers were able to use these tactical 
advantages to confront the problems arising out of a loss 
of traditional boundaries and customs and practices. All 
these phenomena - the displaced workforce experiencing 
frequent incremental technological change, no longer able 
to assert some elements of job control through traditional 
practices and skills, but with a greater tactical 
bargaining advantage - combined to ensure that industrial 
relations in the BOS was noticeably more unsettled than 




Industrial relations at the workplace is shaped not only 
by the workplace environment itself, but also by the 
economic, social, political and industrial relations 
environment within the plant or enterprise. The nature of 
BOS (and open hearth) industrial relations was 
significantly affected by the structures of the workplace 
technology as well as the tactics and strategies which 
workers and managers undertook as a consequence of each 
other's actions and the structures already in place. 
Workplace relations at the BOS was also a consequence of 
industrial relations at the Port Kembla steelworks. 
These, in turn, were partly an outcome of phenomena such 
as the nature of local unions, management strategies and 
style, and the policies and practices of the parent 
company BHP, as was shown in Chapter 2.
That chapter also described the changing fortunes of the 
steel industry and national political and economic changes 
which also had some impact on the imperatives of the 
parties to plant and workplace industrial relations. This 
was very true during and after the steel crisis of 1981-3 
when production capacity was heavily reduced. Because of 
reduced operations, including closure of elderly plant 
such as the No 2 Open Hearth, the company now depended 
more heavily on the retained plant for output. The 
company also recognised the need to produce better quality 
steel more efficiently utilising a smaller, more highly 
skilled workforce. To do this meant a move towards
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achieving a more cooperative workforce. As a result, 
company management styles changed to a more human 
relations approach. Now emphasis was on resolving 
disputes at the workplace rather than escalating disputes 
through reliance on tribunals. With union delegate 
structures already in place, this new approach including 
more effective, less coercive supervision, had the 
capacity to work well. By 1985, disputes at the plant as 
a whole were a fraction of what they had been at the 
beginning of the decade. The Steel Industry Plan and the 
thorough demoralisation of the workforce, after the 
massive workforce reductions of 1982-3, also had 
considerable impact on the attitudes of managers, workers 
and unions. [Kelly, 1988]
But plant and enterprise level relations and policies 
become diffused at the workplace by the peculiar features 
of the workplace, just as different plants and industries 
generate different features. For example, there are 
significant differences between strike levels at Port 
Kembla steelworks and the levels at each of the two 
workplaces under study. An in-depth study of strikes at 
plant or workplace is not the focus of this thesis. 
However, as noted in earlier chapters, the level of 
industrial action indicates differences between workplaces 
which are not obvious from a study of plantwide strikes or 
other measures of industrial relations. Absolute levels 
of strikes in workplaces are not accurate indicators of 
strike activity, however. Different sizes of workplaces
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and different workforce compositions can blur comparisons.
In order to effectively compare strike levels between 
workplaces and the steel plant as a whole, the measure of 
'hours lost per 'wages' worker' per annum has been chosen. 
A major reason for using only 'wages' workers as the basis 
for strike comparisons is that in BHP plants, staff 
unionism has been fairly heavily discouraged in the main. 
Unlike their British counterparts, [Bamber, 1986] there 
has been very little managerial unionism in the Australian 
steel plants. As a result, except in a very few specific 
non-production areas, strikes by those who are classified 
as staff are almost unheard of in the production 
workplaces of Australian steel plants. When considering 
strike data therefore, consideration must be given to this
pattern of unionism. A high number of staff in a
particular department or workplace could conceal a
significant level of strikes by 'wages' workers if a
general per capita measure was used. Calculation based on 
the number of 'wages' workers as the criterion for 
comparative analysis therefore allows for both differing 
size of workplaces and differing staff/'wages' mix. While 
there might be problems with this measure in a closer 
study of strike levels, it offers adequate indication of 
the differences between the workplaces and the plant.
There were generally rising strike levels at Port Kembla 
steelworks throughout the 1970s as Table 3.3 demonstrates. 
[See also Appendix 4]. Strike rates at the plant peaked 
in 1979, the same year that they exceeded national
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manufacturing strike rates. Hours lost through strikes 
remained high until the first half of the 1981-3 steel 
crisis. From the end of 1982 when annual strike levels 
were still very high at 18.8 hours lost per 'wages' 
worker, industrial disputes fell to 5.6 hours lost per 
'wages' worker for 1983. The annual rate was 1.9 by the 
end of 1985. There was some resurgence in strike levels 
in two definable periods in 1986 and 1987. Strike rates 
appeared high for these years because the strikes were 
plantwide and related to significant political issues. 
There were few workplace-based strikes or strikes over pay 
during the Steel Industry Plan era. [Derived from company 
strike data]
As shown in Chapter 3, open hearth industrial relations 
were much milder than overall plant level during the 
1970s, with the exception of 1971. Despite a rising level 
of strikes at Port Kembla steelworks throughout much of 
the 1970s, the annual rate of hours lost per 'wages' 
worker in the open hearths remained below 6. Hours lost 
per 'wages' workers peaked in the open hearth in 1980 at 
11.29 for the year. In the same year, plantwide hours 
lost per 'wages' worker was almost 19, and the BOS was at 
27. This figure doubled at the BOS in 1981 and did not 
fall below the plant wide levels until 1985, although it 
has remained very low since that time. This pattern of 
much higher strike levels per 'wages' worker at the BOS 
than the steelworks as whole, and very much higher than 
the open hearth begins to indicate the significance of
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specific workplace characteristics as an influence on 
industrial relations processes. These include workplace 
technology, management, and work organisation.
Higher strike levels at the BOS are not simply a matter 
of different groups of 'wages' workers acting according to 
different approaches to industrial conflict. Many of the 
BOS workers had come from the open hearths where numbers 
of 'wages' workers declined from almost 2000 in the 1960s 
to about 700 from 1977 when the older No 1 Open Hearth 
shop was closed. Open hearth employment levels remained 
around 600-700 until the closure of No 2 Open Hearth shop 
in December 1982. Many of the ‘wages' workers displaced 
by the shrinking production of open hearth steel were 
relocated at the BOS. It was the same with staff 
employees at the BOS, many of whom began their working 
lives at the open hearth. [Company Interviews]
Just as there were many workers who were employed at 
both plants, so too the union coverage was the same to a 
very considerable extent. From the perspective of 
workplace industrial relations, delegates can play a 
significant role at Port Kembla steelworks. It might be 
expected, therefore, that some difference in workplace 
industrial relations may arise from the differing 
approaches of delegates. On the other hand, the sustained 
high level of strikes throughout the BOS cannot simply be 
explained by the activities of delegates who cover 
sub-workplace areas and who, like other BOS, employees 
came from the open hearth in any case. The reasons for
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the volatility of BOS industrial relations were therefore 
more complex.
The greater pace and intensity of work processes and 
geographical separation of workers differentiated the work 
environment of the BOS from the open hearth, as the number 
of disputes over manning levels attests. At the open 
hearth cooperative traditions and less sophisticated 
technology contrasted with the required coordination and 
greater exactitude of work and metallurgical processes at 
the BOS. When referring to the much better physical 
environment and reduced manual labour required at the BOS 
in the 1970s, one ex-open hearth worker commented , "The 
BOS is kidstuff compared to the open hearth, but it's not 
so friendly, more remote" [Interview, 1986; see also BHP
Review, December 1981:9-13]. At the BOS, the work
environment was impersonal, the work exacting. The
imperative to produce better steel more efficiently meant 
that the technically oriented supervisors made demands on 
workers which led to disputes over the ways in which jobs 
should be done, and by whom. It is perhaps not surprising 
then, that fifteen of the seventeen strikes at the BOS in 
1977, for example, related to the allocation or 
organisation of work and working conditions. [Derived 
from company data].
That almost all disputes throughout the first decade of 
BOS production at Port Kembla were of this pattern also 
reflects the very newness of BOS technology. A widely 
recognised effect of new technology is that it disturbs or
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even destroys the "complex processes of custom and 
practice" [Krieger, 1984:46] which evolve in workplaces, 
localities or industries over time. As Brown [1972] and 
others have noted workplace rules have a fluid and 
informal character which offer workers control over 
aspects of the relations of production at the workplace. 
These rules may not be written or even verbally agreed 
upon but are nevertheless practised procedures or actions 
across a workplace. As such they can be a source of 
stability in the power and labouring relations at the 
shopfloor simply by offering job controls achieved through 
models of action. At the open hearth a fair degree of 
worker autonomy was achieved even under autocratic foremen 
through widespread acceptance of customs and practices of 
task allocation, seniority and the like. 
Trades/non-trades boundaries were clearly defined and 
accepted, albeit mostly quite informally.
As was argued in Chapter 3 the acceptance of custom and 
practice was in part a consequence of the longstanding 
nature of open hearth technology. The BOS by its newness 
had no such traditions or workplace rules which could 
offer elements of apparent job control to workers. These 
had to be built up over a number of years, a difficult 
process where incremental technological change continued 
to alter patterns of work. Nevertheless, and arguably as 
a consequence of strong, active workplace-based unionism, 
BOS workers, by the late 1980s, could point to elements of 
workplace rules and job controls which were not
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necessarily formally derived at the tribunals or even 
formally agreed upon. By these latter years industrial 
relations at the BOS u/ere markedly more peaceful than 
elsewhere on the plant.
The lack of customs and practices in the first decade or 
so of BOS production was amplified by the fact that 
foremen were appointed on the grounds of technical 
qualifications rather than workplace experience. Even by 
the late 1970s when a much higher proportion of foremen at 
the open hearth had technical education than previously, 
over half the foremen had been promoted to their positions 
from the 'wages' work areas. They were therefore also 
familiar with the reliance on workplace rules and work 
practices as a form of work organisation. The NSWIC 
judges too were familiar with the role of workplace rules 
and often took cognisance of them in their judgements. At 
the BOS in its first years, the greater and more 
continuous pace of production could only serve to 
emphasise the lack of workplace rules which would give 
workers elements of job control. .
Because the workplace was highly unionised and the 
unions at the plant very active in acting on workers' 
grievances, the high level of disputes in the BOS in the 
first few years was not surprising. By rigorously working 
to ameliorate workplace problems for workers in the new 
environment, the unions assisted in developing the 
eventual level of acceptance with work organisation at the 
BOS. The overall low trust relations between management
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and unions at plant level during the 1970s probably 
retarded the development of effective workplace rulemaking 
at the BOS. In some work areas the increasingly 
confrontationist approaches to industrial relations at 
plant level during the 1970s was a lesser problem because 
management in these work units condoned traditional 
workplace practices. However, these were not available in 
workplaces where an entirely new process was in place.
The frequent introduction of new technology or 
organisational changes invoked at the BOS also acted as a 
strong continuing destabilising factor on BOS industrial 
relations until the mid-1980s. For example, the proposal 
to move to the 2.2 operations discussed previously 
required several compulsory conferences through NSWIC. 
Eventually the process was agreed upon for trial with 
increased manning and other changes in 1981. The 2.2 
dispute though not a source of a large strike was notable 
for the fact that it could mean significant changes to the 
work organisation and pace. It was also one consequence 
of the growing pressures on Port Kembla steelworks at the 
beginning of the 1980s to operate more competitively in 
recognition of the tightening world steel market. [NSWIC 
Transcript, BOS Bonus, 1980]
A major problem with these kinds of changes was they 
were introduced in a somewhat unilateral manner until well 
into the 1980s. This reflected the deep belief in 
managerial prerogative long held by management at Port 
Kembla and strongly reinforced by senior management in BHP
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as discussed earlier in the thesis. [Quinlan, 1986; 
Sheridan, 1982b]. One consequence for workplace 
industrial relations was that there were frequent disputes 
and expressions of dissatisfaction at what workers 
perceived to be unheralded changes to work and work 
conditions. Even the NSWIC took the company to task for 
this approach as it did, for example, in rather 
exasperated tones in 1979 over organisational changes in 
the slab yard. [Referred to as the steelyard in NSWIC 
Transcript, 1979].
The company is at fault and as such it 
should accept the consequence. It 
introduced the new procedures, and new 
working methods into the industry. It 
does not notify the union it is doing 
this. Therefore the union is not in a 
position to become aware of these things 
and some of them are very considerable.
It follows therefore that the union is not 
in a position to have the matter dealt 
with immediately or even in the next award 
because the union is not aware..... 
Therefore there is no way in the world 
that the officers of the union are in a 
position to know that there are 
injustices.
Workplace disputes were not only over conditions, manning 
and supervision although these formed the bulk of 
attributed strike causes in the BOS. With the frequency 
of technological and organisational change, pay was also a 
frequent source of dissatisfaction.
Pay structures at Port Kembla, as in all BHP steel 
plants, are exceedingly complicated with five significant 
elements to a 'wages' worker's pay. [See also Appendix 5: 
Pay determination in the open hearth] First, all pay rests 
on a basic wage, far removed from any Harvester standard
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and simply a floor for the other elements of the u/age 
structure. Margins for skill and responsibility have 
comprised the bulk of workers' wages since the 1970s wages 
explosion. Penalties and allowances form the third 
element of a steelworker's pay, although these are more 
significant for tradesmen than for non-trades 'wages' 
workers. These first three elements are within the 
steelworks award which has been a consent award since 
1972. The fourth element is overtime, which is decided at 
the workplace according to production needs and 
availability of workers. It was more significant up to 
the mid-1970s, because of the industry's expansionary 
state and because of the severe shortage of labour for 
steel plants until about 1973/4.
The final element of a steelworker's pay, production 
bonus, has been the most fraught, from both an 
organisational and an industrial relations perspective. 
Bonuses are entirely a matter of company prerogative. 
They are set at workplace level by superintendents within 
restrictions set by the company's Central Industrial 
Relations Directorate, which has placed considerable faith 
in them as a means of motivating workers. Although, they 
are derived in a rather complicated fashion, bonuses are 
paid to all workers in a shift at a particular workplace, 
with incremental increases in bonus payments based on the 
level of output exceeding a preset minimum rate of output. 
Each worker receives a different level of bonus pay.
The difficulty with bonuses has been that they are
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complicated and for many years their calculation u/as 
singularly secretive. They also caused problems of 
relativity between workplaces and between workers within a 
workplace. Since they are based on the output, as defined 
by management, of each department or production unit their 
makeup became increasingly difficult from the 1970s when 
the range and pace of technological and organisational 
change in the plant as a whole began to increase.
For example the major area of worker and union concern 
in the 2.2 dispute described above was that of BOS 
bonuses. Management proposed a new bonus setting as a 
consequence of an expected increase in the number of heats 
per shift that the new operation would incur. Based on 
the "old" bonus setting, workers in a 2.2 shift would have 
gained huge increases. The unions argued that 
management's initial proposal would result in a decrease 
for some workers and for those on shifts where production 
proceeded under the old form of production. Ultimately a 
compromise bonus setting was agreed upon for trialling. 
[NSWIC Transcript, BOS Bonus, 1980]. This somewhat drawn 
out dispute, which was not an isolated one in BOS 
industrial relations, demonstrates the way in which the 
new technology of BOS production by its very capacity for 
incremental technological change not only destabilised 
workplace relations through altering work patterns and 
intensity, but also by the concomitant effects of the new 
methods on aspects of pay determination.
It might be proposed by some that a further reason for
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the unsettled industrial relations of the BOS could be 
found in the reduced skill content of the work of some of 
the non-trades 'wages' classifications. It is certainly 
true that the most senior non-trades 'wages' workers had 
less discretion than their open hearth counterparts and 
that access to staff classifications without appropriate 
qualifications was no longer possible. On the other hand, 
workers, particularly in recent years have had access to 
technical education so that those who wish to do so have 
been able to gain the necessary qualifications. Moreover 
the truncated internal labour market at the BOS offers the 
opportunity for job security through acquisition of new 
workplace-specific skills. While this clearly also works 
to the company's benefit, such patterns of skill 
acquisition can also benefit workers. This is especially 
evident where an active union stance ensures that there 
are requisite rewards for such skills. Many of the jobs 
that have disappeared or been improved with the 
introduction of basic oxygen steelmaking have been those 
requiring heavy manual work. Who would wish the return to 
the backbreaking shovelling of dolomite into a furnace 
radiating heat from its 2000° c interior? Heavy manual 
work has not completely disappeared at the BOS, but it is 
significantly less than at the open hearth and in better 
physical working conditions. Thus while there has been a 
mixture of deskilling and enskilling at the BOS, the 
overall impact has probably been to improve the content 
and condition of jobs, with some notable loss of
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discretion at the higher non-trades 'wages' levels. The 
probable effect of skill changes on industrial relations 
was therefore diffuse. What was of greatest difficulty 
for BOS workers was the very nature of change itself - the 
changing pace of work brought about by the incremental 
technological and organisational changes which took place 
from the first days of operation.
The difficulties for workers in dealing with these 
frequent changes were magnified for those workers for whom 
English was not their first language, a significant 
proportion of non-trades 'wages' workers. A number of BOS 
disputes and strikes from 1972 had their source in 
dismissal or suspension of workers, a very high proportion 
of whom were non-Anglophone migrants. A brief perusal of 
the NSWIC transcripts for these delineates the apparently 
autocratic attitude of foremen to these workers in 
particular. The crux of many of these disputes lay in the 
breakdown in communications which occurred as a 
consequence of poor or inadequate interpreting. Some of 
these disputes would begin with an order from the foremen 
for a worker to work a particular shift or job, with 
little notice or consultation. Where the worker refused 
he was threatened with suspension or dismissal, and 
frequently the disagreement escalated to actual suspension 
or physical violence.
This is exemplified by briefly considering the case of a 
casting pit labourer, who in late 1979 refused to train as 
a vacuum degasser operator. On the second or third
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occasion he refused to do this work he was involved in a
fight with the foremen. Six other staff employees were 
present at what began as a formal warning. Contrary to a 
company-union agreement, there were no fellow-workers or a 
union official present. Once the worker was suspended, 
other workers went on strike. [NSWIC Transcript, BOS 
Dismissal, 1980]
The significance of this dispute was not simply that 
there were many such disputes at Port Kembla although 
there were. Rather, in identifying the major factors in 
BOS disputes, it is important to recognise the magnified 
effect of a destabilised workplace where work practices 
were not yet sufficiently in place for workers or their 
supervisors to recognise or accept workplace rules, 
customs and practices. It is worth noting also that the 
supervisors themselves were also without the security of a 
familiar or unchanging workplace. While the impact of a 
new workplace without agreed traditions affected all 
workers, the effect on those who were not able to 
communicate in English was even more alienating. They in 
turn responded less effectively to the new and changing 
demands than their non-Anglophone counterparts in the 
longstanding workplaces.
A final proposed factor in the poorer industrial 
relations of the BOS, as explained rather pejoratively in
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one interview with a manager, was that it was a result of
workers in the BOS being,
a bunch of bloody prima donnas in the 
first few years. They thought they had 
the most up to date equipment in the plant 
and they demanded the world and half the 
time they got it. [Company Interview,
1986]
The basis for this assertion was based on the belief that 
a high number of strikes was a consequence of workers' 
selfishness and overuse of their bargaining power. Since 
most of the strikes resulted from management actions and 
the pace of both work and change, this assessment is 
simply a personal opinion which is representative of the 
view of some managers to higher levels of industrial 
action than they would expect or wish for.
Nevertheless it points to an important feature of the 
impact of changing technology on workers' bargaining 
power. The high cost of the equipment and the greater 
interdependence of the processes, if optimal use of the 
technology was to be made, meant that work processes 
demanded close coordination between workers operating 
equipment. Similarly there was less margin for error in 
the more exacting processes of modern steelmaking, and so 
less margin for error allowed in workers' output. This 
demanded development of skills of concentration and
physical coordination. It also meant greater management 
reliance on strategically placed workers with job-specific 
skills increasing BOS workers' bargaining leverage. Brown 
and Nuwer [1987] noted the same pattern about the time of 
the introduction of open hearth steelmaking. At that
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time, and by contrast with the earlier forms of 
steelmaking, the open hearth process provided greater 
tactical bargaining power for the "hands".
The new strategic industrial skills offered the BOS 
workers and their unions the opportunity to actively 
respond to the problems of displacement, lack of custom 
and practice, and increasing pace of work and change. 
These pressures were accentuated by the very capacity for 
modern technology to adapt more readily to incremental 
technical and organisational changes. The consequent 
impermanence of many job structures and work processes had 
a further displacing effect on both workers and their 
supervisors, which further emphasised the hostile 
workplace relations characteristic of the BOS until the 
1980s. ,
About the time of the Steel Industry Plan however, 
workplace relations in the BOS began to be more peaceful 
and by late 1987 managers could assert with little fear of 
contradiction that it was one of the most peaceful 
workplaces at the steelworks. In part this change 
reflected the same changes that had occurred plantwide. 
The retrenchment shocks and widespread fears for job 
security at all levels in the early 1980s had a 
significant effect on industrial action across the plant. 
The Steel Industry Plan which resulted from the 1981-3 
steel crisis had the effect at plant level of 
institutionalising workplace conflict, through closer 
reliance on grievance procedures. These kinds of
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plantwide variables influenced industrial relations at the 
BOS as they influenced other workplaces at the plant. Of 
themselves however, they do not explain why the 
steelmaking unit reversed its position from having higher 
strike levels than the overall plant levels, to having 
fewer hours lost through strikes over only two years.
One reason for this reversal is perhaps the greater 
effect on BOS relations of plantwide changes in management 
tactics and in levels of supervisor training from the 
early 1980s. By the beginning of 1983 the BOS was the 
only large scale steelmaking unit at Port Kembla. 
Moreover, there was a new national emphasis from unions 
and the state on attainment of higher skill levels and on 
multi-skilling. These were reinforced in the steel 
industry by the belief that multi-skilling and a 
concomitant revival of the internal labour market were 
means of achieving higher levels of productivity which was 
perceived as a vital requirement if Australian steel was 
to remain economic. [Ewer, Higgins and Stevens, 1987; 
Kelty, 1987; Company and Union Interviews, 1987] In this 
situation the old inflexible confrontationist approach to 
workplace conflict was quite outmoded.
At the BOS, as in other workplaces, line management 
became more overtly interactive with wages workers. The 
new emphasis was on preventing disputes or solving them at 
their point of origin. At the same time industrial 
relations management became more closely involved at the 
workplace level, with industrial relations officers taking
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a greater part in day-to-day workplace relations. In 
these kinds of ways the technical focus and expertise of 
foremen and managers were augmented by management training 
and greater expertise in human resources management. This 
was successful in reducing disputes at the BOS because, in 
large part, it had been the very lack of management 
training or workplace experience which had led to clumsy 
authoritarianism and a high level of conflict in the 
earlier days of the BOS. At the same time, the more 
communicative, interactive style of management provided a 
receptive environment for the patterns of workplace 
rulemaking which had been developing over the previous 
decade or so. Thus without any marked reduction in 
managerial prerogative, the supervision and management of 
workers at the BOS was more attuned by the mid-1980s to 
the ways in which workplace issues could be dealt with. 
At the same time the new production imperatives of high 
reliability, better quality, and improved productivity 
were also achieved.
Conclusion
The BOS first began production at Port Kembla in 1972 
when the future for steel appeared rosy. It was also a 
time of severe local labour market shortages and 
relatively low strike rates across the plant. The BOS 
process was perceived by the technically preoccupied 
management as the "state of the art" method of steel 
production, rather than as a new way of increasing control
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over workers, although this was one outcome of BOS 
production. That it utilised fewer 'wages' workers and a 
higher proportion of staff workers reflected the 
management's intense interest in the new technology. BOS 
steelmaking also moved the process closer to management's 
aims to achieve ultimately 'no hands steelmaking' [BHP 
Review, 1980]. The technological focus of management at 
plant level was also reflected in the lack of concern for 
its workers, evident in authoritarian management styles 
and the unilateral way in which new technology was 
introduced. This was offset to some degree by union 
responses to management tactics where the unions 
vigorously defended workers' rights in the unsettled 
environment.
About the time the BOS began production the oppressive 
industrial relations climate at Port Kembla also began to 
change as worker resistance to the older industrial 
relations management tactics gathered pace. This change 
reflected national trends of rising strikes, as well as 
the change in leadership of the local FIA. The outcome of 
these kinds of changes was a more challenging approach to 
management tactics from the bulk of 'wages' workers as 
well as a more coordinated union approach to industrial 
relations at the plant. Thus, until the early 1980s, the 
industrial relations climate at Port Kembla was 
characterised by hostility, low-trust and rising strike 
levels. The broad plant level picture however obscures 
the workplaces where workers' responses were mediated and
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differentiated by a variety of factors.
At the BOS for example, the general picture of low-trust 
relations and rising strikes was evident but with the 
difference that from the mid-1970s strike levels at the 
BOS were much higher than overall plant strike levels. 
Moreover BOS strike levels were radically higher than at 
the open hearth, the other, older major form of 
steelmaking at Port Kembla, which had remarkably low 
strike levels, relative to the plant levels. The reasons 
for this are a complex set of inter-related factors 
pertaining to the strategies and characteristics of 
management and workers, which are grounded in the 
technology of the plant and workplace.
What differentiated the BOS from the older technologies 
at the Port Kembla steelworks was not simply that it was a 
modern process, but that like much postwar technology it 
had the capacity to accept incremental technological 
additions. The BOS today is a noticeably different plant 
to that of seventeen years ago. Its process has been 
refined and the speed of metal conversion is much faster. 
The frequency of taps from a furnace each eight hour shift 
has doubled from seven or eight each shift in the early 
1970s. Much of this change occurred over the first decade 
of BOS production, so that the effect on workers and 
management alike, was that of having to deal not only with 
the new intensity of modern technology, but also a 
constantly changing pattern. This was not wholesale 
change, but because BOS processes were interdependent, new
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operations in one area of the workplace almost invariably 
affected the others.
Since most BOS workers came from the open hearth shops 
where few changes took place, the difference was indeed 
marked. This was particularly true for non-trades 'wages' 
workers who comprised the over 60% of the BOS workforce, 
although this proportion had been much higher in the 
labour-intensive open hearths. For these employees it was 
not just that the BOS was a completely different 
workplace, but that it meant a change in work tasks and 
job structures. The extended internal labour market of 
the open hearth was greatly truncated at the BOS by the 
requirement that staff positions in the BOS were premised 
on technical qualifications. In the latter years of the 
1980s when multi-skilling and access to upgrading or 
acquisition of qualifications became important for unions 
and the company, there was a renewed commitment to the 
internal labour market, with the Port Kembla management 
actively encouraging unqualified workers who were at the 
highest 'wages' levels to enrol in technical courses.
In the 1970s, however, work at the BOS also meant that 
for some workers there was a reduction in the skill 
requirements and discretionary content of their jobs. 
This was emphasised at the BOS where the control room was 
the obvious central point of decision making. Operations 
which previously needed to be performed manually could now 
be completed by automatic process control equipment. On 
the other hand the BOS demanded new skills of non-trades
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production workers such as concentration, physical 
coordination, and exercise of fine judgement, as well as 
increasing the skill requirements of other trades and 
non-trades 'wages' workers. Because old skills are 
redundant, that does not necessarily demonstrate 
deskilling.
Nevertheless the marked difference in job content at the 
BOS and the constant changes in technology meant that new 
skills had to be learned in an unsettled work environment. 
Added to this, much greater constancy of activity and 
demanding coordination were required of BOS workers than 
had been the case at the open hearths. In the early years 
of BOS production especially, the enforced teamwork had 
placed great pressures on workers, and contrasted markedly 
with the easier traditional atmosphere of cooperation at 
the open hearth.
A major factor in the easier atmosphere of the open 
hearth had been the informal work rules or work practices. 
These were not apparent at the BOS. Workplace rules which 
could inform responses and attitudes, and which could 
assist in the structure and stability of workplace 
relations need to be developed over time. It is not 
simply the rules themselves which provide for job controls 
and so, related stability. To a fair extent, workplace 
rules are fluid and responsive to changing demands. What 
is important is the capacity to create workplace rules. 
This capacity is a prerequisite for developing the rules 
themselves. Rules or job controls, no matter how
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informally achieved, depend on the availability of a 
process by which workers can implement acknowledged 
workplace patterns of behaviour. Particularly in a highly 
formalised industrial relations system has been the case 
of the Australian steel industry industrial relations, 
such informal workplace rules need not necessarily conform 
to rules at a broader or more formal level. It is only 
required that such rules do not openly conflict with 
formal rules.
The sheer newness of the BOS technology meant that not 
only was there an absence of customs and practices, but 
that it was quite without an established process of 
achieving job controls. Moreover the frequent incremental 
changes to technology and the fact that initially foremen 
were chosen for their technical education, rather than 
their experience at the workplace, mitigated against the 
development of workplace rules and against cooperative 
management-worker workplace relations. Reinforcing this 
pattern of instability in BOS relations until the 1980s, 
was the management practice of notifying neither unions 
nor workers of impending change and its probable impact on 
workers, much less consulting them over such change.
The unions1 responses to the demands and changes at the 
BOS were from the first, reactive attempts to reinstate 
the sorts of rules and codes of practice which were worker 
orientated and which had been extant at the open hearth. 
To do this meant an aggressive approach to industrial 
relations based on a strong workplace delegate structure
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and utilising the neu/ly acquired strategic bargaining 
power in the BOS. Hence, until BOS workers could perceive 
that they had attained some modicum of job control but yet 
had the capacity to demonstrate this need to their 
managers, strike rates remained higher than the overall 
plant level.
Changes became apparent in the early 1980s. Cost 
pressures, the steel crisis, and sole reliance on one form 
of steelmaking after the closure of No 2 Open Hearth, led 
to a revision of Port Kembla management's attitudes to its 
industrial relations. The change in the management 
approaches to industrial relations has also been 
attributed to a related range of changes in personnel 
involved directly or indirectly in company and plant level 
industrial relations management. Certainly, greater 
emphasis on a cooperative approach between steelworks 
management and workers and their unions dates from about 
the time of the 1981-3 steel crisis. The new imperatives 
which appeared to threaten the very existence of the steel 
industry during the steel crisis also forced unions to 
alter their traditional responses. This led to more 
peaceful industrial relations for all Port Kembla workers.
What is most noteworthy for this chapter, however, was 
that the strike rate at the BOS was even below that of the 
plant as a whole by the mid-1980s. This new stable and 
mild pattern of industrial relations at the BOS rests on a 
consultative management approach which includes unions and 
workers in its plans. Supervision of workers is more
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effective but less coercive. The existence of stable
workplace rules and rulemaking augments the new pattern. 
By contrast the slabcaster which is adjacent to the BOS, 
and indeed replaces the teeming and stripping of ingots, 
which was a BOS activity at the time of commissioning in 
1972, has some of the currently highest strike rates at 
Port Kembla.
The Port Kembla steelworks has always received 
considerable media attention simply because the plant is 
the largest in Australia, so that any industrial conflict 
takes on Brobdingnagian proportions, relative to other 
plants. Such a large picture however obscures the 
workplaces, just as descriptions of national industrial 
relations obscure the myriad but not insignificant 
patterns and differences at industry and enterprise level. 
To understand workplace industrial relations at the 
steelworks, or other workplaces in other plants however 
requires some knowledge of particular workplaces, rather 
than generalising all points of production in a plant. 
The choices and actions of workers and managers alike are 
made within the constraints of the physical, technical and 
social environments in which they work. In this way the 
micro can inform the macro.
[219]
CONCLUSION
Closer interest in the nature of workplace industrial 
relations has been one consequence of the problems arising 
from declining profitability and economic instability 
which have been evident in recent years. As a source of 
improving productivity and efficiency, the workplace has 
assumed increased significance for employers and 
governments in most liberal democratic countries. In some 
countries employers and governments have become committed 
to confronting the economic problems through less fettered 
managerial prerogative by way of deregulated markets, 
including the marginalisation of unions. In other 
countries the workplace has also received renewed interest 
from those who seek to achieve stability and improve 
productivity through centralist tripartite strategies. 
Whatever the orientation, the upsurge of theoretical and 
empirical interest in the workplace derives from the need 
to clarify and analyse what happens at the workplace, and 
what influences processes and behaviour in the workplace. 
What processes and attitudes derive from the workplace 
itself, and what have their source in wider events and 
initiatives? From the industrial relations perspective 
the central question in this line of enquiry asks: 'To 
what extent, and in what ways, do the specific
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characteristics of the workplace influence the pattern of 
workplace industrial relations?' It is to this question 
that this thesis has addressed itself.
Central to the argument of this thesis, is the idea that 
the workplace is a discrete entity. It is not simply the 
shopfloor or the various points of production within the 
larger plant or organisation. Rather, except in very 
small establishments which are sufficiently homogeneous of 
themselves, the workplace is an organisational sub-unit of 
a plant or enterprise. It is also recognisable by its 
distinct technological and social characteristics. The 
technology and organisation which is in place, provide the 
frame for the social relations and regulatory patterns.
In order to examine workplace industrial relations in 
this way, the thesis has focused on two workplaces at the 
Port Kembla steelworks over twenty years, 1967 until 1987. 
The choice of workplaces within the same plant provided 
the opportunity for exploring the effects of plant, 
enterprise and regional industrial relations patterns on 
the workplace. It is through recognising the effect of 
these levels of industrial relations that the researcher 
can then begin to delineate what processes come from the 
workplace and what influence it. Because the two kinds of 
workplaces have had the same end product, steel, the 
specific characteristics have been more clearly 
discernible than if the workplaces chosen for studying had 
produced different goods.
The areas chosen for study present two generations of
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large scale steelmaking technology. The older method, 
open hearth steelmaking, began at Port Kembla in 1931 and 
ceased in 1982. The modern form of steelmaking, basic 
oxygen steelmaking (BOS), began at the plant in 1972 and 
is likely to remain the dominant form of large-scale 
steelmaking for some time into the future. The choice of 
steelmaking as the production activity in both workplaces 
has provided insights into industrial relations in the 
Australian steel industry. Barring a very few excellent 
analyses, such as those by Sheridan and Quinlan, the 
Australian steel industry has been a neglected area of 
industrial relations research.
The nature of workplace industrial relations research 
in Australia, while more extensive than the study of the 
steel industry, has been fragmented. The major reason for 
this fragmentation of research has been because the 
general understanding of what actually constitutes the 
workplace is often imprecise. This imprecision is partly 
linked to the fact that most workplace studies have been 
undertaken primarily to gain understanding of general 
processes or accommodation structures at the shopfloor. 
Yet the shopfloor at a larger plant or establishment may 
contain a variety of processes and imperatives for 
workers, supervisors and managers. The shape and effect 
of the specific characteris- tics of workplaces on 
workplace industrial relations may thus be concealed in 
generalised findings. This has been particularly the case 
in Australia where much research appears to have been
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based on the assumption that the arbitration system has 
shaped workplace industrial relations by dint of the fact 
that most formal rulemaking has occurred within the 
tribunals. This assumption has directed research away 
from the workplace towards the plant or enterprise levels. 
As a result, debate about the role of workplace industrial 
relations and the influences on the processes has been 
more diffuse and less rigorous than it has been over other 
levels of industrial relations. Yet, as Edwards [1986] 
argues, the workplace is a distinct sphere of activity, 
into which the actors bring their broader social values, 
status and beliefs.
The workplace thus replicates and so reflects the social 
relations of the wider society; it is a microcosm which 
deserves closer attention. At a time of economic 
instability, governments and industries have looked to the 
factors which affect output, productivity and depend­
ability at the point of production. An understanding of 
the economic aspects of the workplace needs to be balanced 
with closer scrutiny of the consequences for industrial 
relations. Since the responses of workers and workplace 
managers reflect both the wider framework and the actual 
environment in which they spend every day, it has been 
important to identify the variables which affect work and 
industrial relations.
This study of two production workplaces in a steelworks 
has demonstrated that there were many shared 
characteristics in the two sites, besides both producing
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steel. Many of the same workers and managers had been 
employed at both sites at different times; they were 
located within the same plant and thus shared the same 
constraints and imperatives of the plant and enterprise. 
Yet, the pattern of industrial relations in the two areas 
was markedly different. This was partly a result of 
different responses to changing market demands. However, 
it was also, in large part, a consequence of the different 
technology at each of the two workplaces. These 
differences resulted in quite different patterns of work 
organisation and had notably different effects on workers, 
supervisors and managers. Conversely workers, unions and 
management utilised different strategies to achieve their 
objectives.
Despite a seemingly milder approach to the management of 
its workers, relative to the Newcastle steelworks, Port 
Kembla steelworks was still notable for the coercive 
authoritarian style of management until the 1980s. At 
that time, changes in management strategies at plant and 
enterprise level were influenced primarily by BHP' s 
product diversification and increasing competition in the 
domestic and international steel market. The latter led 
to the introduction of an array of new equipment. These 
factors altered the composition of the workforce, and 
taken altogether, contributed to the recasting of 
management strategies.
Until the 1980s, plant and company tactics in the 
management of workers and labour relations centred on
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attempts to remove union activity from the plant and apply 
close controls on workers and work processes. Not only 
was the presence of union officials on the plant strongly 
discouraged, but also strike activity or union meetings 
were interpreted by management as directly threatening to 
plant security. Management responses to strikes included 
punitive measures such as the withdrawal of overtime which 
was an important addition to many workers' pay. In the 
1960s, these kinds of measures resulted in an extremely 
low level of strikes at Port Kembla. The level of 
industrial action increased markedly in the 1970s as a 
consequence of more aggressive union tactics at the plant, 
and throughout Australia. Between 1969 and 1971 strike 
levels increased by 500%. While this spectacular trend 
was not sustained, it indicated the change in the 
industrial relations environment at Port Kembla which 
remained throughout the 1970s.
Strike levels did not increase evenly across the plant 
in the 1970s. Rather there was a very significant 
increase in some areas, and only a small increase in 
others, or even a decrease, as in the open hearths, in 
other areas. What may be more significant in clarifying 
the nature of industrial relations after the change in 
local FIA leadership in 1970, was the more concerted 
action of all unions which was apparent in the increased 
plantwide union activity. It is also noteworthy that the 
more authoritarian style used by management may have been 
reinforced across the plant in the second half of the
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1970s by the effect of rising unemployment levels. The 
new labour market of the 1970s finally eased the problems 
of severe labour shortages and high turnover problems at 
Port Kembla during the postwar years.
The impact of changing local management and union 
tactics was not so obvious at the level of the workplace 
where the effect was variable. At the point of 
production, factors such as work organisation and 
workplace identification can act to depress or enhance 
union and company management goals. The effect of local 
and national union changes will also draw out changes in 
management strategies and the approaches of the state. 
These too, will affect the nature and manifestations of 
industrial conflict at the workplace. Different responses 
in different workplaces are thus determined by both, the 
special characteristics of the unit of production and the 
way in which the broader factors act on them.
The point is that while the workplace, like the factory, 
is not an island, it is a distinct sphere with its own 
community and its own antagonisms. Its. managers manage 
according their imperatives, which do not necessarily 
parallel company imperatives. This is because there is a 
multiplicity of company imperatives which may conflict at 
the workplace. Demands from senior management for both 
increased output and industrial peace can be difficult to 
ensure at the workplace level. Senior management policies 
will therefore be diffused as workplace management sets 
its own goals according to perceptions of the priorities
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of higher management and the nature of the social 
relations in the unit or department.
Certainly the mild nature of workplace industrial 
relations, in the open hearths in the 1970s, together with 
the high turnover and absentee levels, was a consequence 
of both plantwide characteristics and the effects of the 
technology and work organisation in the workplace. It is 
not enough to look for explanations of workplace 
industrial relations simply by examining the effects of 
plant level policies at the shopfloor across the 
establishment.
This is evident from the marked disparity in strike 
levels between the open hearths and the BOS during the 
1970s. Not only did these levels differ from each other 
but neither the BOS nor open hearth strike patterns 
mirrored that of the plant. Such dissimilarities point to 
the problems of accepting that plantwide statistics are 
the sum of equally distributed workplace statistics, 
particularly in larger work environments. To understand 
the pattern of industrial relations as a whole it is 
necessary to consider the workplaces themselves. For 
within each workplace, there are a new set of factors 
which interact with the influences from the wider 
environment.
At the open hearths the general patterns of work organ­
isation were set by steelmaking traditions. The company 
was committed to the pattern of work organisation through 
its dependence on the internal labour market as a form of
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control. This worked not so much as Stone [1974] has 
argued by fragmenting workers through competition for jobs 
within the internal labour market hierarchy. The 
company's devotion to the internal labour market was more 
a consequence of its need for a "stable core of workers" 
at workplaces such as the open hearths. This was a 
formidable task when the labour turnover rate was high in 
1960s and early 1970s. The high turnover was itself the 
result of government policy at the behest of BHP. Newly 
arrived migrants, regardless of skills or former 
experience, were directed to the steelworks in order to 
meet the severe labour shortages. When they found the 
work inappropriate, or the work environment unacceptable, 
they left, to be replaced by more newly arrived migrants. 
Thus organisation of many workplaces throughout the Port
Kembla steelworks remained centred on the traditional
internal labour market, despite the continuous
introduction of new workers at the bottom of the 
organisation. But each internal labour market has its own 
traditions which tend to reinforce workplace 
identification.
In the open hearths, for example, the internal labour 
market reinforced the recognition of the skills of the 
First Helpers. The most respected of these workers were 
admired for their expertise in being able to "read" the 
state of the metal during the melting process. The line 
of access to such jobs did not entirely depend on 
management choices because the Australian union tradition
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of seniority rules limited the ways in which management 
could allot appointments to each classification. The 
internal labour market at the open hearth also provided an 
opportunity for workers to gain skills, and a degree of 
autonomy in their work processes. As a result of the 
functioning of the internal labour market, together with 
the traditions of open hearth mutual assistance, there was 
strong workplace identification among open hearth 
steelworkers which served to strengthen workers' job 
satisfaction but weaken their bargaining power.
This occurred through the dependent status of the most 
secure open hearth workers as a consequence of their 
highly job-specific skills. While many workers from the 
open hearths transferred to the BOS at the classification 
which they had held in the open hearths, most of the 
skills from the old technology were unimportant in BOS 
steelmaking. What the company hoped these workers would 
bring to the BOS was their dependability and stability. 
However the basis for the stability and industrial placid­
ity of the open hearth was in patterns of work, together 
with fears workers may have had for their jobs once open 
hearth steelmaking ceased altogether.
In relying on the open hearth traditions and the 
internal labour market at Port Kembla, workplace 
management also allowed levels of cooperation and autonomy 
which were peculiar to the old technology. Once automatic 
process equipment and a greater requirement for exactitude 
entered the process, these ways of workers deciding who
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needed assistance in the most arduous tasks u/ere no longer 
possible. At the open hearths, this process of cooper­
ation which operated as a worker derived model of action 
also acted to reinforce workplace identification.
It is important not to paint a picture of workplace 
democracy at the open hearths. The processes of mutual 
cooperation and assistance in heavy tasks were done with 
the acknowledgement of the foremen. In many cases mutual 
assistance was probably necessary, simply because of the 
onerous nature of the work. Even the First Helpers who 
took important decisions in the melting process were 
required to undertake heavy manual work in immensely hot 
conditions. Like other open hearth workers they were also 
under the jurisdiction of the foremen, many of whom ruled 
their work areas very autocratically. This reflected the 
long held management policy of close supervision in which 
the foremen's rights extended to considerable disciplinary 
powers " such as suspension and stand-down. At the open 
hearth the legitimacy of the foremen's authority came 
partly from their experience as ironworkers who had moved 
through the classifications the workplace. This was 
sustained further through the disciplinary powers at their 
disposal and augmented by the bureaucratic company 
controls.
This traditional BHP style of management was certainly 
discernible at the BOS from its beginnings in the 1970s. 
It was an identifiable factor which, together with 
changing union tactics, led to the much higher levels of
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strikes and disputes notified to the NSWIC. But 
authoritarian management was a plantwide attribute and BOS 
strike levels were noticeably above plant levels.
Rather, poor industrial relations at the BOS were an 
outcome of several factors arising from the newness and 
constant upgrading of BOS technology. Managers, 
supervisors and workers alike were unfamiliar with the 
nature of the technology. It was not simply a matter of 
new machinery but also that the BOS placed new demands on 
all employees in terms of pace and constancy of 
production. The greater exactitude of basic oxygen 
steelmaking required closer attention to detail from wages 
workers and staff production workers alike. Because the 
process was relatively much faster than the open hearth, 
decisions were taken more quickly. While much of the 
decision making was computer controlled, there were, 
nevertheless, requirements for teamwork. At the same 
time, workers at all levels had to perform their 
respective tasks with considerably more precision and 
promptitude than in the old method.
The reliance on automatic equipment had several other 
effects on work processes and job expectations. The use 
of automatic process control equipment in a geographically 
large work unit, such as the BOS, separated workers from 
each other. Secondly, the use of computer technology 
removed access to decision making from the point of 
operation to the control room. Third, it truncated the 
internal labour market since, management argued, access to
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staff jobs in a workplace which depended on automatic 
equipment should be based on technical knowledge and 
metallurgical qualifications. Previously access to staff 
positions had been available through acquisition of 
knowledge of production through experience at the 
workplace. Those technically qualified persons appointed 
to new staff production and supervision jobs therefore 
were often neither familiar with the workers or trained in 
supervisory techniques. An examination of attributed 
strike causes in the BOS suggests that the basis and style 
of supervision remained essentially autocratic until well 
into the 1980s.
The combination of the ill-suited supervisory style 
practised by many BOS foremen, the unsettled nature of 
work processes as a result of technological changes, and 
the increasing pace and constancy of work led to a high 
level of industrial conflict at the BOS. The feelings of 
alienation that BOS workers felt towards their work was 
manifested in a high level of strike activity. The 
capacity for strikes to be effective was a notable outcome 
of the greater tactical advantage held by workers in the 
new steelmaking unit. The very skills of teamwork, 
concentration and judgement required of BOS workers were 
also the source of their bargaining strength.
The BOS however operated on a much smaller margin of 
workers than had been the case at the open hearths. The 
rapid pace of production at the BOS was organised so that 
it depended on workers doing their particular tasks
[232]
several times each shift and in close cooperation with 
those next in the sequence of operations. There was thus 
a loss of autonomy in decision making, especially for 
those in the highest wages classifications. However, it 
also seems likely that the reduced number of workers at 
the BOS offered greater ease in workplace union 
organisation for delegates than had been the case in the 
open hearths.
Renewed emphasis on management training and a less 
suspicious attitude towards unionism at the beginning of 
the 1980s were evidence of the beginnings of a change in 
management style at Port Kembla. As international 
competition for steel increased and world steel prices 
fell in the early 1980s, an unexpectedly severe domestic 
recession placed great pressures on steel plants 
throughout Australia. BHP1s continued diversification 
into a variety of resource-based ventures added pressure 
on the steel plants to reduce costs and increase 
productivity very significantly. As Chapter 1 showed this 
pressure to improve BHP steel plants' competitiveness 
occurred with only little warning from BHP management, 
although unions had been foreshadowing the need for change 
for some years. The rapid reduction in employment levels 
at Port Kembla during 1981-3 resulted in a severe local 
recession and a shaken and insecure remaining workforce at 
Port Kembla. The gravity of the rationalisation concealed 
for a time a strong shift in plant management style and 
tactics which had begun a few years earlier.
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By the advent of the Steel Industry Plan in 1984, the 
changes in management policies u/hich steelworks management 
had begun to implement several years earlier were well 
underway. Industrial officers had proposed or accepted 
major changes to its relationship with the unions in the 
1982 Margins-Hours case, including better access to the 
plant for union officials. The plan itself offered a 
means to reinforce the changing nature of company-union 
relations, as well as ensuring the continuing viability of 
the steel industry. Effective tripartism allowed for a 
sustained and integrated policy, which stood in sharp 
contrast to the former piecemeal approach in which each of
the parties vied for achievement of their goals.
The weakness of the plan, as is sometimes the case in
centralised programmes, lay in the failure of its
architects to recognise the different strengths and
weaknesses of the different plants and workplaces within 
them. What works at one site may need modification to be 
effective at another. Nevertheless, while any expectation 
that the plan could overset fifty or more years of 
confrontationist industrial relations in five years was 
unrealistic, the plan witnessed a marked improvement in 
the environment for labour management relations at Port 
Kembla. Much of this success however originated in the 
plant itself, and was certainly dependent on the workers 
and managers in the workplace.
The move to a more open and conciliatory style of 
management was in large part a recognition that the
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company now depended on its workforce for quality and 
surety of output in the highly competitive world steel 
market. The BOS was not only central to this need, but by 
1983 it was the sole large scale steelmaking unit at Port 
Kembla. The old tactics of management by aggression and 
coercion were less appropriate than ever. Effective
training of supervisors and managers was greatly
increased. The new approach by line management was
reinforced by closer involvement at workplaces by
industrial relations officers.
BOS workers had, by this time, developed a variety of
processes and informal practices which offered some
autonomy and workers 1 controls. Relations between
delegates and foremen were also more settled. By 1985 the
BOS was notable for its placid industrial relations just 
as the open hearth had been a decade previously. The 
pattern of open communication and more cooperative 
approaches to industrial relations was sustained and at 
the end of 1987 BOS workers and management alike pointed 
to their low strike record over the previous three years. 
For the unions the reduced level of disputes meant the 
opportunity to use union resources for improving other 
aspects of work conditions.
The specific character of industrial relations at the 
BOS and open hearths was, thus, a consequence of the 
nature of workplace traditions and the ways in which 
workers and managers dealt with these in a changing 
environment. This study has shown that the technology of
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the workplace and resultant workplace job regulation can 
greatly affect the choices available to managers and 
workers. The differences in workplaces also casts some 
question on the widespread assumptions that it has been 
the arbitration system has shaped workplace industrial 
relations in Australia. As Quinlan [1986] has argued the 
nature of the award system itself, as well as the recent 
award restructuring, attest to the importance of the 
tribunals for formal industrial relations processes and 
industry level industrial relations.
But like senior management policies, work-related 
elements of tribunal decisions become diluted at the 
workplace. Managers of the production unit attempt to 
meet a range of goals which come not only from the 
workplace itself but also from other areas. These may 
include engineering, budgetary, and market imperatives, as 
well as formal industrial relations policies and rules. 
Added to this the workplace technology, which influenced 
the choices available for the ways in which work might be 
organised give workplace relations their own distinctive 
features. At the open hearth in the 1970s disputes 
occurred through disruption to traditional patterns of 
work. At the BOS in the same years they occurred as part 
of the process of workers and managers defining tasks and 
agreed codes of behaviour. The form and pattern of 
workplace industrial relations was therefore an outcome of 
the special characteristics of each of the two workplaces. 
The other external variables acted upon workplace
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industrial relations, but not necessarily in the same ways 
or with the same force.
The role of NSWIC therefore was as an external variable. 
While the award set the margins for skill and rated the 
work value of partcular classifications, it neither 
regulated the tasks done by each worker, nor the relations 
within the workplace. To ascribe too much to the 
arbitration system in this case is to deflect from the 
role of managers. The arbitration system offered BHP and 
Port Kembla management a way of legitimising its 
decisions, but the decisions and the managerial codes of 
behaviour were only rarely questioned. The changing style 
of Port Kembla management after the steel crisis was much 
more a determinant of changing workplace relations than 
the role of the tribunal.
In general, scholarly analyses of plant level industrial 
relations have tended to ignore the technology and related 
work organisation at the workplace. This is partly 
because these workplace aspects can vary so greatly across 
the plant or establishment. In Australia, it has also 
been the outcome of widespread acceptance of the 
influences of the arbitration system on industrial 
relations at the shopfloor. Yet workplaces are the actual 
environments in which workers and managers operate in 
their daily work lives. It is apparent that workplace 
industrial relations constitutes something rather more 
than processes at the various points of production in a 
plant. The generalised analysis of shopfloor processes
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will undoubtedly remain important. Plant or establishment 
level industrial relations is significant and closely 
linked to the pattern of formal industrial relations 
processes.
However, this thesis has presented a case for giving 
greater import to the differences that occur at the 
different workplaces within the plant or establishment. 
To do this, it must be recognised that the workplace has 
specific characteristics which derive in large part from 
the technology. It is not simply technological 
determinism to present the case for taking the workplace 
technology into account. For the worker and the manager, 
the workplace technology and the way work is organised 
defines material circumstance of his or her daily working 
life. These influence her or his behaviour, so that to 
exclude them from analysis of what occurs in a plant or 
establishment is to ignore the very real factor of the 
technology, work and management at the workplace.
The capacity to clarify the sources of workplace 
behaviour through a focus on the particular technology and 
workplace environment is not necessarily limited to large 
scale metal processing. This sector provides most obvious 
examples simply through the magnitude of operations and 
through the sustained efforts of the large, traditional 
unions involved in metal processing. However, the 
approach can also provide insights into other areas of 
manufacturing, and into industries which provide public 
services such as transport. Like the steel industry,
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these contain work areas which are clearly self-contained 
and so generate different requirements of the workers and 
managers. In such localised environments, a generalised 
analysis will ignore salient features of management and 
worker behaviour.
As the implementation of the Steel Industry Plan 
demonstrated, policy making at the centralised level needs 
to take plant and workplace differences into account. At 
the time when the plan was being formulated, there was 
throughout Australia, a reassessment of the ways in which 
work should be reorganised to meet the demands of the 
1980s. An element of the plan, which was not fully 
addressed during its five years of operation, was the 
deregulation of work organisation. Some aspects such as 
work practices were put on the industrial relations 
agenda, but like management practices, these need to take 
the workplace into account. It is the same with the 
belief that productivity advances can be gained through 
the development of a multi-skilled workforce. In the case 
where workers are expected to hold a range of skills, the 
potential consequences for work organisation and workplace 
relations are considerable.
Many scholars and policy makers now consider reorganis­
ation of work as central to the new approaches for 
confronting economic instability and market competition. 
If this is to be the case, the nature and impact of the 
changes on workers and managers need to be fully explored 
so that the basis for work organisation is not simply
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economic rationalism. This is why the trade union 
movement will need to retain its essential role if it is 
to promote the interests of the workers not only at a 
national level, but also at the workplace.
[240]
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SELECTED YEARS, 1965 TO 1978 AND 
SIX MONTHLY, 1979 TO 1988
STEELMAKING WORKFORCE, PORT KEMBLA STEELWORKS, 
1967 TO 1985
TONNES PER STEELMAKING EMPLOYEE, PORT KEMBLA 
STEELWORKS, 1967 TO 1985
HOURS LOST THROUGH STRIKES, PER WAGES WORKER, 
PLANT AND STEELMAKING SHOPS, PORT KEMBLA 
STEELWORKS, 1966 TO 1986
WORKFORCE, PORT KEMBLA, NUMBERS EMPLOYED 
SIX MONTHLY, 1979 TO 1988
WORKFORCE, PORT KEMBLA, PER CENT CHANGE EACH 
SIX MONTHS, 1980 TO 1988
WORKFORCE REDUCTIONS BY TYPE, PORT STEELWORKS, 
IN THE YEARS 1981-4
IN THE OPEN HEARTH
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TABLE A1.2
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 1969-87 
INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 
ANNUAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATES - SELECTED AREAS 
(NATIONAL DEFINITIONS)




P . A . P . A 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
U.S.A 4.4 6.8 7.2 7.5 9.7 9.6 7.5 7.3 7.0 6.2
JAPAN 1.2 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.8 2.8
GERMANY 0.7 3.2 3.5 4.8 6.8 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.0 7.9
U.K. 3.1 4.9 7.0 10.5 11.2 11.8 11.7 11.8 11.8 10.4
EEC n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a,. n.a. 9.9 10.3 10.5 11.3 11.0
TOTAL OECD (a) 
3.0 4.9 6.3 7.0 8.4 8.8 8.4 8.3 8.3 7.9














UNEMPLOYMENT RATES -  U.S., U.K., OECD
1980 -  1987












GDP/GNP ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH








1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1956 1957
□ UNITED STATES + UNITED KINGDOM OECD
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TABLE A2.1
SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
AUSTRALIA - 1969-87
GDP AT CONS­ GDP AT CONS-
GDP AT TANT PRICES -TANT PRICES
CONSTANT BY INDUSTRY BY INDUSTRY
PRICES - MANUFACTURING - MANUF'ING
($ MILLION) ($ MILLION) (% TO TOTAL)
1969-70 86380 . 19013 4.11970-71 91236 19391 5.3
1971-72 96066 19788 5.7
1972-73 100365 20659 5.9
1973-74 104543 22055 6.2
1974-75 106621 21148 6.4
1975-76 109574 20915 5.9
1976-77 112535 21429 6.4
1977-78 113508 21345 6.4
1978-79 119327 22200 6.2
1979-80 121349 23157 5.9
1980-81 124791 23640 5.8
1981-82 127447 24159 5.6
1982-83 126209 22255 6.0
1983-84 132625 22545 6.2
1984-85 139628 23724 6.5
1985-86 145904 24817 7.1
1986-87 148959




SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS - (B) 
AUSTRALIA - 1967 to 1986
AUSTRALIA -
AUSTRALIA AUSTRALIA AUSTRALIA RATES OF RET']
INDUSTRIAL INDUSTRIAL CPI ON CAPITAL -
EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT MANUFACTURING
(000) (% CHANGE) (% CHANGE) (% PER ANNUM)
1967 1828 2.0 3.4 21.8
1968 1866 2.1 2.7 21.8
1969 1907 2.2 2.9 21.0
1970 1963 2.9 3.9 21.1
1971 2027 3.3 5.9 18.3
1972 1975 -2.6 5.8 19.2
1973 2054 4.0 9.6 20.2
1974 2058 0.2 15.1 14.0
1975 1959 -4.8 15.0 22.0
1976 1959 0.0 13.6 25.4
1977 1945 -0.7 12.2 20.7
1978 1875 -3.6 8.0 15.6
1979 1898 1.2 9.0 10.9
1980 1939 2.2 10.1 10.6
1981 1935 -0.2 9.7 13.9
1982 1883 -2.7 11.1 16.0
1983 1750 -7.1 10.2 17.7
1984 1806 3.2 3.9 16.0
1985 1846 2.2 6.7 15.5
1986 1861 0.8 9.1 13.6
Reserve Bank of Australia, Australian Economic 















INDEX OF MANUFACTURING GROSS PRODUCT 
AT AVERAGE 1979-80 PRICES 
BY SELECTED INDUSTRIES & TOTAL MANUFACTURING 
1976/7 TO 1986/7
(BASE 1979-80 = 1000)
BASIC TRANSPORT FABRICATED TOTALMETAL EQUIPMENT METAL MANUFACT­PRODUCTS PRODUCTS URING
820 958 904 915823 881 914 918922 1024 942 9731000 1000 1000 1000945 986 1043 1007888 1119 1063 1027700 866 908 913750 898 837 927758 998 883 947793 1051 960 991797 924 993 990











INDEX OF GROSS MANUF. PRODUCT
METALS 1 9 7 6 /7  TO 1 9 8 6 /7  (1 9 7 9 /8 0  = 1 0 0 0 )
□ eASIC METAL INDEX + FA8. METAL INDEX
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TABLE A3.1
SELECTED ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL STEEL MARKET 
PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 
1967-87
(MILLION TONNES INGOT EQUIVALENTS)
APP CONS CRUDE STEEL APP CONS CRUDE STEEL CRUDE STEELYEAR OTHER ASIA PART ASIA OECD OECD
(PRODUC'N)
WORLD
(PRODUC'N)1967 12.53 7.42 311.58 324.51 496.99
1969 14.17 7.85 367.20 383.38 574.64
1971 16.34 7.96 348.48 368.04 582.44
1973 21.17 9.99 430.35 456.57 697.19
1975 21.73 12.47 348.27 383.93 643.44
1977 30.39 18.26 367.10 392.38 675.77
1979 36.57 23.04 406.09 433.58 746.44
1981 41.22 26.77 372.27 392.39 707.14
1983 42.53 29.64 324.47 336.60 663.25
1985 47.10 34.50 357.40 365.50 720.60
1987 57.60 40.10 366.70 351.90 737.40
APP. CONS. - APPARENT CONSUMPTION
SOURCE: OECD, The Iron and Steel Industry (various years) 
OECD, World Steel Trade Developments, 1960-1983
TABLE A3.2
INTERNATIONAL STEEL INDUSTRY 
"MANPOWER" - AVERAGE NUMBERS EMPLOYED 
SELECTED REGIONS & WORLD 
SELECTED YEARS - 1974 TO 1987 
(000)
1974 1980 1984 1987
EEC (10) 800.4 644.9 464.2 385.7
EEC(12) 894.8 737.4 540.1 439.1
U.K. 197.7 133.4 62.3 55.1
U.S 521.4 428.4 268.1 210.0
FRANCE 155.7 113.6 87.1 62.9
GERMANY 230.6 201.0 156.5 137.3
JAPAN 323.9 271.0 264.8 232.3
AUSTRALIA 43.2 44.5 30.5 29.1
WORLD 1991.7 1673.0 1269.2 1067.0
SOURCE: OECD , THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY, (varL
TABLE A3.3
INTERNATIONAL STEEL INDUSTRY 
"MANPOWER" - PER CENT CHANGES IN STEEL EMPLOYMENT 
SELECTED REGIONS & WORLD 
SELECTED PERIODS - 1974 TO 1987 
(% CHANGE)
CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE
1974-80 1980-84 1974-84 1984-7 1974-87
EEC (10) -19.4% -28.0% -42.0% -16.9% -51.8%
EEC(12) -17.6% -26.8% -39.6% -18.7% -50.9%
U.K. -32.5% -53.3% -68.5% -11.6% -72.1%
U.S -17.8% -37.4% -48.6% -21.7% -59.7%
FRANCE -27.0% -23.3% -44.1% -27.8% -59.6%
GERMANY -12.8% -22.1% -32.1% -12.3% -40.5%
JAPAN -16.3% -2.3% -18.2% -12.3% -28.3%
AUSTRALIA 3.0% -31.5% -29.4% -4.6% -32.6%
WORLD -16.0% -24.1% -36.3% -15.9% -46.4%
SOURCE: OECD, THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY, (various)
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TABLE A3.4
AUSTRALIAN STEEL PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 
1966/7 TO 1985/6
AUSTRALIAN IMPORTS EXPORTS AUSTRALIA
PRODUCTION (INGOT TNNE (INGOT TNNE PER CAPITA
(INGOT TNNE) - EQUIV) - EQUIV) CONSUMPTION
(OOO) (OOO) (OOO) (KILOGRAMS)
1966/67 6144 331 1521 425
1967/68 6396 443 1219 471
1968/69 6702 589 1460 479
1969/70 6874 458 1495 469
1970/71 6795 885 721 549
1971/72 6579 801 1070 483
1972/73 7233 663 1807 458
1973/74 7705 1237 1586 545
1974/75 8017 887 2284 483
1975/76 7822 504 2734 404
1976/77 7550 671 3208 358
1977/78 7445 695 3133 353
1978/79 7587 . 605 2908 369
1979/80 7918 582 2116 437
1980/81 7906 886 1845 469
1981/82 7247 1065 1770 435
1982/83 5378 987 1725 304
1983/84 6155 808 1274 368
1984/85 6311 900 1508 364
1985/86 6158 910 1731 337




AUSTRALIAN STEEL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
1 9 6 6 /7  TO 1 9 8 5 /6
□ IMPORTS +  EXPORTS
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TABLE A4.I
PORT KEMBLA STEELWORKS 
WORKFORCE
SELECTED YEARS, 1965 -1978 
and SIX MONTHLY, NOVEMBER 1979 TO NOVEMBER 1988
AVERAGE: WORKFORCE








AVERAGE: WORKFORCE PER CENT
SIX MONTHS PORT KEMBLA CHANGE ON
PREV. 6 MTHS
NOV 1979 19979
MAY 1980 20379 2.00%
NOV 1980 20388 0.04%
MAY 1981 20379 -0.04%
NOV 1981 19960 -2.06%
MAY 1982 19538 -2.11%
NOV 1982 16575 -15.17%
MAY 1983 14449 -12.83%
NOV 1983 13813 -4.40%
MAY 1984 13330 -3.50%
NOV 1984 12957 -2.80%
MAY 1985 12964 0.05%
NOV 1985 12891 -0.56%
MAY 1986 12943 0.40%
NOV 1986 12878 -0.50%
MAY 1987 12918 0.31%
NOV 1987 12512 -3.14%
MAY 1988 11670 -6.73%
NOV 1988 10577 -9.37%
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BOS, OPEN HEARTH & ALL PORT KEMBLA











WORKFORCE -  PORT KEMBLA STEELWORKS









WORKFORCE -  PORT KEMBLA STEELWORKS
NUMBER EMPLOYED, 1979 -1 9 8 8 , SIX MTHLY
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GRAPH A4.6
WORKFORCE REDUCTIONS, PORT KEMBLA
SEPTEMBER 1981 -  NOVEMBER 1985
VOL RESIG'N (58 .5 /
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APPENDIX 5:
PAY DETERMINATION IN TOE OPEN HEARTH
The internal u/age structure at the open hearth was derived 
from the original BHP wage structure set from the beginnings 
of the Newcastle steelworks in 1915. It also reflected the 
role of tribunals in Australian wage determination system. 
There were five elements in the pay of a worker in the open 
hearth. Most remain today, albeit slightly modified. Some of 
these elements were based on workers* skills or activities in 
the workplace, while others were based on wider considerations 
external to the workplace. The effect of such a complicated 
wage structure on industrial relations was that it offered a 
potential for conflict. This was less likely at the open 
hearth where technology and work relations were relatively 
stable.
The first element of a steelworker's pay was a basic wage 
which has been indexed, not to CPI but to an index which left 
out many items which are in the currently accepted CPI 
package. As a consequence of this the steel “basic wage" has 
been a decreasing proportion of the steelworkers' wage.
The second element was the margin for skill. This element 
had been originally determined through the first BHP Newcastle 
award in 1915. [Wright, 1988] The Port Kembla award has been 
separate from the Newcastle award for many years but in many 
respects the margins for skill remained similar for equivalent 
classifications at each plant. Where differences arose it was 
presented as a consequence of differences in technology,
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equipment size, or work conditions at the two plants. In the 
open hearths there were over forty different ironworker 
classifications but these were grouped in sixteen different 
major bands for the purposes of award negotiation. At Port 
Kembla, as in all BHP plants awards, margin increases were 
achieved through conciliation and arbitration until 1972 when 
this policy was rejected in favour of consent awards. From 
this time some differences in margins at the BHP plants began 
to appear. However, as this was also a rather hectic era in 
Australian wage determination, it is difficult to identify how 
significant the move away from the more legalistic forms was 
as a factor in these changes. Certainly at the open hearth 
some significant differences in skill margins began to appear. 
The margin of the floor labourer, the lowest paid ironworker 
classification, rose very rapidly from a little over 20% of 
the first helper's margin to over 60% in less than five years. 
On the other hand the total wage (basic wage + margin) of the 
floor labourer remained an almost constant proportion of the 
1st helper's throughout the period 1958 - 82. [Calculated 
from rates of pay in awards: Steelworks Employees (Broken Hill 
Proprietary company Limited) and, from 1968, Iron and Steel 
Works Employees (Australian Iron & Steel Pty Limited - Port 
Kembla)]
However, there were three more elements of wage 
determination in an open hearth wages worker's pay • 
Allowances and special rates were embedded in the award and 
had been increased to a fair degree during the the postwar 
era. For open hearth non-trade trained production workers,
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special rates u/ere applied mainly to shift work. The 
tradesmen, whose wages were determined in a slightly different 
manner, had a little more to gain from special rates which 
were added to wages. They were defined in terms of hot, dirty 
and high work. However these were not especially generous, 
providing only 6c per hour in 1969 for work done at over 15 
metres. Rates for hot work on the other hand is allowed where 
temperatures exceed 49 degrees or 1206 Fahrenheit. Such 
temperatures were common in the summer. However in some cases 
there was no penalty payment for these events for production 
workers in the open hearth, since it was considered that rates 
for these were incorporated in the margins. As a consequence, 
old-timers interviewed who considered themselves unwilling 
conscripts into the union, recollect with some glee being 
willing strikers if the the weather was very hot.
More important in open hearth wage determination, and the 
most specific to the individual workplace were bonuses and 
overtim Bonuses were set by management in each department 
according to the perceived input of each worker's job in 
producing the specific output of the dept. • A department's 
bonus was based on a "setting" which was the key rate for the 
whole dept. It included the minimum output required for all 
workers to receive their particular bonus. Thus the key rate 
varied from workplace to workplace. The employee 
classification that was the key rate received a specific 
percentage of the bonus, if production targets were reached 
and more if they were exceeded. All other employees received 
a percentage that was tied to the key rate. Steelmaking
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bonuses tended to be higher than most. As a result they 
formed a significant proportion of the steelworker's pay. The 
open hearth bonuses were completely revised in 1979 when 
management identified a range of anomalies as a result of the 
incremental technological changes which had occurred over many 
years. As was the case in most workplaces, the unions and 
workers could make representations over bonus levels for each 
worker, but bonus settings were unusual in that they were 
entirely at management's prerogative.
At the 1970 steel holiday pay case, [In re Steelworks 
Employees (BHP P/L) Award and others, Decision, June 12 1970] 
for example, the company defined bonuses "in the Oxford 
dictionary sense of a boon or gift over what is normally due, 
a gratuity to workmen beyond their wages." [NSWIC, Industrial 
Reports, 1970, 141-2] It is worth noting that in the early 
1970s, when labour demand was very high, bonuses were 
mentioned as an enticement for potential workers.
The fifth element of a steelworker's wages was overtime 
which again was at the company's prerogative. Overtime was 
administered from the workplace. Linked to overtime, it is 
important to recognise that different forms of rosters were 
set at each workplace. While the open hearth was operated on 
the basis of three eight hour shifts per day, seven days per
week, the rosters for shift crews were, to a novice,
surprisingly complex affairs. There were least a dozen
varieties of shift rosters extant at any one time. From the
worker's perspective some rosters were preferable to others 
because of the easier availability of overtime. Some of the
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very feu; disputes in the open hearth in the 1970s were linked 
to roster changes. When examined in closer detail problems 
with rosters were often related to changing expectations of 
overtime availability.
Overtime was allotted by the General Foreman in consultation 
with his foremen in specific areas and shifts. This meant 
that overtime pay depended a great deal on an employee's 
standing within the workplace. In some cases overtime was 
determined on a very subjective basis indeed. For example, in 
some workplaces, footballers were given preference either in 
the timing or the availability of overtime. This was 
certainly frequently recalled by those interviewees who had 
been employed in the open hearths in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. However overtime availability was also subject to
company rulings. It was BHP policy for example that no 
overtime should be available to employees who had taken part 
in a strike in the previous two weeks. Conversely unions 
such as the AMWU introduced counter-bans on overtime as a way 
to induce the company to desist from such industrial relations 
tactics. [Interviews, former employees]
The total pay thus consisted of five elements, each 
determined separately, except in the case of award 
negotiations, when the "basic" wage and margins were
determined. These five elements are set out below. They 
refer to Newcastle steelworks, but these would have been 
little different to Port Kembla as the latter had only gained 
a separate award the previous year.
TABLE 6.1
Makeup of average weekly earnings for two
[266]







MARGIN 17.50 0.19 6.00 0.08
BONUS 19.03 0.21 12.42 0.16
OVERTIME 5.13 0.06 7.30 0.10
W 1 END 8.14 0.09 7.61 0.10
SHIFT PEN 3.06 0.03 3.06 0.04
TOTAL AVGE E 91.96 100.00 75.49 100.00
Source: NSWIC (plus allowances for hot, dirty, high, wet, work 
or doing higher job. not significant e.g. high work at 6.6C 
per hour) This pay rate contrasts with a national AWE of 
$85.91.
Thus a highly skilled OPERATOR at Newcastle, a job which 
parallelled the first helper at Port Kembla received almost 
the national average without overtime. Given the seniority, 
skills, and working conditions of these workers, it appears 
that unlike their American counterparts, the Australian 
steelworker was not particularly highly paid.
From the perspective of workplace industrial relations it is 
noteworthy that at least 25% of workers' pay in steelmaking 
was directly workplace based, with margins as an indirect 
outcome of workplace decisions to allocate particular workers 
to particular jobs.
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title)
A NOTE ON PRIMARY SOURCES
1. As noted in the Acknowledgements much of the anecdotal and 
qualitative evidence was derived from formal interviews and 
informal conversations with many current and former employees 
from the Port Kembla steelworks. Apart from those persons 
cited in the Acknowledgements, some other interviewees were 
promised full confidentiality. Others provided information 
simply in the course of informal discussions, such that it is 
not appropriate to cite them. Where necessary, as in 
descriptions of work or relations between different levels of 
employees, anecdotal evidence was cross-checked with other 
employees and/or in NSWIC documents (See Section iii below) 
and/or in material provided by the unions. Approximately 
fifteen people from the steelmaking work areas were 
interviewed formally, of whom about ten had reached the level 
of foreman, either at the time of interview or at the time 
they left the steelworks. The remainder of interviewees had 
come from levels above foreman. Several industrial officers 
provided other useful anecdotal material.
2. The source of some company data is not specifically identified 
since it was provided to me as handwritten or typed 
information extracted by the informant from the records. 
Quantitative data of this kind, such as BOS and open hearth 
employment statistics, came from the steelworks' six-monthly 
reports which are comprehensive documents detailing a large 
range of data from each workplace and department. Data on 
strikes and disputes, including in many cases descriptions of 
causes and sequences of events, came from company industrial 
reports which are not readily available, or from a strike 
database. As far as possible, again within the bounds of the 
confidentiality undertaken and promised the researcher, 
sources of company data are specifically identified.
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SELECTED NEW SOUTH WALES INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CASES GERMANE TO 
THIS THESIS
(t) Transcript; (d) Decision; (a) Application
*. No 360 of 1971 Re Steel Works Employees Au/ard (Broken Hill 
Proprietary Company Limited) Award and other award, re an 
application by the FIA of Australia, New South Wales Division, 
for new awards, 15 October 1971. (a)
*. No 686 of 1987, re Iron and Steel Works Employees (AI&S P/L - 
Port Kembla) Award, Application by AI&S P/L “for variation re 
margins for furnace Attendant and Charging Floor Attendant, 9 
September, 1987. (d)
*. No 774 of 1979, Application by the FIA (NSW Division) for
variation of Steel Works Employees (BHP Co. Limited) Award and 
other awards for variation re wages and other matters, 17 April 
1980. (d)
*. No 463 of 1982, Application by FIA of NSW and others for
variation of Steel Works Employees (BHP Co. Limited) Award and 
other awards, 2 July 1982. (d)
*. Nos 648 and 803 of 1981, (Stand-down & Manning dispute) 
Notifications under Sec.25A By AI&S and FIA re dispute at Bloom 
Rail and Continuous Mills, 2 July, 1982
*. No 854 of 1982, FIA (NSW Division) and BHP Co P/L & others, re 
Steel Works Employees (BHP Co. Limited) Award and other awards, 
re redundancy, 25 October, 1982.
*. No 429 of 1974, re Steel Works Employees (BHP Co. Limited)
Award and other awards, re variation of award, 4 December 1974 
and earlier. (t) (d)
*. No 155 of 1972, re Webb & AI&S P/L, Application for Award or 
Order of Reinstatement by FIA, NSW Division, 13 June, 1972.
*. No 766 of 1980, re Iron and Steel works Employees (AI&S P/L) 
Award, re Application by FIA NSW Division for variation re 
margins (BOS), 29 April 1980. (t) (d)
*. No 131 of 1972, re Dispute - AI&S P/L, re stand-down of 
Bricklayers (No 1), June 27 1972. (d)
*. No 774 of 1979, Steel Works Employees (BHP Company Limited), and 
other awards, re Application by FIA for variation of award, 
(work value), 17 April, 1979. (t)
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*. Nos 648 and 803 of 1981, re Dispute - AI&S P/L and FIA - re 
stand-downs at Bloom Rail and Continuous Mill, 2 July 1972.
*. In re Steel Works Employees (BHP Company Limited), and another 
Award, - in rescinding and replacing current awards, December 18 
1968. (new AI&S Award) (d)
* • In r e Steel Works Employees (BHP Company Limited), and another 
Award, re matters relating to sick pay and holiday pay, June 12 
1970.
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